Unit 42: Gremlin stealer hides its payload in XOR-encoded .NET resources and adds a crypto clipper, Discord token theft and WebSocket session hijacking
Unit 42: evolved Gremlin stealer hides its payload in .NET resources and hijacks live Chromium browser sessions
Analysis
Unit 42 identified a new Gremlin stealer variant that bundles stolen browser cookies, session tokens, clipboard contents, cryptocurrency wallet data and FTP and VPN credentials into a ZIP archive named with the victim's public IP address and uploads it to an attacker-controlled site, while exfiltration through private web panels or the Telegram Bot API stays as in earlier builds (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The variant moves its payload into the .NET resource section masked with single-byte XOR encoding, decrypts and maps each critical function into memory only when needed, and hides its strings behind a runtime decoder that reads them from an embedded encrypted resource; one sample is wrapped in a commercial packer that turns the code into custom bytecode run by a private virtual machine (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). New modules extract Discord tokens by scanning multiple paths with regex validation, watch the clipboard for wallet-address patterns and replace the victim's address with the attacker's in real time, and hijack live sessions in Chromium-based browsers over WebSocket by requesting the data directly from the running browser process, which bypasses modern cookie protections (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The post does not describe how Gremlin is delivered.
Cited evidence
In this version, the malware authors have shifted the malicious payload into the .NET Resource section, masking it with XOR encoding to bypass signature-based detection and heuristic scanning.
When it detects a match, the malware replaces the victim's address with the attacker’s wallet in real time, diverting funds during transactions.
This allows Gremlin stealer to hijack active, live browser sessions and bypass modern cookie protections by requesting the data directly from the running browser process.
The malware names the file using the victim’s public IP address to identify the source, and then uploads it to the attacker-controlled site, as shown in Figure 3.
Updates1
The analyzed variant bundles its haul into a ZIP archive named with the victim's public IP address and uploads it to an attacker-controlled site, with private web panels or the Telegram Bot API as the exfiltration methods carried over from earlier builds; Unit 42 does not describe an HTTPS POST with Telegram as a secondary channel (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The clipper replaces any copied address matching its cryptocurrency wallet patterns, not only Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses, and saved passwords are not among the data Unit 42 lists (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The session-hijack module works by requesting the data directly from the running Chromium-based browser process over WebSocket, and one sample is protected by a commercial packer that runs the code as custom bytecode on a private virtual machine (Unit 42, 2026-05-15).
Sources1
Revision history
- Published 2026-05-16-5bc123a0
- Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit
The analyzed Gremlin variant uploads a ZIP of stolen data, named with the victim's public IP address, to an attacker-controlled web panel, with the Telegram Bot API as an alternative path, rather than using HTTPS POST with Telegram as a secondary channel. Its clipper swaps any copied cryptocurrency wallet address matching its patterns, not only Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses, and Unit 42 does not list saved passwords among the stolen data. The session-hijack module requests session data from the running Chromium browser process over WebSocket, and one sample is protected by a commercial packer with instruction virtualization.
Changed: affected_products body classification evidence headline sources sourcing_note summary techniques title
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