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Calypso telco espionage campaign

campaign · campaign:calypso-red-lamassu-showboat-jfmbackdoor-linux-windows-telco

Calypso (Red Lamassu / Bronze Medley) telco-espionage campaign deploying the Showboat Linux backdoor and JFMBackdoor for Windows.

Aliases: Red Lamassu, Bronze Medley

Coverage
2
first 2026-05-22 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-22
Red Lamassu (Calypso/Bronze Medley): Showboat + JFMBackdoor telco espionage implant pair
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
telco
sectors: telco · regions: middle-east, apac, europe
Sources cited
4
4 hosts
2026-05-222 appearances2026-05-22

Defender insights

What each entry about Calypso telco espionage campaign tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-22NOTABLERed Lamassu (Calypso/Bronze Medley): Showboat + JFMBackdoor telco espionage implant pair

Detection

2026-05-22NOTABLELumen and PwC detail Showboat, a Linux implant that hides and proxies inside telcos, and Red Lamassu's JFMBackdoor

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-22Red Lamassu (Calypso/Bronze Medley): Showboat + JFMBackdoor telco espionage implant pair
    deep-dive
  2. 2026-05-22Showboat Linux post-exploitation framework and JFMBackdoor for Windows used against telecom providers; PwC attributes the operation to Red Lamassu (Calypso)
    active-threatsLumen and PwC detail Showboat, a Linux implant that hides and proxies inside telcos, and Red Lamassu's JFMBackdoor
ATT&CK techniques (16 across 7 tactics)

16 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Systemd Service
  • Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Systemd Service
  • StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: Timestomp · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Hide Artifacts · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL · Reflective Code Loading
  • CollectionScreen Capture · Archive Collected Data
  • Command and ControlData Obfuscation: Steganography · Proxy: Internal Proxy · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer · Data Encoding: Standard Encoding

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×2

Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×2

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×1

Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564Hide Artifacts×1

Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×2

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1113Screen Capture×1

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1560Archive Collected Data×1

An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1001.002Data Obfuscation: Steganography×1

Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy×2

Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/red-lamassu-calypso-bronze-medley-showboat-jfmbackdoor-telco · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

T1132.001Data Encoding: Standard Encoding×1

Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.

Evidence: 2026-05-22/calypso-red-lamassu-bronze-medley-deploys-showboat-linux-and · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Calypso telco espionage campaign (2)

2026-05-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

Red Lamassu (Calypso/Bronze Medley): Showboat + JFMBackdoor telco espionage implant pair

Background. Calypso (also tracked as Red Lamassu and Bronze Medley) is a China-aligned espionage cluster active since at least mid-2022 based on Lumen's binary upload and victim telemetry, the Showboat/JFMBackdoor campaign dates to this period. The group has previously been linked to intrusions against government entities, energy companies, and telecommunications operators in Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East using commodity and bespoke tooling including PlugX and ShadowPad variants. Lumen Black Lotus Labs and PwC Threat Intelligence disclosed the Showboat/JFMBackdoor toolset on 2026-05-21 based on infrastructure analysis, binary upload telemetry, and victim telemetry (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-05-21 · PwC Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-21).

Linux implant: Showboat. Showboat is a modular post-exploitation ELF binary. On disk, the process name is kworker, directly impersonating Linux kernel worker threads to evade basic process-list inspection (T1036.005 Masquerade: Match Legitimate Name or Location). The implant contacts its C2 server, collects basic system information, and encodes the beacon data as Base64 inside PNG image field bytes, blending C2 beaconing with image-format traffic (T1001.002 Steganography). Functional modules provide: (1) remote shell (T1059.004 Unix Shell); (2) bidirectional file transfer; (3) SOCKS5 proxy and port-forwarding (T1090.001 Internal Proxy), enabling the attacker to tunnel through the compromised telecom server into internal network segments without direct external access to those targets; (4) a hide command that fetches a rootkit payload from a Pastebin or forum-style dead-drop at runtime (T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver), pulling additional capability after initial deployment rather than shipping it on disk. C2 infrastructure is geolocated to Chengdu, Sichuan province, consistent with prior Calypso campaigns. X.509 certificate SAN/CN clustering links the campaign's confirmed victim set.

Windows implant: JFMBackdoor. JFMBackdoor is delivered via DLL sideloading (T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading): a batch script drops a legitimate vendor-signed executable alongside a malicious DLL in a writable path; the signed binary loads the DLL, providing the attacker with remote shell, file operations, SOCKS5 proxy, screenshot capture, and self-removal capability. The use of a vendor-signed loader binary defeats application allowlisting based on signing alone.

Kill-chain pattern. Initial access vector is not publicly confirmed; the long-running nature (mid-2022 to 2026) and focus on network-exposed telecom infrastructure suggest exploitation of public-facing services (T1190) or credential-based entry. Post-access, Showboat provides the persistent Linux bridgehead; from there SOCKS5 tunnels are used for lateral movement into internal segments (T1090.001). Data collection via T1560 Archive Collected Data and exfiltration via the C2 covert channel completes the chain.

