CTIPilot

WinRAR path-traversal (referenced as initial-access exploit in Gamaredon GammaPhish/GammaWorm campaign, Sekoia 2026-06-01)

cve · CVE-2025-8088

Coverage timeline
3
first 2026-06-02 → last 2026-06-28
Peak priority
notable
3 notable
Sources cited
13
7 hosts
Sections touched
2
deep-dive, research
Co-occurring entities
2
see Co-occurring entities below
ATT&CK techniques
19
pinned v19.2 · see below

ATT&CK techniques

19 techniques observed across 3 entries, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1091Replication Through Removable Media×1

Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×1

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.005Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic×1

Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as Component Object Model and the Native API through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/year-old-winrar-flaw-cve-2025-8088-still-fuels-ukraine-intru · ATT&CK page ↗

T1203Exploitation for Client Execution×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution×1

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×3

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · 2026-06-10/year-old-winrar-flaw-cve-2025-8088-still-fuels-ukraine-intru · 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution×1

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×3

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · 2026-06-10/year-old-winrar-flaw-cve-2025-8088-still-fuels-ukraine-intru · 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

T1480Execution Guardrails×1

Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.004Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes×1

Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. Within MFT entries are file attributes, such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files).

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/year-old-winrar-flaw-cve-2025-8088-still-fuels-ukraine-intru · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1080Taint Shared Content×1

Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

T1091Replication Through Removable Media×1

Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×1

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071Application Layer Protocol×1

Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/sekoia-consolidates-gamaredon-tooling-under-gammaphish-gamma · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-27Turla's STOCKSTAY: a four-component .NET backdoor for diplomatic intelligence collection
    deep-dive
  2. 2026-06-10Year-old WinRAR flaw (CVE-2025-8088) still fuels Ukraine intrusions, GIFTEDCROOK via UAC-0226 and an Earth Dahu chain
    research
  3. 2026-06-02Sekoia consolidates Gamaredon tooling under GammaPhish / GammaWorm, details an NTFS-ADS USB+network worm
    research

Where this entity is cited

  • research2
  • deep-dive1

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org5 (38%)
  • thehackernews.com3 (23%)
  • blog.sekoia.io1 (8%)
  • cloud.google.com1 (8%)
  • infosecurity-magazine.com1 (8%)
  • therecord.media1 (8%)
  • trendmicro.com1 (8%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

External references

NVD · cve.org · CISA KEV

All cited sources (13)

Entries about WinRAR path-traversal (referenced as initial-access exploit in Gamaredon GammaPhish/GammaWorm campaign, Sekoia 2026-06-01) (3)

2026-06-27 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2025-8088exploited

Turla's STOCKSTAY: a four-component .NET backdoor for diplomatic intelligence collection

Background. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG, formerly Mandiant) published a full technical analysis of STOCKSTAY on 2026-06-25, a modular .NET backdoor it attributes with high confidence to Turla (also tracked as Secret Blizzard, SUMMIT and FSB Center 16) with activity dating to December 2022 (Google Cloud / GTIG, 2026-06-25). GTIG ties STOCKSTAY to Turla's long-running Kazuar implant lineage through shared code: the K1MORPHER Squirrel3-based string obfuscator Turla introduced in April 2025, identical environmental-keying logic, and the same component-separation design pattern, placing this tool in the same toolset GTIG and others have tracked across European diplomatic targeting for years (The Record, 2026-06-26). Primary targets are Ukrainian government and military organisations and European entities with Italian foreign-policy interests.

Architecture and mechanics. STOCKSTAY is partitioned into four .NET assemblies that communicate over Windows WM_COPYDATA inter-process messages, deliberately decoupling the network layer from command execution. MARKETMAKER is the downloader/installer that establishes Registry Run-key persistence masquerading as MicrosoftUpdateOneDrive (T1547.001); STOCKMARKET ("cor") is the orchestrator that generates a 4096-bit RSA key pair on first run; STOCKBROKER ("net") is a proxy-aware WebSocket tunneller built on the open-source websocket-sharp library; and STOCKTRADER ("sys") is the backdoor executor supporting 13 commands (directory listing, file get/put, process execution, registry read/write/delete, screenshot capture, WMI-based system reconnaissance, archive unpacking, and self-destruct). Configuration is AES-encrypted using hostname/domain-name environmental keying (T1480) once past the reconnaissance phase, so the payload will not decrypt or execute off-target, a standard Turla anti-analysis measure.

Command-and-control. C2 responses are wrapped in an RSA-4096-encrypted "CryptoContainer" JSON structure and tunnelled over encrypted WebSocket sessions hosted on legitimate PaaS platforms (Render.com, Glitch) (T1071.001). The controller (a Python Tornado WebSocket server storing victim data in a SQLite database) was found in a public GitHub repository, and the use of third-party PaaS prevents the platform operator from introspecting the encrypted traffic. The implant enforces working hours (09:00–18:00, Mon–Fri) to blend with normal activity.

Delivery / kill chain. Initial access is via spearphishing (T1566.001/.002) using diplomatic-themed lures (drone content, military logistics, diplomatic-education platforms), with malicious RDP configuration files and RAR archives exploiting WinRAR path traversal CVE-2025-8088 for code drop, followed by MSI/HTA execution. STOCKSTAY is then installed, keys to its environment, establishes Run-key persistence, and beacons out over PaaS-hosted WebSockets, staging the operator's interactive command set (T1059) for collection (T1005) and exfiltration over the C2 channel (T1041). GTIG notes deployment alongside other confirmed Turla tools (WILDDAY, DIAMONDBACK).

Detection concepts (no IOCs). Alert on outbound WebSocket connections to *.onrender.com / *.glitch.me from non-browser processes; WM_COPYDATA messages between unrelated processes in EDR telemetry (Sysmon EID 8/10 process-injection/access correlation); Registry Run-key creation pointing at user-space paths masquerading as Microsoft/OneDrive updaters (Sysmon EID 13 / Windows EID 4657); LNK or RDP-config writes into staging directories (Sysmon EID 11); and the WinRAR CVE-2025-8088 exploitation pattern (archive extraction writing files outside the target directory). GTIG published YARA and Google SecOps detection rules with the report.

Hardening / mitigation. Patch WinRAR to 7.11+ to close CVE-2025-8088; enable AMSI and ETW for .NET assemblies and block the AppDomainManager-hijack DLL-placement path; apply GPO to restrict RDP-config auto-connection; and where not operationally required, block Render/Glitch WebSocket egress at the perimeter for diplomat and ministry workstations. For Swiss federal and cantonal foreign-affairs, defence and diplomatic environments, the named Italian-foreign-policy targeting puts this squarely in scope.

Background.

ctipilot v2 brief (migrated)
vulnerability27 Jun 05:17Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-10 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2025-8088exploited

Year-old WinRAR flaw (CVE-2025-8088) still fuels Ukraine intrusions, GIFTEDCROOK via UAC-0226 and an Earth Dahu chain

Trend Micro documents two Russia-aligned campaigns still exploiting CVE-2025-8088 (a path traversal via NTFS Alternate Data Streams in WinRAR patched in July 2025) nearly a year after the fix (Trend Micro, 2026-06-08). SHADOW-EARTH-066 (UAC-0226) delivers GIFTEDCROOK via crafted RAR archives with decoy PDFs and hidden ADS payloads that extract to the Startup folder and run in-memory PowerShell DLL loaders to steal passwords, cookies and documents from Chrome, Edge, Opera and Firefox; a separate Earth Dahu chain uses an HTA-to-VBScript dropper (The Hacker News, 2026-06-09). Both actors moved C2 off Telegram to dedicated servers after Russia's February 2026 Telegram block. The defender lesson is the persistence of an exploited entry point in unmanaged software: hunt wscript.exe/mshta.exe spawned from archive-extraction events, Startup-folder writes (Sysmon EID 11), and PowerShell script-block logging (EID 4104) for in-memory reflection. CVE-2025-8088 affects any unpatched WinRAR globally; ensure deployed versions are current (T1059.005, T1547.001, T1555.003).

Trend Micro documents two Russia-aligned campaigns still exploiting CVE-2025-8088 (a path traversal via NTFS Alternate Data Streams in WinRAR patched in July 2025) nearly a year after the fix (Trend Micro, 2026-06-08).

ctipilot v2 brief (migrated)
research10 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-02 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2025-8088exploitedupdatedNATOB2

Sekoia consolidates Gamaredon tooling under GammaPhish / GammaWorm, details an NTFS-ADS USB+network worm

