UAT-11473
actor · actor:uat-11473
Cisco Talos designation for a cluster that exploited CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers and ran the KeyDrift implant inside the controller's control-plane daemon; Talos assesses with high confidence that its infrastructure overlaps considerably with Volt Typhoon's Silent Train network, without attributing UAT-11473 to Volt Typhoon (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28).
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about UAT-11473, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Upgrade every Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator to its first fixed release (20.9.8.2, 20.12.5.3 or 20.12.6.1, 20.15.4.2 or 20.18.2.1; releases earlier than 20.9 must migrate), and until then limit ports 22 and 830 on the control components to known controller and management addresses, because Cisco offers no workaround.2026-10-29CVE-2026-20127
Defender insights
What each entry about UAT-11473 tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
uses
- KeyDriftTalos reports UAT-11473 running the KeyDrift implant inside the SD-WAN controller's control-plane process
exploits
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN ControllerTalos reports UAT-11473 exploiting CVE-2026-20127, the peering authentication bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers
overlaps with
- Volt TyphoonTalos assesses with high confidence that the operating infrastructure overlaps considerably with Volt Typhoon's Silent Train network; an infrastructure overlap, not an attribution
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (12 across 8 tactics)
12 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
- PersistenceBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts · Create or Modify System Process
- Privilege EscalationBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts · Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls · Create or Modify System Process
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing · Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service · Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls · Indicator Removal: Timestomp · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
- Credential AccessNetwork Sniffing
- DiscoveryNetwork Sniffing · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
- Command and ControlEncrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Initial Access TA0001
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.006Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking×1
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from various environment variables and files, such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name. Each platform's linker uses an extensive list of environment variables at different points in execution. These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions in the original library.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts×1
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543Create or Modify System Process×1
Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. On macOS, launchd processes known as Launch Daemon and Launch Agent are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts×1
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1055.008Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls×1
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543Create or Modify System Process×1
Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. On macOS, launchd processes known as Launch Daemon and Launch Agent are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027.002Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing×1
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.004Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service×1
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1055.008Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls×1
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×1
Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.006Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking×1
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from various environment variables and files, such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name. Each platform's linker uses an extensive list of environment variables at different points in execution. These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions in the original library.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1040Network Sniffing×1
Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1040Network Sniffing×1
Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about UAT-11473 (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller×1
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator peering authentication bypass (CVSS 10.0): exploited by UAT-8616 and, per Talos on 2026-10-28, UAT-11473, which ran the KeyDrift implant; Lumen reports Volt Typhoon exploiting it from late 2025×1
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager×1
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Validator×1
- KeyDrift×1
- Volt Typhoon×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- blog.talosintelligence.com1 (25%)
- cisa.gov1 (25%)
- lumen.com1 (25%)
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.com1 (25%)
All cited sources (4)
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-11473-keydrift/
- cisa.govCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- lumen.comLumen Black Lotus Labshttps://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/silent-train-volt-typhoon-operational-framework
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.comCisco PSIRThttps://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk