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Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager

product · product:cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager

Coverage
5
first 2026-05-15 → last 2026-10-29
Latest activity
2026-10-29
Talos: UAT-11473 implants KeyDrift in Cisco SD-WAN controllers through CVE-2026-20127 to collect data-plane…
Peak priority
critical
2 critical · 2 high · 1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector, defense · regions: switzerland
Sources cited
19
11 hosts

Action items (6)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Upgrade every Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator to its first fixed release (20.9.8.2, 20.12.5.3 or 20.12.6.1, 20.15.4.2 or 20.18.2.1; releases earlier than 20.9 must migrate), and until then limit ports 22 and 830 on the control components to known controller and management addresses, because Cisco offers no workaround.
    2026-10-29CVE-2026-20127
  • Immediate action: Cisco confirms in-the-wild exploitation of an unauthenticated admin-level API bypass in Catalyst SD-WAN Manager and offers no workaround. Upgrade to the first fixed release of the train (20.9.10.1, 20.12.8.2, 20.15.6.1, 20.18.4.1, 26.1.2.1 or 26.2.1), restrict the Manager's web and API access to known trusted hosts behind a firewall in the meantime (Cisco's Live Protect shield adds only temporary, partial protection and may block legitimate logins that use URI encoding), and open a Severity 3 TAC case with the CVE id in the title for any Manager whose logs show the encoded login-path pattern.
    2026-10-02CVE-2026-76504
  • Upgrade every Catalyst SD-WAN Manager to the first fixed release of its train (20.9.10.1, 20.12.8.2, 20.15.6.1, 20.18.4.1, 26.1.2.1 or 26.2.1; anything earlier than 20.9 must migrate) and, until the upgrade is done, restrict the Manager's web and API access to known trusted hosts behind a firewall; Cisco's Live Protect shield for this CVE adds only temporary, partial protection and may block legitimate logins that use URI encoding.
    2026-10-02CVE-2026-76504
  • On every Manager that was internet-reachable before the upgrade, search serviceproxy-access.log for POSTs to the login path with a percent-encoded character from unknown addresses and vmanage-server.log for login-path requests tied to viptela-reserved- user names, and open a Severity 3 Cisco TAC case with the CVE id in the title if anything matches.
    2026-10-02CVE-2026-76504
  • Upgrade every Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator to its first fixed release (20.9.9.2, 20.12.7.2, 20.15.4.5 or 20.15.5.3, 20.18.3.1 or 26.1.1.2) after collecting request admin-tech from each control component, then verify the configuration of every edge device.
    2026-06-06CVE-2026-20245 +2
1 older action item
  • Immediate action: Run request admin-tech on every control component, then upgrade to a fixed release (for example 20.9.9.1, 20.12.7.1, 20.15.5.2, 20.18.2.2 or 26.1.1.1); check auth.log and control-connection history for the documented indicators, because on a compromised system the upgrade alone does not remediate.
    2026-05-15CVE-2026-20182

Defender insights

What each entry about Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-29HIGHexploitedTalos: UAT-11473 implants KeyDrift in Cisco SD-WAN controllers through CVE-2026-20127 to collect data-plane keys

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-10-02CRITICALexploitedCisco confirms exploitation of an unauthenticated admin bypass in the SD-WAN controller; no workaround, fixes per train

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-06-06HIGHexploitedA netadmin user on Cisco SD-WAN can become root through a crafted upload file; Mandiant saw zero-day use in April

Exposure · detection

2026-06-16NOTABLEexploitedAn SD-WAN Manager user with write access can overwrite any file; Cisco confirms limited exploitation

Exposure · detection

2026-05-15CRITICALexploitedA forged vHub peer can plant an SSH key on Cisco SD-WAN controllers without credentials; Talos ties exploitation to UAT-8616

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-29KeyDrift: Talos reports UAT-11473 exploiting CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers to run an implant inside the control-plane daemon that collects data-plane keys, with infrastructure overlapping Volt Typhoon's Silent Train network
    active-threatsTalos: UAT-11473 implants KeyDrift in Cisco SD-WAN controllers through CVE-2026-20127 to collect data-plane keys
  2. 2026-10-02CVE-2026-76504, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager: one percent-encoded character in the login path skips the password check and mints an admin API session, exploited in the wild (CVSS 9.8)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesCisco confirms exploitation of an unauthenticated admin bypass in the SD-WAN controller; no workaround, fixes per train
  3. 2026-06-16CVE-2026-20262: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager authenticated arbitrary file write, exploited and KEV-listed; Cisco says a written file could later be used to gain root
    trending-vulnerabilitiesAn SD-WAN Manager user with write access can overwrite any file; Cisco confirms limited exploitation
  4. 2026-06-06CVE-2026-20245: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN netadmin-to-root command injection exploited as a zero-day; fixed releases and a Live Protect shield available
    trending-vulnerabilitiesA netadmin user on Cisco SD-WAN can become root through a crafted upload file; Mandiant saw zero-day use in April
  5. 2026-05-15CVE-2026-20182: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN peering authentication bypass (CVSS 10.0) exploited by UAT-8616; affects Controller, Manager and Validator
    trending-vulnerabilitiesA forged vHub peer can plant an SSH key on Cisco SD-WAN controllers without credentials; Talos ties exploitation to UAT-8616
ATT&CK techniques (20 across 9 tactics)