Sekoia's Threat Detection & Research team published part one of a Gamaredon (UAC-0010 / ACTINIUM, attributed to Russia's FSB) series describing a January 2026 campaign against Ukrainian government and military targets, introducing unified naming for two capability clusters: GammaPhish (the funnel from spearphishing through GammaLoad deployment) and GammaWorm (the propagation layer, subsuming the tooling previously tracked as LitterDrifter / PteroLNK) (Sekoia TDR, 2026-06-01 · Infosecurity Magazine, 2026-06-01). The chain begins with weaponised xHTML files exploiting CVE-2025-8088 (the WinRAR path-traversal flaw) to drop HTA payloads into Windows Startup directories via mshta.exe. GammaWorm itself is a 20,000+-line obfuscated VBScript worm that persists via scheduled tasks and RunOnce/Run registry keys, hides components in NTFS Alternate Data Streams, propagates across USB and mapped network drives using Ukrainian-language lures, and resolves C2 through dead-drop resolvers on Telegram, Telegra.ph, Teletype.in, Supabase and Cloudflare Workers.

Why it matters to us: The ADS-hiding + removable-media propagation + legitimate-service dead-drop pattern is highly transferable to any EU public-sector estate. Hunt for mshta.exe spawning wscript.exe, large obfuscated VBScripts executing from %APPDATA%, scheduled tasks with randomised GUID names pointing into user-profile paths, ADS on %TEMP%/%APPDATA% files, and outbound HTTPS to Telegra.ph / Supabase / Workers endpoints from non-developer hosts.

This archive exploits the CVE-2025-8088 vulnerability to extract a hidden HTA file directly into the user’s Windows Startup directory. Upon execution, the HTA file leverages mshta.exe to call a remote payload hosted on a C2 server.

Forensic analysis of compromised hosts revealed a highly obfuscated VBScript worm. It establishes persistence via scheduled tasks and actively conceals its core modules within NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS).

Sekoia TDR
Updaterun 2026-06-03-ee0eae61actionscvesevidenceregionssourcestagsbody

Sekoia TDR's "FSB's Matryoshka" series adds material technical detail to the Gamaredon (UAC-0010 / ACTINIUM) tooling consolidation covered yesterday: the group is exploiting the WinRAR path-traversal flaw CVE-2025-8088 as an initial-access vector, using the traversal to write payloads directly into %APPDATA%\…\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ for persistence without a Registry or Scheduled-Task artefact (Sekoia TDR, 2026-06-01).

The series also names GammaSteel, a modular file-stealer (consolidating prior QuietSieve/HarvesterX-class modules) that captures files by extension and (newly) exfiltrates to attacker-controlled S3-compatible cloud storage in addition to Gamaredon's previously documented HTTP/Telegram channels (The Hacker News, 2026-06-02). The full chain runs WinRAR archive → GammaPhish (HTA) → GammaLoad (VBScript downloader) → GammaWorm/GammaSteel.

Delta for defenders: CVE-2025-8088 is fixed in WinRAR 7.13 (August 2025), so the entry vector is closed by patching, inventory WinRAR versions across the estate. Hunt for archive utilities writing executables or .vbs into Programs\Startup paths (Sysmon EID 11 on target path containing Programs\Startup), WinRAR spawning wscript.exe/mshta.exe, and VBScript processes making outbound requests to S3 endpoints inconsistent with normal business traffic. The targeting is Ukraine-centric, but the WinRAR vector reaches any organisation that opens archive-format lures.

Improvementrun 2026-08-30T1312Z-auditactionsclassificationtechniquesevidence

Three things on this entry are now right that were not.

It carries a source-reliability rating it predated: B2. Sekoia TDR is an original research lab, and the two outlets alongside it republish that report rather than assessing the campaign independently, so corroboration does not lift the credibility number.

Its cited evidence was wrong. The single evidence record reproduced an earlier summary of this entry's own update and attributed it to a publisher that never wrote it. It is replaced with two passages quoted directly from Sekoia's report: "This archive exploits the CVE-2025-8088 vulnerability to extract a hidden HTA file directly into the user's Windows Startup directory. Upon execution, the HTA file leverages mshta.exe to call a remote payload hosted on a C2 server", and "Forensic analysis of compromised hosts revealed a highly obfuscated VBScript worm. It establishes persistence via scheduled tasks and actively conceals its core modules within NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS)" (Sekoia TDR, 2026-06-01).

Its ATT&CK mapping was empty despite a body describing a full chain, so nothing in this entry reached the technique matrix or the actor profile. It now maps the WinRAR exploitation, the Startup-folder and scheduled-task persistence, the Alternate Data Stream concealment, the dead-drop resolvers on legitimate web services (the exact sub-technique, not the parent web-service class), the tainting of USB and network-drive content, and the script obfuscation. No claim in the analysis changed.

research02 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