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ENIGMA Locker

malware · malware:enigma-locker single-source

Ransomware family that VMRay links through a shared build path to Zer0day Stealer and an HVNC remote-control sample, and that Cyderes finds among artifacts of the tcherber toolkit (VMRay, 2026-09-01; Cyderes, 2026-11-17).

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-19 → last 2026-11-19
Latest activity
2026-11-19
Cyderes: 'tcherber' VPN toolkit for FortiGate and SonicWall, credential file mixing default and real logins…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about ENIGMA Locker, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Audit every FortiGate and SonicWall VPN gateway for local accounts with default or guessed passwords (guest, admin, test) or passwords that appear in credential dumps, reset or remove them, and search VPN logs since May 2026 for logins by such accounts that are followed by a broad LDAP enumeration from the VPN address pool, because Cyderes found a broker's toolkit and logs showing root-level tunnels into multiple victims.
    2026-11-19Cyderes: 'tcherber' VPN toolkit for FortiGate and…

Defender insights

What each entry about ENIGMA Locker tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-19NOTABLECyderes: 'tcherber' VPN toolkit for FortiGate and SonicWall, credential file mixing default and real logins, LDAP sweep

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-19tcherber: Cyderes finds an access broker's Go toolkit with VPN clients for FortiGate and SonicWall that, once a tunnel is up, maps internal routes and sweeps Active Directory over LDAP; a credential file mixes default guest, admin and test logins with organisation-specific passwords (more than 500 FortiGate entries) and connection logs show root-level tunnels into multiple victims in May and June 2026
    active-threatsCyderes: 'tcherber' VPN toolkit for FortiGate and SonicWall, credential file mixing default and real logins, LDAP sweep
ATT&CK techniques (5 across 5 tactics)

5 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Default Accounts · External Remote Services
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Default Accounts · External Remote Services
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Default Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts: Default Accounts
  • DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery · Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · Account Discovery: Domain Account

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1016System Network Configuration Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/tcherber-access-broker-fortigate-sonicwall-vpn-ldap-sweep · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about ENIGMA Locker (1)

2026-11-19 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

tcherber: Cyderes finds an access broker's Go toolkit with VPN clients for FortiGate and SonicWall that, once a tunnel is up, maps internal routes and sweeps Active Directory over LDAP; a credential file mixes default guest, admin and test logins with organisation-specific passwords (more than 500 FortiGate entries) and connection logs show root-level tunnels into multiple victims in May and June 2026

Cyderes' Howler Cell identified a database holding more than 500 FortiGate VPN credential entries and VPN connection records showing successful root-level tunnels into multiple victim environments during May and June 2026 (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). The recovered Go toolkit wraps OpenConnect with --protocol=fortinet for FortiGate, with a 30-second reconnect loop that keeps the tunnel up, and NetExtender for SonicWall, whose wrapper probes seven login URL paths and ten page patterns to find the authentication domain (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). The credential file mixes default guest, admin and test logins with organisation-specific passwords, which Cyderes reads as both brute-force harvesting and credential-dump sourcing; the broker's forum advert claims the access came from brute-forcing and an "exploit toolkit", which Cyderes relays without confirming (Cyderes, 2026-11-17).

The orchestrator launches the FortiGate client in the background with a 20-second stabilization delay, maps internal subnets and gateways from the established tunnel, and runs an LDAP module that enumerates users, groups, domain structure and domain controllers; port scanning, SMB reconnaissance and credential validation sit in separate tools that the operator runs by hand (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). Cyderes assesses a Russian-speaking operator working as both an initial access broker and a malware-as-a-service provider, with operations ongoing as of September 2026, and notes that the handle comes from a build-path username that one machine or several could share (Cyderes, 2026-11-17). VMRay independently links the same build path to Zer0day Stealer and ENIGMA Locker and calls the same developer the likely author of an HVNC remote-control sample, without mentioning VPN access brokerage (VMRay, 2026-09-01).

Howler Cell identified a database containing more than 500 FortiGate VPN credential entries, together with VPN connection records showing successful root-level network tunnels into multiple victim environments during May and June 2026.

Contains a mix of default credentials (guest:guest, admin:admin, test:test) and organization-specific passwords, indicating both brute-force harvesting and credential dump sourcing.

The remaining tools (nmap.go, netexec_scaner.go, smb_info.go, sonik.go) are not called by the orchestrator and are intended for manual use by the operator as needed.

Defenders should treat the indicators in this report as current and actionable and prioritize VPN credential audits across FortiGate and SonicWall appliances.

Cyderes Howler Cell 2026-11-17
threat19 Nov 05:22Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • cyderes.com1 (50%)
  • vmray.com1 (50%)