Calypso/Red Lamassu (Bronze Medley) deploys Showboat (Linux) and JFMBackdoor (Windows) against telecoms, new implant pair disclosed by Lumen Black Lotus Labs and PwC Threat Intelligence
Calypso/Red Lamassu (Bronze Medley) deploys Showboat (Linux) and JFMBackdoor (Windows) against telecoms, new implant pair disclosed by Lumen Black Lotus Labs
Analysis
Lumen's Black Lotus Labs and PwC Threat Intelligence disclosed on 2026-05-21 two purpose-built implants used by the China-aligned espionage cluster Calypso (also tracked as Red Lamassu, Bronze Medley, active since at least mid-2022 based on binary upload and victim telemetry) in a multi-year campaign against telecommunications providers (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-05-21 · PwC Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-21). Confirmed victims include a Middle East ISP, an Afghanistan ISP, and entities in Azerbaijan, the US, and Ukraine; European telecoms are within the actor's documented targeting pattern. Showboat is a modular ELF binary masquerading as a Linux kernel worker thread (kworker, T1036.005 Masquerade: Match Legitimate Name) providing remote shell (T1059.004), bidirectional file transfer, SOCKS5 proxy to internal network segments (T1090.001 Internal Proxy), and a hide command that fetches a rootkit payload from Pastebin at runtime (T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver); the C2 payload is exfiltrated base64-encoded inside PNG image fields to blend with web traffic (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-05-21). JFMBackdoor, the Windows counterpart, is delivered via DLL sideloading (T1574.002): a batch script drops a legitimate signed executable that loads the malicious DLL, providing remote shell, file operations, SOCKS5 proxy, and self-removal (PwC Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-21). C2 infrastructure clusters to Chengdu, Sichuan-geolocated IP ranges; X.509 certificate SAN/CN patterns link the victim set (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-05-21). Detection: hunt for kworker ELF processes whose parent is not kthreadd (PID 2) on Linux telecom servers (auditd EXECVE or Sysmon for Linux EID 1 parent-pid check); alert on unsigned DLLs loaded by vendor-signed executables (Sysmon EID 7: signed process, unsigned module); flag egress DNS queries or HTTP GET to pastebin.com from daemon-context processes.
Sources4
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