Detection for EU/telco SOCs. (1) Linux: kworker processes whose parent is not kthreadd (PID 2) are anomalous; legitimate kernel workers are exclusively children of kthreadd; any kworker-named process with a user-space parent (e.g., bash, sshd, any application binary) is high-confidence suspicious. Enumerate via auditd EXECVE rules or Sysmon for Linux EID 1 with parent-pid cross-check. (2) Linux: SOCKS5 connection establishment from application-layer daemon processes (not expected proxy services) to non-standard ports is a lateral-movement pivot indicator. (3) Linux: DNS queries or HTTP GET to pastebin.com from processes running as root or as non-web-facing service accounts are anomalous; no production daemon should be fetching Pastebin content. (4) Windows: Sysmon EID 7 (ImageLoad) showing a signed process binary loading an unsigned DLL from a writable user-controlled path (e.g., AppData, Temp, or any path not under %SystemRoot%) warrants investigation. (5) Network: X.509 certificate attribute hunting against the Chengdu IP ranges described by Lumen Black Lotus Labs; if your threat-intel platform supports cert-fingerprint or SAN searches, use the campaign's known certificate clustering pattern as a pivot.

Hardening. On Linux telecom servers: (a) enforce process-name uniqueness checks via auditd rules that alert on EXECVE where comm matches kworker but ppid != 2; (b) egress-filter server processes to block outbound connections to hosting services (Pastebin, paste sites, general code-hosting) from root-context processes. On Windows: (c) require DLL signature enforcement via Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) RequireSignedCode policy; (d) restrict writable paths in the DLL search order through AppLocker or WDAC deny-list rules on AppData\Roaming, Temp, and user-writable directories. Across the estate: (e) enforce strict outbound firewall rules on telecom infrastructure servers limiting egress to known management and update destinations.

threat22 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB1

Showboat Linux post-exploitation framework and JFMBackdoor for Windows used against telecom providers; PwC attributes the operation to Red Lamassu (Calypso)

Lumen's Black Lotus Labs published Showboat on 2026-05-20: a modular Linux post-exploitation framework, used since at least mid-2022, that spawns a remote shell, uploads and downloads files, acts as a SOCKS5 proxy and port mapper into internal hosts, can persist as a service and swap C2 nodes, and has a "hide" command that conceals its process with code fetched from Pastebin or online forums used as a dead drop (Lumen, 2026-05-20). It reports the host data it gathers in a PNG field as an encrypted, base64-encoded string, and Lumen found it on VirusTotal rather than on a live system, so the initial access vector is unknown (Lumen, 2026-05-20). PwC, publishing in tandem on 2026-05-21, found a Showboat sample, which it calls kworker, in an open directory active from July to October 2025 next to JFMBackdoor: a batch script downloads the files into the victim's temp directory and runs the legitimate fltMC.exe, which side-loads a malicious FLTLIB.dll that decrypts its configuration and loads the backdoor in memory through a shellcode stub; JFMBackdoor then offers a remote shell, full file operations including timestomping, TCP proxying and screenshots it base64-encodes and XOR-encrypts for exfiltration (PwC, 2026-05-21). Lumen's telemetry confirms two victims, an Afghanistan-based ISP whose Outlook server talked to a C2 node from 2025-12-01 to 2026-02-03 and an entity in Azerbaijan, finds two potential compromises in the United States, and links C2 traffic with the Donbas region, with moderate confidence, to a separate cluster sharing the tooling; the C2 nodes cluster on a shared self-signed certificate (Lumen, 2026-05-20). PwC ties the open directory to a telecommunications provider in Afghanistan and attributes it to Red Lamassu (also known as Calypso), a China-based actor likely operating from Sichuan Province that it has tracked since 2019 against telecom organizations in Asia (PwC, 2026-05-21), while Lumen attributes Showboat only to at least one and likely several PRC-aligned clusters (Lumen, 2026-05-20).

Showboat is a modular post-exploitation framework designed for Linux systems, capable of spawning a remote shell, transferring files and functioning as a Socks5 proxy.

As the malware was not directly observed on any live systems, we are unable to comment on the initial access vector or exploit.

Lumen Black Lotus Labs 2026-05-20

Red Lamassu is our name for a China-based threat actor likely operating out of Sichuan Province, associated with the targeting of telecommunications organisations based in Asia, predominantly Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, and India.

PwC Threat Intelligence 2026-05-21
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditbodyclassificationevent_dateevidenceheadlineregionssourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitlepriority

The confirmed victims are an Afghanistan-based ISP and an entity in Azerbaijan; Lumen calls the US cases potential compromises, links the traffic from Ukraine's Donbas region with moderate confidence to a separate cluster sharing the tooling, and neither source places European telecoms in the targeting (Lumen, 2026-05-20). Showboat is not described as masquerading as a kernel worker thread: kworker is PwC's name for the malware and the sample PwC found was named systemd-ac-update (PwC, 2026-05-21), while Lumen documents process hiding and service persistence (Lumen, 2026-05-20).

The campaign dates from at least mid-2022 (Lumen, 2026-05-20), whereas PwC has tracked Red Lamassu since 2019; JFMBackdoor offers remote shell access, file system operations, network proxying, screenshot capture and self-removal (PwC, 2026-05-21); and the self-signed certificate clusters the C2 nodes rather than linking the victims (Lumen, 2026-05-20).

threat22 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1
  • Deep dive1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (25%)
  • lumen.com1 (25%)
  • pwc.com1 (25%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (25%)