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Kimsuky

actor · actor:kimsuky single-source

North Korea-aligned APT conducting credential-theft and espionage operations against South Korean and European targets; 2026 reporting (Kaspersky GReAT, May 2026) documents a Rust-based HelloDoor backdoor, the HTTPSpy RAT, PebbleDash toolkit evolution and TryCloudflare/VS Code tunnel C2.

Aliases: Ruby Sleet, APT43, Velvet Chollima

Coverage
5
4 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-05-17 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-09-08
A Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented…
Peak priority
notable
4 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, defense, healthcare · regions: apac, europe, dach
Sources cited
8
7 hosts
2026-05-175 appearances2026-09-08

Defender insights

What each entry about Kimsuky tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-09-08NOTABLEA Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented commodity ransomware in the same window

2026-09-03NOTABLEThe command-and-control channel is a legitimate cloud storage API, not a registered domain

Triage

2026-05-17NOTABLEKaspersky: Kimsuky's new PebbleDash backdoors hide C2 behind tunnels and take over hosts through VSCode Remote Tunnels

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names Kimsuky, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-09-08Sekoia and Kudelski Security split the 'Lazarus umbrella' into six named DPRK clusters, and document two of them adopting commodity ransomware-as-a-service within two months of each other
    researchA Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented commodity ransomware in the same window
  2. 2026-09-07"ted backdoor" and curlRAT, a DPRK-nexus actor recompiles a victim's own HAProxy source tree to hide C2 inside the load balancer's self-reported connection statistics
    mentionactive-threatsRapid7 finds a DPRK-nexus implant that falsifies HAProxy's own traffic counters so its command-and-control never appears in the load balancer's own logs
  3. 2026-09-03Kimsuky's seafood-invoice LNK campaign abuses Backblaze B2 cloud storage as C2 and exfiltration infrastructure, keyed by victim BIOS serial number
    active-threatsThe command-and-control channel is a legitimate cloud storage API, not a registered domain
  4. 2026-05-30Kimsuky (Velvet Chollima) deploys HTTPSpy RAT and Rust-based HelloDoor via VS Code Remote Tunnel and Cloudflare Quick Tunnel C2
    research
  5. 2026-05-17Kaspersky: Kimsuky adds Rust-based HelloDoor and httpMalice to its PebbleDash toolkit and takes over hosts through VSCode tunnels and DWAgent
    researchKaspersky: Kimsuky's new PebbleDash backdoors hide C2 behind tunnels and take over hosts through VSCode Remote Tunnels
ATT&CK techniques (35 across 12 tactics)

35 techniques observed across 4 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessPhishing: Spearphishing Attachment
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · User Execution: Malicious File
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading · Masquerading: Double File Extension · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 · System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window · Reflective Code Loading
  • Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
  • Credential AccessInput Capture: Keylogging
  • DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery · Process Discovery · System Information Discovery · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
  • CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Archive Collected Data
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Protocol Tunneling · Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Financial Theft

Initial Access TA0001

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×3

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×3

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×2

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036Masquerading×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.007Masquerading: Double File Extension×1

Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.010System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32×1

Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32×1

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.003Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window×1

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1016.001System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery×1

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1057Process Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1082System Information Discovery×2

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1113Screen Capture×1

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1560Archive Collected Data×1

An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071Application Layer Protocol×1

Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Kimsuky (4)

2026-09-08 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Sekoia and Kudelski Security split the 'Lazarus umbrella' into six named DPRK clusters, and document two of them adopting commodity ransomware-as-a-service within two months of each other

Sekoia's TDR team and Kudelski Security, a Switzerland-based research firm, jointly published a reassessment of how North Korea's offensive-cyber apparatus is organized (Kudelski Security, 2026-09-07). The authors now track the historical "Lazarus umbrella" as six distinct sub-clusters (TEMP.Hermit, Citrine Sleet, CryptoCore, Jade Sleet, Moonstone Sleet, and Famous Chollima, the last already tracked here as an alias of the North Korean fraudulent-IT-worker cluster) each carrying a different primary mandate spanning strategic espionage, dual espionage-and-revenue operations, and pure financially motivated crime (Kudelski Security, 2026-09-07). The espionage-focused clusters under GRIB (formerly RGB), TEMP.Hermit among them, are the authors' own described inheritors of both the historical Lazarus umbrella and the Kimsuky cluster's lineage, even where their precise bureau affiliation is debated within the CTI community (Kudelski Security, 2026-09-07). The authors date the Lazarus umbrella's internal reorganization into specialized sub-clusters to a 2018–2023 transition phase alongside the global expansion of the cryptocurrency market, out of which APT38 itself emerged as the financially-motivated sub-cluster; APT38 has since, per the authors' own current research, further split into two of these (CryptoCore and Jade Sleet) both exclusively financially motivated and focused on cryptocurrency, Web3 and blockchain targets, though the authors do not date this more recent split.

