2026-09-08NOTABLEA Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented commodity ransomware in the same window
Kimsuky
actor · actor:kimsuky single-source
North Korea-aligned APT conducting credential-theft and espionage operations against South Korean and European targets; 2026 reporting (Kaspersky GReAT, May 2026) documents a Rust-based HelloDoor backdoor, the HTTPSpy RAT, PebbleDash toolkit evolution and TryCloudflare/VS Code tunnel C2.
Aliases: Ruby Sleet, APT43, Velvet Chollima
Coverage
5
4 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-05-17 → last 2026-09-08
Latest activity
2026-09-08
A Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented…
Peak priority
notable
4 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, defense, healthcare · regions: apac, europe, dach
Sources cited
8
7 hosts
2026-05-175 appearances2026-09-08
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Kimsuky, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Hunt for Kimsuky's TryCloudflare-tunnel C2 pattern on government / defence / healthcare endpoints. Alert on outbound2026-05-17Kaspersky GReAT documents Kimsuky's Rust-based…
*.trycloudflare.comconnections that don't correlate with a developer's legitimate Cloudflare-tunnel usage profile; review VSCode tunnel authentications via GitHub for unrecognised tunnel names; flag Rust-compiled PE images loading from non-standard paths. The German targeting documented in Kaspersky's report is the closest geographic-proximity Kimsuky signal to Swiss government estate in recent reporting. Reference: § 3 Kimsuky item.
Defender insights
What each entry about Kimsuky tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
attributed activity
Story timeline
Every entry that names Kimsuky, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-09-08Sekoia and Kudelski Security split the 'Lazarus umbrella' into six named DPRK clusters, and document two of them adopting commodity ransomware-as-a-service within two months of each other
- 2026-09-07"ted backdoor" and curlRAT, a DPRK-nexus actor recompiles a victim's own HAProxy source tree to hide C2 inside the load balancer's self-reported connection statistics
- 2026-09-03Kimsuky's seafood-invoice LNK campaign abuses Backblaze B2 cloud storage as C2 and exfiltration infrastructure, keyed by victim BIOS serial number
- 2026-05-30Kimsuky (Velvet Chollima) deploys HTTPSpy RAT and Rust-based HelloDoor via VS Code Remote Tunnel and Cloudflare Quick Tunnel C2
- 2026-05-17Kaspersky GReAT documents Kimsuky's Rust-based HelloDoor and TryCloudflare-tunnel C2 added to the PebbleDash toolkit
Hunting pivots
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (16 across 7 tactics)
16 techniques observed across 4 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · User Execution: Malicious File
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading · Indicator Removal: File Deletion
- DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery · Process Discovery · System Information Discovery
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Proxy: External Proxy · Web Service
- ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Financial Theft
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×2
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×2
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036Masquerading×1
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1016.001System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery×1
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1057Process Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1082System Information Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071Application Layer Protocol×1
Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1
Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗
T1657Financial Theft×1
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Kimsuky (4)
Earlier coverage (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- thehackernews.com2 (25%)
- asec.ahnlab.com1 (12%)
- enki.co.kr1 (12%)
- kudelskisecurity.com1 (12%)
- rapid7.com1 (12%)
- securelist.com1 (12%)
- sekoia.com1 (12%)
All cited sources (8)
- asec.ahnlab.comAhnLab ASEChttps://asec.ahnlab.com/en/95217/
- enki.co.krENKI WhiteHathttps://www.enki.co.kr/en/media-center/blog/kimsuky-s-advanced-attack-techniques-jsonping-webex-spoofing-and-a-new-httpspy-variant
- kudelskisecurity.comKudelski Security (Switzerland)https://kudelskisecurity.com/research/beyond-lazarus-organization-of-dprk-cyber-capabilities
- rapid7.comRapid7 Labshttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-dprk-apts-ted-backdoor-curlrat-target-south-korean-media-automotive-sectors/
- securelist.comKaspersky Securelist, 2026-05-14https://securelist.com/kimsuky-appleseed-pebbledash-campaigns/119785/
- sekoia.comSekoiahttps://www.sekoia.com/blog/beyond-lazarus-organization-of-dprk-cyber-capabilities
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/kimsuky-deploys-httpspy-expands-arsenal.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/09/new-ted-backdoor-hides-inside-victims.html