2026-09-08NOTABLEA Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented commodity ransomware in the same window
Kimsuky
actor · actor:kimsuky single-source
North Korea-aligned APT conducting credential-theft and espionage operations against South Korean and European targets; 2026 reporting (Kaspersky GReAT, May 2026) documents a Rust-based HelloDoor backdoor, the HTTPSpy RAT, PebbleDash toolkit evolution and TryCloudflare/VS Code tunnel C2.
Aliases: Ruby Sleet, APT43, Velvet Chollima
Coverage
5
4 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-05-17 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-09-08
A Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented…
Peak priority
notable
4 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, defense, healthcare · regions: apac, europe, dach
Sources cited
8
7 hosts
2026-05-175 appearances2026-09-08
Defender insights
What each entry about Kimsuky tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Exposure · triage · detection
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
attributed activity
Story timeline
Every entry that names Kimsuky, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-09-08Sekoia and Kudelski Security split the 'Lazarus umbrella' into six named DPRK clusters, and document two of them adopting commodity ransomware-as-a-service within two months of each other
- 2026-09-07"ted backdoor" and curlRAT, a DPRK-nexus actor recompiles a victim's own HAProxy source tree to hide C2 inside the load balancer's self-reported connection statistics
- 2026-09-03Kimsuky's seafood-invoice LNK campaign abuses Backblaze B2 cloud storage as C2 and exfiltration infrastructure, keyed by victim BIOS serial number
- 2026-05-30Kimsuky (Velvet Chollima) deploys HTTPSpy RAT and Rust-based HelloDoor via VS Code Remote Tunnel and Cloudflare Quick Tunnel C2
- 2026-05-17Kaspersky: Kimsuky adds Rust-based HelloDoor and httpMalice to its PebbleDash toolkit and takes over hosts through VSCode tunnels and DWAgent
Hunting pivots
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (35 across 12 tactics)
35 techniques observed across 4 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessPhishing: Spearphishing Attachment
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · User Execution: Malicious File
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading · Masquerading: Double File Extension · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32 · System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window · Reflective Code Loading
- Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- Credential AccessInput Capture: Keylogging
- DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery · Process Discovery · System Information Discovery · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
- CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Archive Collected Data
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Protocol Tunneling · Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel
- ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Financial Theft
Initial Access TA0001
T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×3
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×3
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×2
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036Masquerading×1
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.007Masquerading: Double File Extension×1
Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1218.010System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32×1
Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32×1
Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1564.003Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window×1
Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1620Reflective Code Loading×1
Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1016.001System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery×1
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1057Process Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1082System Information Discovery×2
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1113Screen Capture×1
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1560Archive Collected Data×1
An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071Application Layer Protocol×1
Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/kimsuky-velvet-chollima-deploys-httpspy-rat-and-rust-based-h · ATT&CK page ↗
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×1
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1572Protocol Tunneling×1
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-05-17/kaspersky-great-documents-kimsuky-s-rust-based-hellodoor-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗
T1657Financial Theft×1
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Kimsuky (4)
Earlier coverage (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- ScarCruft×2
- Andariel×1
- Citrine Sleet×1
- CryptoCore×1
- curlRAT×1
- HAProxy×1
- Jade Sleet×1
- Kimsuky HelloDoor / PebbleDash C2 evolution×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- thehackernews.com2 (25%)
- asec.ahnlab.com1 (12%)
- enki.co.kr1 (12%)
- kudelskisecurity.com1 (12%)
- rapid7.com1 (12%)
- securelist.com1 (12%)
- sekoia.com1 (12%)
All cited sources (8)
- asec.ahnlab.comAhnLab ASEChttps://asec.ahnlab.com/en/95217/
- enki.co.krENKI WhiteHathttps://www.enki.co.kr/en/media-center/blog/kimsuky-s-advanced-attack-techniques-jsonping-webex-spoofing-and-a-new-httpspy-variant
- kudelskisecurity.comKudelski Security (Switzerland)https://kudelskisecurity.com/research/beyond-lazarus-organization-of-dprk-cyber-capabilities
- rapid7.comRapid7 Labshttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-dprk-apts-ted-backdoor-curlrat-target-south-korean-media-automotive-sectors/
- securelist.comKaspersky Securelisthttps://securelist.com/kimsuky-appleseed-pebbledash-campaigns/119785/
- sekoia.comSekoiahttps://www.sekoia.com/blog/beyond-lazarus-organization-of-dprk-cyber-capabilities
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/kimsuky-deploys-httpspy-expands-arsenal.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/09/new-ted-backdoor-hides-inside-victims.html