The most defender-relevant finding is a documented pattern of commodity-ransomware adoption by nominally espionage-focused units: Andariel, a dual-mandate cluster, used its own custom ransomware (Maui, H0lyGh0st) and separately collaborated with the criminal Play ransomware-as-a-service operation in 2024, citing prior reporting from Unit 42; Moonstone Sleet deployed its own custom malware (FakePenny) the same year and then adopted the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service in 2025, within two months of Andariel's own RaaS adoption (Kudelski Security, 2026-09-07). The authors note it is "interesting" that the two clusters integrated RaaS into their campaigns within two months of each other, a single observed timing overlap, not a claimed broader trend, though it is consistent with the general possibility that DPRK clusters rent commodity ransomware infrastructure alongside, or instead of, running only bespoke tooling.

The report also states that "Reaper" (already tracked here as an alias of ScarCruft/APT37) is the cluster aligned with North Korea's newly renamed National Intelligence Agency (formerly the Ministry of State Security, renamed June 2026), tasked with surveillance of defectors and South Korean NGOs and activists. Kudelski Security's own separate prior research, cited in this report, found that DPRK fake-IT-worker infrastructure and offensive-APT infrastructure share the same VPN exit nodes, a concrete pivot point for correlating IT-worker-fraud indicators against APT intrusion infrastructure (Kudelski Security, 2026-09-07). Separately, the report documents a Cambodia-based money-laundering hub, the Huione Group (flagged by the US Treasury's FinCEN as a primary money-laundering concern) whose executives the authors say have shown indications of direct ties to North Korean actors, with an estimated USD 37.6 million in DPRK-linked cryptocurrency laundered through it between 2021 and 2025 via stablecoins and technical tooling that let North Korea convert illicit proceeds into ostensibly legitimate assets (Kudelski Security, 2026-09-07).

We notably made our clustering evolved by splitting the Lazarus umbrella into six distinct sub-clusters: TEMP.Hermit, Citrine Sleet, CryptoCore, Jade Sleet, Moonstone Sleet, and Famous Chollima.

Sekoia TDR team / Kudelski Security

Of note, Andariel is particular as it used custom ransomware (Maui and H0lyGh0st) for financial theft, as well as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) developed by an operator of the Russian cybercrime ecosystem. It was notably observed collaborating with Play in 2024. Another DPRK cluster, Moonstone Sleet, acted similarly by deploying its custom malware FakePenny in 2024, but also the Qilin RaaS in 2025. It is interesting to note that the two clusters integrated RaaS in their campaigns within two months of each other.

Kudelski Security observed that fake IT workers and offensive teams often share the same VPN exit nodes.

Kudelski Security

Builds on: A Swiss research lab traces a stealer-log leak into DPRK gambling infrastructure and the… · The command-and-control channel is a legitimate cloud storage API, not a registered domain · Rapid7 finds a DPRK-nexus implant that falsifies HAProxy's own traffic counters so its…

research08 Sep 04:41Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-09-03 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Kimsuky's seafood-invoice LNK campaign abuses Backblaze B2 cloud storage as C2 and exfiltration infrastructure, keyed by victim BIOS serial number

