tcherber: Cyderes finds an access broker's Go toolkit with VPN clients for FortiGate and SonicWall that, once a tunnel is up, maps internal routes and sweeps Active Directory over LDAP; a credential file mixes default guest, admin and test logins with organisation-specific passwords (more than 500 FortiGate entries) and connection logs show root-level tunnels into multiple victims in May and June 2026
Cyderes: 'tcherber' VPN toolkit for FortiGate and SonicWall, credential file mixing default and real logins, LDAP sweep
Defender actions
- Audit every FortiGate and SonicWall VPN gateway for local accounts with default or guessed passwords (guest, admin, test) or passwords that appear in credential dumps, reset or remove them, and search VPN logs since May 2026 for logins by such accounts that are followed by a broad LDAP enumeration from the VPN address pool, because Cyderes found a broker's toolkit and logs showing root-level tunnels into multiple victims.
Analysis
Cyderes' Howler Cell identified a database holding more than 500 FortiGate VPN credential entries and VPN connection records showing successful root-level tunnels into multiple victim environments during May and June 2026 (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). The recovered Go toolkit wraps OpenConnect with --protocol=fortinet for FortiGate, with a 30-second reconnect loop that keeps the tunnel up, and NetExtender for SonicWall, whose wrapper probes seven login URL paths and ten page patterns to find the authentication domain (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). The credential file mixes default guest, admin and test logins with organisation-specific passwords, which Cyderes reads as both brute-force harvesting and credential-dump sourcing; the broker's forum advert claims the access came from brute-forcing and an "exploit toolkit", which Cyderes relays without confirming (Cyderes, 2026-11-17).
The orchestrator launches the FortiGate client in the background with a 20-second stabilization delay, maps internal subnets and gateways from the established tunnel, and runs an LDAP module that enumerates users, groups, domain structure and domain controllers; port scanning, SMB reconnaissance and credential validation sit in separate tools that the operator runs by hand (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). Cyderes assesses a Russian-speaking operator working as both an initial access broker and a malware-as-a-service provider, with operations ongoing as of September 2026, and notes that the handle comes from a build-path username that one machine or several could share (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). VMRay independently links the same build path to Zer0day Stealer and ENIGMA Locker and calls the same developer the likely author of an HVNC remote-control sample, without mentioning VPN access brokerage (VMRay, 2026-09-01).
Cited evidence
Howler Cell identified a database containing more than 500 FortiGate VPN credential entries, together with VPN connection records showing successful root-level network tunnels into multiple victim environments during May and June 2026.
Contains a mix of default credentials (guest:guest, admin:admin, test:test) and organization-specific passwords, indicating both brute-force harvesting and credential dump sourcing.
The remaining tools (nmap.go, netexec_scaner.go, smb_info.go, sonik.go) are not called by the orchestrator and are intended for manual use by the operator as needed.
Defenders should treat the indicators in this report as current and actionable and prioritize VPN credential audits across FortiGate and SonicWall appliances.
Sources2
AI-generated · no human review · this permalink is the shareable record for the finding · verify operationally critical claims against the linked primary source.