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Poland's ABW: attackers breached five municipal water treatment plants in 2025 and in some cases altered equipment parameters, and hacktivists exploited weak passwords on exposed management panels at municipal sites

ABW reports breaches at five Polish water plants in 2025, with equipment settings altered in some cases, naming no actor or access route

Analysis

Poland's Internal Security Agency (ABW) reports in its 2024-2025 activity review that in 2025 "security breaches were reported at water treatment plants in the following towns: Jabłonna Lacka, Szczytno, Małdyty, Tolkmicko and Sierakowo", and that "by gaining access, in some cases, to industrial control systems, the attackers were able to alter the technical parameters of the equipment", a direct risk to the plants' continued operation and to water supply (ABW, 2026-05-25). ABW describes hacktivist groups as particularly active against municipal infrastructure and says they "exploited glaring vulnerabilities in the form of poor password policies and unsecured device management panels, accessible directly via the public internet" (ABW, 2026-05-25). The report names no actor and no access vector for the water-plant breaches and does not tie them to the hacktivist activity. The state-sponsored groups it names, APT28, APT29 and UNC1151, are described as carrying out "sophisticated, long-term espionage and sabotage operations" (ABW, 2026-05-25). ABW's press office told CyberDefence24 that the potentially compromised water and sewage operators had IT resources reachable from the public internet, including HMI panels controlling their processes (CyberDefence24, 2025-10-08). CyberDefence24, which lists the five plants among the sites hit, describes the attacks on the Polish water sector as the work of pro-Russian hacktivists (CyberDefence24, 2025-10-08).

Cited evidence

By gaining access, in some cases, to industrial control systems, the attackers were able to alter the technical parameters of the equipment

ABW (Internal Security Agency), Internal Security Agency ABW 2024-2025: Selected activities 2026-05-25

Updates2

Update

ABW's 2024-2025 activity review, published in Polish on 2026-05-06 with an English edition dated 2026-05-25 (ABW, 2026-05-06), names the five affected facilities: Jabłonna Lacka, Szczytno, Małdyty, Tolkmicko and Sierakowo (ABW, 2026-05-25). It names no actor and no access vector for the water-plant intrusions (ABW, 2026-05-25).

Correction

The earlier text said pro-Russian hacktivists modified pump settings at all five facilities and that manual overrides prevented disruption. It also said ABW attributed these intrusions to APT28, APT29 and UNC1151, and that ABW attributed the five plant breaches to pro-Russian hacktivists exploiting flat IT/OT networks, in a pattern like NoName057(16) and Cyber Army of Russia Reborn campaigns, and it detailed Poland's NIS2 transposition. It dated ABW's report 2026-05-07. ABW released the review in Polish on 2026-05-06 and in English on 2026-05-25 (ABW, 2026-05-06). ABW's report names no actor and no access vector for the water-plant breaches. It says breaches were reported at the five plants and that, "in some cases", the attackers reached industrial control systems and altered the technical parameters of the equipment (ABW, 2026-05-25).

Sources3

Revision history

  1. Published 2026-05-08-migrated
  2. Update 2026-05-09-migrated

    UPDATE (originally covered 2026-05-08):

    Changed: entities sectors sources body

  3. Correction 2026-09-30T0639Z-audit

    The earlier text said pro-Russian hacktivists modified pump settings at all five facilities, with manual overrides preventing disruption, that ABW attributed the intrusions to APT28, APT29 and UNC1151 and to hacktivists exploiting flat IT/OT networks, and it described Poland's NIS2 transposition. ABW's 2024-2025 activity review names the five plants and says that in some cases the attackers reached industrial control systems and altered equipment parameters, but it names no actor or access vector. ABW's press office has said the potentially compromised operators had internet-reachable IT resources, including HMI panels. ABW released the review in Polish on 2026-05-06 and in English on 2026-05-25, not on 2026-05-07. The priority moves from high to notable.

    Changed: title headline summary event_date priority tags entities techniques sources evidence classification body verification

PROVENANCE

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