AhnLab ASEC attributes a new malicious-LNK campaign to Kimsuky based on code and behavioural overlap with prior Kimsuky LNK operations: matching PowerShell extraction syntax, the same fixed-offset method of extracting data embedded in the LNK, and the same Task Scheduler registration pattern (AhnLab ASEC, 2026-09-01). The lure is a spearphishing attachment named "[Royal Hotel Seoul] Request for Review of Seafood Ingredient Purchases.LNK." Running it uses PowerShell to extract embedded data: it drops a legitimate-looking decoy .hwp document at the same path, displayed to the victim, while simultaneously writing an XOR-encrypted ZIP to C:\ProgramData\systmp\sunshine containing a PowerShell script (termsvc.ps1) and a JScript file, saved separately as C:\ProgramData\systmp\ping_<first-4-UUID-digits>.js (AhnLab ASEC, 2026-09-01). Persistence is a Scheduled Task named MicrosoftOffice2016_<first-4-UUID-digits> that runs the JS file via wscript.exe roughly every 14 minutes; the obfuscated script checks for the presence of termsvc.ps1 and bypasses the PowerShell execution policy to run it hidden (AhnLab ASEC, 2026-09-01). termsvc.ps1 collects OS name and architecture, system timezone, public IP (queried via api.ipify.org), username, domain, the running-process list, and computer name, then authenticates to the Backblaze B2 API and uploads the collected data to a per-victim path keyed on the BIOS serial number, a legitimate cloud-storage service used as command-and-control infrastructure rather than attacker-registered domains (AhnLab ASEC, 2026-09-01). It then polls the same B2 path for a follow-up command file, saves it under an arbitrary name as a .cmd in %TEMP%, executes it hidden via cmd.exe /c, and deletes the local copy roughly 120 seconds later. The actor deletes the original LNK and the intermediate ZIP during execution, leaving only the components needed for the persistence loop.

Triage: authenticated outbound HTTPS traffic to Backblaze B2 API endpoints from a workstation with no legitimate backup or storage use case, alongside a Scheduled Task invoking wscript.exe against a script under C:\ProgramData on a short (~14-minute) interval, is the reusable detection hook, it generalises beyond this campaign to "legitimate cloud storage abused as C2," a pattern increasingly common across unrelated actors, not only Kimsuky.

In this attack, Backblaze B2 was used not merely as a file storage space but as a C2 infrastructure to exfiltrate information from infected PCs and relay follow-up commands.

Based on such similarities in code and behavior, AhnLab determined that this malicious LNK is also linked to the Kim Sukki group.

it is configured to execute ping_<FIRST 4 digits of UUID>.Js approximately every 14 minutes via wscript.Exe

AhnLab ASEC 2026-09-01
threat03 Sep 05:18Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: AhnLab ASEC

2026-05-30 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

Kimsuky (Velvet Chollima) deploys HTTPSpy RAT and Rust-based HelloDoor via VS Code Remote Tunnel and Cloudflare Quick Tunnel C2

ENKI WhiteHat and The Hacker News documented Kimsuky campaigns in March and April 2026 targeting South Korean military personnel and corporate entities with two malware chains (The Hacker News, 2026-05-29; ENKI WhiteHat, 2026-05-27). March chain: masquerade installers for nProtect Online Security and AhnLab Safe Transaction launch MemLoader.dll via regsvcs.exe, which downloads HTTPSpy. April chain: fake Webex meeting page delivers encrypted JavaScript (.jse extension) which stages a PowerShell downloader, ultimately installing HTTPSpy. HTTPSpy is a full-capability RAT (first observed 2022; previously used against a German defence manufacturer May–September 2024): RC4-encrypted C2, shell execution, file upload/download, screenshot capture, process injection, self-deletion. HelloDoor is a Rust-based PebbleDash variant (assessed LLM-assisted per ENKI): configurable sleep, command execution, directory traversal. C2 evasion: Kimsuky now abuses Visual Studio Code Remote Tunneling (authenticated via GitHub OAuth, registered via code --tunnel --name <name>) and Cloudflare Quick Tunnels (cloudflared.exe); neither can be blocked by IP or domain without blocking Microsoft and Cloudflare respectively. JSONPing confirms active infections via a locally-running HTTP server, reducing exposure of attacker infrastructure. MITRE ATT&CK: T1036 (Masquerading), T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1059.007 (JavaScript), T1071 (Application Layer Protocol). Detection: hunt for regsvcs.exe as a parent of DLL loads in non-.NET-Framework contexts; alert on VS Code CLI processes with --tunnel argument from non-developer endpoints; audit GitHub OAuth app grants for unrecognised VS Code tunnel registrations; monitor cloudflared.exe on managed endpoints without prior baseline.

research30 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Earlier coverage (1)

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research3
  • Threats2

Source distribution

  • thehackernews.com2 (25%)
  • asec.ahnlab.com1 (12%)
  • enki.co.kr1 (12%)
  • kudelskisecurity.com1 (12%)
  • rapid7.com1 (12%)
  • securelist.com1 (12%)
  • sekoia.com1 (12%)