20 techniques observed across 5 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Default Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
  • PersistenceBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Account Manipulation · Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys · Create Account: Local Account · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Create or Modify System Process
  • Privilege EscalationBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts · Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Account Manipulation · Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys · Create or Modify System Process
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing · Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service · Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Indicator Removal: Timestomp · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
  • Credential AccessNetwork Sniffing
  • DiscoveryNetwork Sniffing · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: SSH
  • Command and ControlEncrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×4

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · 2026-10-02/cve-2026-76504-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-auth-bypass-kev · 2026-06-16/cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-cve-2026-20262-authenticated-a · 2026-05-15/cve-2026-20182-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controller-manager-pre · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×2

Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.006Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from various environment variables and files, such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name. Each platform's linker uses an extensive list of environment variables at different points in execution. These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions in the original library.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1037Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts×1

Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.004Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys×1

Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> (or, on ESXi, `/etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys`). Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives `PubkeyAuthentication` and `RSAAuthentication` to the value `yes` to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled, as well as modify the directive `PermitRootLogin` to the value `yes` to enable root authentication via SSH. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/cve-2026-20182-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controller-manager-pre · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-cve-2026-20262-authenticated-a · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543Create or Modify System Process×1

Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. On macOS, launchd processes known as Launch Daemon and Launch Agent are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1037Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts×1

Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.008Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×2

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-cve-2026-20262-authenticated-a · 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.004Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys×1

Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> (or, on ESXi, `/etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys`). Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives `PubkeyAuthentication` and `RSAAuthentication` to the value `yes` to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled, as well as modify the directive `PermitRootLogin` to the value `yes` to enable root authentication via SSH. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/cve-2026-20182-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controller-manager-pre · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543Create or Modify System Process×1

Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. On macOS, launchd processes known as Launch Daemon and Launch Agent are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027.002Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing×1

Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.004Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.008Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×1

Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.006Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from various environment variables and files, such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name. Each platform's linker uses an extensive list of environment variables at different points in execution. These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions in the original library.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1040Network Sniffing×1

Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1040Network Sniffing×1

Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · 2026-05-15/cve-2026-20182-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-controller-manager-pre · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.

Evidence: 2026-10-29/keydrift-uat-11473-cisco-sd-wan-controllers-cve-2026-20127 · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager (5)

2026-10-29 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-20127exploitedNATOB2

KeyDrift: Talos reports UAT-11473 exploiting CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers to run an implant inside the control-plane daemon that collects data-plane keys, with infrastructure overlapping Volt Typhoon's Silent Train network

Cisco Talos reports that UAT-11473 exploited CVE-2026-20127, an authentication bypass in the peering authentication of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-10-28), and then installed a custom framework it calls KeyDrift (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28). CISA has listed the flaw in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog since 2026-02-25 (CISA KEV, 2026-10-28). Cisco's advisory (CVSS 10.0) says an unauthenticated remote attacker can log in as an internal high-privileged non-root user and reach NETCONF to change the SD-WAN fabric configuration, and that there is no workaround (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-10-28). Cisco's advisory, revised on 2026-10-28 to link Talos's post, says its PSIRT is aware of limited exploitation (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-10-28). Lumen's Black Lotus Labs reported on 2026-10-28 that Volt Typhoon had exploited the flaw since late 2025 and after Cisco's February disclosure (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28), and Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11473's operating infrastructure overlaps considerably with Volt Typhoon's Silent Train network (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28).

