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Microsoft SharePoint Online

product · product:microsoft-sharepoint-online single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-10-23 → last 2026-10-23
Latest activity
2026-10-23
Huntress: stolen post-MFA M365 tokens replayed within minutes; a password reset leaves planted devices and…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Microsoft SharePoint Online, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • In every Entra tenant, list the devices registered since 2026-07-14 whose names are DESKTOP- followed by eight uppercase hexadecimal characters, the authenticators that were deleted and re-registered within minutes, and the inbox rules whose names are one to three characters or punctuation only or that move mail to RSS Feeds, RSS Subscriptions or Conversation History, and remove what nobody created; then revoke the sessions of any affected user, because a password reset leaves the devices, MFA methods and a roughly 90-minute access token in place.
    2026-10-23Huntress: stolen post-MFA M365 tokens replayed…

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft SharePoint Online tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-23NOTABLEHuntress: stolen post-MFA M365 tokens replayed within minutes; a password reset leaves planted devices and MFA methods

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-23M365 token spray and replay: Huntress tracks a 10-week campaign that replays stolen post-MFA tokens from rented hosting within minutes, registers rogue Entra devices, wipes and re-registers MFA methods and hides mail with inbox rules of one to three characters or punctuation only
    active-threatsHuntress: stolen post-MFA M365 tokens replayed within minutes; a password reset leaves planted devices and MFA methods

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Microsoft SharePoint Online
ATT&CK techniques (8 across 9 tactics)

8 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing Link
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
  • StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Credential AccessModify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Adversary-in-the-Middle
  • Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
  • CollectionAdversary-in-the-Middle
  • Command and ControlProxy: Multi-hop Proxy

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.008Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules×1

Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

Evidence: 2026-10-23/m365-token-spray-replay-rogue-entra-devices-mfa-wipe · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft SharePoint Online (1)

2026-10-23 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

M365 token spray and replay: Huntress tracks a 10-week campaign that replays stolen post-MFA tokens from rented hosting within minutes, registers rogue Entra devices, wipes and re-registers MFA methods and hides mail with inbox rules of one to three characters or punctuation only

Between 2026-07-14 and 2026-09-22 Huntress detected 497 Microsoft 365 sign-in events across 79 victim organizations that replayed stolen sign-in tokens instead of guessing passwords (Huntress, 2026-10-22). The tokens came from adversary-in-the-middle relays behind fake sign-in pages, from device-code phishing and from social engineering during a genuine sign-in; a relay passes the real login page and MFA prompt through and keeps the token Microsoft issues afterwards, so its holder does not face MFA again (Huntress, 2026-10-22). Replay followed within minutes, after 12 minutes on 2026-07-21 and four minutes on 2026-09-22, from one of six addresses in a single rented range used in turn, so blocking one address stops at most one phase (Huntress, 2026-10-22).

A scripted replayer with the user agent node requests tokens with the Microsoft Office and Microsoft Authentication Broker client applications against Microsoft Graph, Exchange Online, SharePoint Online and the Device Registration Service and joins 48 rogue Entra devices named DESKTOP- plus exactly eight uppercase hexadecimal characters, where the Windows default is seven alphanumeric characters; a browser-session replayer uses current Chrome or Edge through the OfficeHome client (Huntress, 2026-10-22). What outlives a password reset is the persistence: in 19 organizations the victim's MFA methods were wiped and a new authenticator registered within three hours, the rogue devices stay in the directory until deleted, and hidden inbox rules with names of one to three characters or punctuation only, created from VPN or other rented addresses, moved mail to RSS Feeds, RSS Subscriptions or Conversation History or deleted it, one keyed on payroll and bank terms (Huntress, 2026-10-22). Conditional Access blocks reported as AADSTS53003 fire only after authentication has succeeded, so they signal a valid credential, and ranking tenants by failed attempts points responders at the wrong ones (Huntress, 2026-10-22).

Triage: a node user agent with an Office client identifier can be legitimate automation, so Huntress focuses on sign-ins that touch user mailboxes or the Device Registration Service from hosting infrastructure, and it says the device-name pattern is rare but not unique to this campaign, so a device should be confirmed before it is deleted (Huntress, 2026-10-22).

Between July 14, 2026 and September 22, 2026, Huntress detected 497 Microsoft 365 sign-in events across 79 victim organizations related to a token replay campaign

In 19 organizations, the victim's existing MFA methods were wiped and a new method registered within three hours of the first sign-in from a campaign address.

A password reset alone does not remove attacker-registered devices or MFA methods.

Huntress 2026-10-22

Builds on: ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+ Microsoft 365 tenants; disabling it does not… · Calendar-invite phishing spreads: Outlook and Gmail add the lure on their own and keep it after… · Microsoft: Storm-0940 runs the ARTEX agent framework at machine speed; Expel adds an Okta…

threat23 Oct 03:39Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Huntress

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • huntress.com1 (100%)