The Gentlemen affiliate: an SSL-VPN account without MFA, a Windows Server 2003 host and a dormant local administrator gave Domain Admin in under an hour; the GPO locker most likely lost a replication race, so antivirus was disabled estate-wide but only one host was encrypted (Ransom-ISAC)
Ransom-ISAC: Gentlemen affiliate, VPN without MFA to Domain Admin in an hour; GPO locker likely lost a replication race
Analysis
Ransom-ISAC reconstructs an early-August 2026 intrusion into a small company by a Gentlemen ransomware affiliate from forensic images of two domain controllers, event logs of 41 hosts and firewall logs (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13). Entry was an SSL-VPN account without MFA that succeeded on the first attempt from an unusual country; neither egress address appears in any earlier failed login, so the credential was most likely held beforehand. Within the hour the actor ran an anonymous SMB sweep, three Kerberoast-style service-ticket requests (the KDC logged an RC4 and DES downgrade against an AES-only account) and hundreds of failed SMB logons against a domain controller, then used a dormant, weak-password local administrator on an end-of-life Windows Server 2003 SQL host that allowed null sessions. A Domain Admin session opened on the domain controller less than an hour after the first login; Ransom-ISAC could not prove how and says the credentials were most likely taken from that host. The actor then pushed a Rust credential harvester, which takes the DPAPI domain backup key, and EtherRAT, a Node.js implant that reads its command address from an Ethereum smart contract and never reached it; data left through the VPN tunnel over about two days of a weekend (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).
The locker, run on a domain controller in domain-wide mode, built a GPO linked enforced at the domain root and the Domain Controllers container, with eight registry values that disable antivirus and a Preferences scheduled task in SYSVOL. The call that declares the Preferences extension reached a domain controller the GPO had not replicated to, the script suppressed the error and no client read the task: antivirus was off estate-wide but the locker ran on one host, which wiped its logs (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).
Triage: scanners and inventory tools also sweep SMB anonymously and legacy applications use null sessions (the finding is a dormant account logging on right after); developers resolve Ethereum RPC providers, so scope that rule to servers; administrators edit GPOs, so correlate with the change calendar (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).
Cited evidence
Everything here comes from a single incident response engagement.
The GPO still turned off the antivirus across the estate, but the locker ran on only one host.
Sources1
AI-generated · no human review · this permalink is the shareable record for the finding · verify operationally critical claims against the linked primary source.