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FrostyNeighbor March to May 2026 campaign

campaign · campaign:frostyneighbor-2026-05-campaign single-source-national-cert

FrostyNeighbor campaign against governmental organisations in Ukraine since March 2026 (ESET).

Coverage
3
first 2026-05-15 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-07-09
CERT-PL: Ghostwriter/UNC1151 now phishes Gmail with a live 2FA-relay panel that defeats TOTP and SMS
Peak priority
high
1 high · 2 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, defense, education · regions: europe, switzerland, dach
Sources cited
5
4 hosts
2026-05-153 appearances2026-07-09

Action items (2)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about FrostyNeighbor March to May 2026 campaign, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

Defender insights

What each entry about FrostyNeighbor March to May 2026 campaign tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-07-09HIGHCERT-PL: Ghostwriter/UNC1151 now phishes Gmail with a live 2FA-relay panel that defeats TOTP and SMS

2026-05-15NOTABLEBelarus-aligned FrostyNeighbor hits Ukrainian government bodies with geofenced PDF lures and Cobalt Strike

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

attributed to

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-09CERT Polska: UNC1151/Ghostwriter shifts to Gmail with real-time 2FA-relay phishing against officials and public administration
    active-threatsCERT-PL: Ghostwriter/UNC1151 now phishes Gmail with a live 2FA-relay panel that defeats TOTP and SMS
  2. 2026-05-23Ghostwriter / UAC-0057 / FrostyNeighbor, CERT-UA documents new OYSTERFRESH → OYSTERBLUES → OYSTERSHUCK implant chain via Prometheus learning-platform lures
    active-threats
  3. 2026-05-15FrostyNeighbor (Ghostwriter, UNC1151): since March 2026, geofenced PDF lures deliver a JavaScript PicassoLoader and Cobalt Strike to Ukrainian government organisations
    active-threatsBelarus-aligned FrostyNeighbor hits Ukrainian government bodies with geofenced PDF lures and Cobalt Strike
ATT&CK techniques (15 across 7 tactics)

15 techniques observed across 3 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessPhishing: Spearphishing Attachment · Phishing: Spearphishing Link
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · User Execution: Malicious File
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32
  • DiscoveryProcess Discovery · System Information Discovery
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools

Initial Access TA0001

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/unc1151-ghostwriter-gmail-realtime-2fa-phishing · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×2

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-05-23/ghostwriter-uac-0057-frostyneighbor-cert-ua-documents-new-oy · 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×2

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-23/ghostwriter-uac-0057-frostyneighbor-cert-ua-documents-new-oy · 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×2

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-23/ghostwriter-uac-0057-frostyneighbor-cert-ua-documents-new-oy · 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×2

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-05-23/ghostwriter-uac-0057-frostyneighbor-cert-ua-documents-new-oy · 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.003Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities×1

Adversaries may rename legitimate / system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for legitimate utilities adversaries are capable of abusing, including both built-in binaries and tools such as PSExec, AutoHotKey, and IronPython. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on these utilities executing from non-standard paths.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32×1

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1057Process Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-15/frostyneighbor-ghostwriter-unc1151-belarus-state-aligned-ese · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-05-23/ghostwriter-uac-0057-frostyneighbor-cert-ua-documents-new-oy · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about FrostyNeighbor March to May 2026 campaign (3)

2026-07-09 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOA2

CERT Polska: UNC1151/Ghostwriter shifts to Gmail with real-time 2FA-relay phishing against officials and public administration

CERT Polska (NASK) reports that UNC1151/Ghostwriter, the Belarus-linked cluster that for years phished Polish-provider webmail (Onet, WP, Interia), has since March 2026 shifted at high, near-daily intensity to Gmail accounts, with new phishing domains appearing almost daily (CERT Polska, 2026-07-08). The lure imitates a Gmail security/administrator notice ("suspicious activity", "account may be blocked") written in error-free Polish and sent from purpose-created Gmail accounts or compromised mailboxes with a spoofed display name, frequently via BCC to obscure the target list. Targeting is broad (political and public-life figures, senior officials, researchers, journalists, public-administration and law-enforcement staff, and their family and social contacts) with some campaigns narrowed to specific professional groups such as translators and court experts.

The core technical escalation over prior campaigns is a real-time second-factor relay: after harvesting the password, the fake login panel displays a second form requesting the TOTP/SMS code, which the operators feed into an automated login against the real account, defeating both app-based (Google Authenticator) and SMS-based factors (CERT Polska, 2026-07-08). Infrastructure mixes dedicated phishing domains on .icu/.digital/.top TLDs with abuse of *.netlify.app subdomains, plus fake panels planted on compromised Polish websites whose main pages are left untouched to avoid tipping off the site owner. The initial lure maps to T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link; the live-relay capture is best described qualitatively (CERT Polska does not name specific AitM tooling).

Since March 2026, however, the group has been running phishing campaigns targeting Gmail users. These campaigns are carried out with high intensity, mainly on weekdays. Notably, they enable the theft of two-factor authentication (2FA) credentials.

If a second factor is required, the phishing page displays an additional form requesting the code. This allows attackers to capture both SMS-based codes and those generated by applications such as Google Authenticator.

