Microsoft 365 device-code phishing in French-speaking Switzerland (November 2026)
campaign · campaign:m365-device-code-phishing-romandie-2026-11 single-source
Device-code phishing campaign against Microsoft 365 accounts that the canton of Vaud warned of on 2026-11-04 as running in French-speaking Switzerland with several organisations already affected: mail posing as a company or known contact leads to a workers.dev page and a code entry on a genuine Microsoft sign-in page; the notice names no actor, kit or count.
Aliases: Vaud Microsoft 365 device-code phishing warning
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Microsoft 365 device-code phishing in French-speaking Switzerland (November 2026), newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- In every Microsoft 365 tenant your organisation runs or administers, audit device code sign-ins with the authentication protocol filter of the sign-in logs and, where no documented device needs the flow, create a Conditional Access policy with the Authentication flows condition set to Device code flow and Block access, starting in report-only mode and excluding emergency-access accounts and, where devices register through it, the Device Registration Service.2026-11-05Vaud: device-code phishing against Microsoft 365 is…
Defender insights
What each entry about Microsoft 365 device-code phishing in French-speaking Switzerland (November 2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
affects
- Microsoft 365The canton of Vaud's notice says the technique gives the attackers fraudulent access to the victim's Microsoft 365 account
Story timeline
ATT&CK techniques (3 across 5 tactics)
3 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Credential AccessSteal Application Access Token
Initial Access TA0001
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-05/vaud-m365-device-code-phishing-campaign-romandie · ATT&CK page ↗
T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×1
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
Evidence: 2026-11-05/vaud-m365-device-code-phishing-campaign-romandie · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-05/vaud-m365-device-code-phishing-campaign-romandie · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-05/vaud-m365-device-code-phishing-campaign-romandie · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-05/vaud-m365-device-code-phishing-campaign-romandie · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1528Steal Application Access Token×1
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Evidence: 2026-11-05/vaud-m365-device-code-phishing-campaign-romandie · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Microsoft 365 device-code phishing in French-speaking Switzerland (November 2026) (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- learn.microsoft.com2 (50%)
- developers.cloudflare.com1 (25%)
- vd.ch1 (25%)
All cited sources (4)
- developers.cloudflare.comCloudflare Docs (workers.dev routes)https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/configuration/routing/workers-dev/
- learn.microsoft.comMicrosoft Learn (Authentication flows as a condition in Conditional Access policy)https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/concept-authentication-flows
- learn.microsoft.comMicrosoft Learn (Block authentication flows with Conditional Access policy)https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-block-authentication-flows
- vd.chCanton of Vaud (news item, in French)https://www.vd.ch/actualites/actualite/news/26768-campagne-de-phishing-ciblant-les-comptes-microsoft-365