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Gremlin Stealer

tool · tool:gremlin-stealer-evolution-2026 single-source

Unit 42 documents an evolved Gremlin Stealer: .NET XOR resource-section obfuscation, a crypto-clipper, and WebSocket browser-process session hijacking.

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-16 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-16
Unit 42: evolved Gremlin stealer hides its payload in .NET resources and hijacks live Chromium browser…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
finance
sectors: finance, technology
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Gremlin Stealer tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-16NOTABLEUnit 42: evolved Gremlin stealer hides its payload in .NET resources and hijacks live Chromium browser sessions

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-16Unit 42: Gremlin stealer hides its payload in XOR-encoded .NET resources and adds a crypto clipper, Discord token theft and WebSocket session hijacking
    researchUnit 42: evolved Gremlin stealer hides its payload in .NET resources and hijacks live Chromium browser sessions
ATT&CK techniques (13 across 5 tactics)

13 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Credential AccessSteal Application Access Token · Steal Web Session Cookie · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
  • CollectionData from Local System · Clipboard Data · Browser Session Hijacking · Archive Collected Data
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Web Service
  • ImpactData Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation

Stealth TA0005

T1027.002Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing×1

Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1

Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1528Steal Application Access Token×1

Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×1

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1115Clipboard Data×1

Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1185Browser Session Hijacking×1

Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1560Archive Collected Data×1

An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1565.002Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation×1

Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

Evidence: 2026-05-16/unit-42-gremlin-stealer-evolved-with-net-resource-xor-obfusc · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Gremlin Stealer (1)

2026-05-16 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

Unit 42: Gremlin stealer hides its payload in XOR-encoded .NET resources and adds a crypto clipper, Discord token theft and WebSocket session hijacking

Unit 42 identified a new Gremlin stealer variant that bundles stolen browser cookies, session tokens, clipboard contents, cryptocurrency wallet data and FTP and VPN credentials into a ZIP archive named with the victim's public IP address and uploads it to an attacker-controlled site, while exfiltration through private web panels or the Telegram Bot API stays as in earlier builds (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The variant moves its payload into the .NET resource section masked with single-byte XOR encoding, decrypts and maps each critical function into memory only when needed, and hides its strings behind a runtime decoder that reads them from an embedded encrypted resource; one sample is wrapped in a commercial packer that turns the code into custom bytecode run by a private virtual machine (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). New modules extract Discord tokens by scanning multiple paths with regex validation, watch the clipboard for wallet-address patterns and replace the victim's address with the attacker's in real time, and hijack live sessions in Chromium-based browsers over WebSocket by requesting the data directly from the running browser process, which bypasses modern cookie protections (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The post does not describe how Gremlin is delivered.

In this version, the malware authors have shifted the malicious payload into the .NET Resource section, masking it with XOR encoding to bypass signature-based detection and heuristic scanning.

When it detects a match, the malware replaces the victim's address with the attacker’s wallet in real time, diverting funds during transactions.

This allows Gremlin stealer to hijack active, live browser sessions and bypass modern cookie protections by requesting the data directly from the running browser process.

The malware names the file using the victim’s public IP address to identify the source, and then uploads it to the attacker-controlled site, as shown in Figure 3.

Unit 42
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationevidenceheadlinesourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitle

The analyzed variant bundles its haul into a ZIP archive named with the victim's public IP address and uploads it to an attacker-controlled site, with private web panels or the Telegram Bot API as the exfiltration methods carried over from earlier builds; Unit 42 does not describe an HTTPS POST with Telegram as a secondary channel (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The clipper replaces any copied address matching its cryptocurrency wallet patterns, not only Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses, and saved passwords are not among the data Unit 42 lists (Unit 42, 2026-05-15). The session-hijack module works by requesting the data directly from the running Chromium-based browser process over WebSocket, and one sample is protected by a commercial packer that runs the code as custom bytecode on a private virtual machine (Unit 42, 2026-05-15).

research16 May 05:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • unit42.paloaltonetworks.com1 (100%)