CERT Polska
threat09 Jul 04:32Zsingle-source · national CERTOpen finding →

2026-05-23 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

Ghostwriter / UAC-0057 / FrostyNeighbor, CERT-UA documents new OYSTERFRESH → OYSTERBLUES → OYSTERSHUCK implant chain via Prometheus learning-platform lures

UPDATE (originally covered weekly 2026-W21): CERT-UA published a bulletin (surfaced 2026-05-22) on a spring-2026 phishing campaign by Ghostwriter (a.k.a. UAC-0057, UNC1151, FrostyNeighbor) targeting Ukrainian government entities through lures themed on the Prometheus online-learning platform (The Hacker News, 2026-05-22 · SC World, 2026-05-22). The material delta from this week's weekly long-running coverage of FrostyNeighbor / Ghostwriter activity is a new three-stage implant trio distinct from the prior PicassoLoader toolset.

Chain: phishing email from a compromised account → PDF attachment with a link to a ZIP archive → ZIP carrying a JavaScript file (OYSTERFRESH). OYSTERFRESH renders a decoy document as cover while writing an obfuscated, RC4-encrypted OYSTERBLUES payload to the Windows Registry and launching OYSTERSHUCK. OYSTERSHUCK decodes OYSTERBLUES (executed via JavaScript) which then collects computer name, user account, OS version, last boot time and running process list, exfiltrates via HTTP POST to C2, and executes dynamically received JavaScript via eval(). The final payload is assessed as Cobalt Strike. (MITRE ATT&CK overlay added by this brief, not by the CERT-UA narrative as carried by The Hacker News: T1027 Obfuscated Files/Information on the OYSTERFRESH stage, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys on the OYSTERBLUES persistence, T1059.007 JavaScript on OYSTERSHUCK execution, T1219 Remote Access Software on the Cobalt Strike final.)

Defender vantage: CERT-UA's own recommendation is to block wscript.exe execution for standard user accounts, a high-yield control because the OYSTER trio relies on script-host execution from user context. EDR signal: wscript.exe spawning powershell.exe or a base64-encoded command; registry monitoring for new HKCU\Software Run-key values containing binary blobs or script paths; hunt for Cobalt Strike beacon signatures in HTTP POST egress to non-corporate domains. The EU/CH relevance is direct: Ghostwriter historically targets Belgium, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and other NATO members alongside Ukraine, and the OYSTER implant chain is a toolset upgrade defenders should expect to see surfaced in EU government tenants and Eastern-Europe-focused think tanks.

threat23 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-15 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

FrostyNeighbor (Ghostwriter, UNC1151): since March 2026, geofenced PDF lures deliver a JavaScript PicassoLoader and Cobalt Strike to Ukrainian government organisations

ESET attributes new activity since March 2026 to FrostyNeighbor, also known as Ghostwriter, UNC1151, UAC-0057, TA445, PUSHCHA or Storm-0257, a long-running cyberespionage group apparently aligned with the interests of Belarus, using links in spearphishing PDFs to target governmental organisations in Ukraine (ESET, 2026-05-14). In ESET's telemetry the group's Ukrainian targeting focuses on military, defence and government, while its victimology in Poland and Lithuania is broader, spanning industry and manufacturing, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, logistics and many governmental organisations (ESET, 2026-05-14).

The lure is a blurred PDF impersonating Ukrtelecom whose download button leads to the group's delivery server; visitors outside Ukraine receive a benign PDF of the same name, while Ukrainian IP addresses receive a RAR archive holding a JavaScript first stage that shows a decoy, re-runs itself, drops a base64-embedded JavaScript PicassoLoader and builds a scheduled task from an XML template the C2 serves as a fake JPG (ESET, 2026-05-14). PicassoLoader collects the username, computer name, OS version, boot time, current time and running processes, posts them over HTTPS every 10 minutes and evaluates any response longer than 100 bytes (ESET, 2026-05-14). Operators very likely decide by hand whether the victim is of interest; if so, the C2 returns a third-stage dropper that copies rundll32.exe into %ProgramData% under another name, writes the base64-decoded Cobalt Strike beacon DLL beside it, and registers in the HKCU Run key a LNK that starts the copied rundll32 with the DLL's export (ESET, 2026-05-14).

Triage: rundll32.exe is a normal Windows binary when it runs from the system directory; a copy of it under a different name in %ProgramData%, which ESET says is very likely meant to bypass detection rules, is the signal (ESET, 2026-05-14).

Since March 2026, we have detected new activities that we attributed to FrostyNeighbor, using links in malicious PDFs sent via spearphishing attachments to target governmental organizations in Ukraine.

The decision whether or not to deliver a payload is very likely manually performed by the operators, based on the collected information to decide if the victim is of interest.

The payload is only delivered after server-side victim validation, combining automated checks of the requesting user agent and IP address with the manual validation by the operators.

ESET 2026-05-14
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationevidenceheadlinesectorssourcessourcing_notesummarytagstechniquestitleentities

The activity ESET documents since March 2026 targets governmental organisations in Ukraine (ESET, 2026-05-14); the industrial, healthcare and pharmaceutical, logistics and governmental victims in Poland and Lithuania come from ESET's introduction to the group's broader victimology, not from this campaign wave. The chain also persists: the first stage builds a scheduled task from a downloaded XML template to run PicassoLoader, and the Cobalt Strike stage copies rundll32.exe into %ProgramData% under another name and starts it from a LNK registered in the HKCU Run key (ESET, 2026-05-14), which gives defenders host artefacts to hunt where geofencing hides the network side.

threat15 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: ESET · The Hacker News

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3

Source distribution

  • thehackernews.com2 (40%)
  • cert.pl1 (20%)
  • scworld.com1 (20%)
  • welivesecurity.com1 (20%)