KeyDrift runs inside the control-plane daemon. The actor edits the runit launchers of sshd and of a look-alike aaamgr service and remounts /rootfs.rw executable: the sshd launcher starts a script that injects the PolyFlame library into every running vdaemon process by ptrace, and the aaamgr launcher runs a packed PolyFlame loader directly (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28). PolyFlame is tasked in-band over the control-plane traffic and offers a command, file-write and file-read backdoor and an intermediate command relay; Talos recovered no hardcoded address, port or domain (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28). A second component, LittleFilch, hooks SSL_read in vdaemon and collects peer system addresses and 32-byte values Talos assesses to be OMP-distributed IPsec data-plane keys, writing them RSA-encrypted to /var/tmp (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28). Talos lists observed targeting as space and satellite services, defense and aerospace technology, and policy research, calls the activity historical and does not say how many controllers were affected (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28).

Triage: an aaamgr service that runs as a compiled ELF is the discriminator, because the legitimate component is a Python package and does not normally appear that way (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-28).

Observed targeting spans across space and satellite services, defense and aerospace technology, and policy research.

The legitimate Cisco aaamgr component is a Python package; it does not normally appear as a compiled ELF runit service.

Cisco Talos 2026-10-28

The Cisco PSIRT is aware of limited exploitation of this vulnerability.

Cisco PSIRT 2026-10-28

Exploitation continued well after Cisco disclosed the vulnerability in February 2026, underscoring Volt Typhoon’s sustained interest in it.

Lumen Black Lotus Labs 2026-10-28

Builds on: A netadmin user on Cisco SD-WAN can become root through a crafted upload file; Mandiant saw…

threat29 Oct 04:40Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-10-02 · view entry permalink →

CRITICALCVE-2026-76504exploitedupdatedNATOA1

CVE-2026-76504, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager: one percent-encoded character in the login path skips the password check and mints an admin API session, exploited in the wild (CVSS 9.8)

Cisco published an advisory on 2026-09-30 for CVE-2026-76504, an authentication bypass in the API session management of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker reach the API with the privileges of the admin user (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30). Cisco states its PSIRT became aware of active exploitation in September 2026 (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30), CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the same day (CISA, 2026-09-30), and no source names an actor. The flaw affects the Manager regardless of configuration and Cisco lists no workaround (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30); Cisco's revision of 2026-10-02 adds a Live Protect shield that it describes as temporary, partial protection, and says the only way to remediate is to upgrade to the first fixed release (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30).

VulnCheck's reproduction explains the mechanism. The application server decodes the request path when it matches its login security constraint, but Cisco's login module tests the raw, undecoded path for the string j_security_check before it decides whether to run the real password check, so a request to /%6a_security_check skips the password check (VulnCheck, 2026-10-01). The request then falls into a branch written for continuing an already trusted session, whose only gate is a substring match against four internal viptela-reserved- account names, and supplying any of them builds a fresh login session (VulnCheck, 2026-10-01). Two of the four accounts hit role checks on admin-only endpoints and two are expected to carry the needed permissions (VulnCheck, 2026-10-01). Cisco stresses that any single encoded character works, not only %6a (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30). VulnCheck counts about 1,500 internet-exposed Managers and found no legitimate public exploit as of 2026-10-01; it rejected a fake proof-of-concept repository (VulnCheck, 2026-10-01).

Cisco's first fixed releases are 20.9.10.1, 20.12.8.2, 20.15.6.1, 20.18.4.1, 26.1.2.1 and 26.2.1; releases earlier than 20.9 must migrate to a fixed train, and the Cisco-managed cloud service (release 20.15.605) needed no customer action (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30). NCSC Switzerland posted its own advisory on 2026-09-30 and lists the flaw as actively exploited (NCSC Switzerland, 2026-09-30).

Triage: Cisco warns that these log entries can also occur during standard operation and must be assessed against normal network posture; a viptela-reserved- name is an internal service account, so the signal is a login-path request with an encoded character from an address that is not part of the fabric (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30).

In September 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability.

This vulnerability affects Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, regardless of system configuration.

Cisco PSIRT 2026-09-30

there are no legitimate public exploits for CVE-2026-76504 as of October 1, 2026

VulnCheck 2026-10-01

This shield offers only temporary partial protection.

A legitimate user with URI encoding might not be able to login to SDWAN Manager.

Cisco PSIRT 2026-09-30
Updaterun 2026-10-03T0404Z-intelsummaryimmediate_actionactionsbodysourcesevidence

Cisco revised its advisory to version 1.1 on 2026-10-02 ("Added information about Live Protect shield availability") and now states it has released a Live Protect shield for CVE-2026-76504 "to provide temporary security coverage" while upgrades are planned (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30). Cisco says the shield offers only temporary partial protection and that, once applied, a legitimate user with URI encoding might not be able to log in to the Manager (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-30). Cisco's Live Protect page lists the feature from Catalyst SD-WAN Control Components release 20.18.3, describes a monitoring mode that shows exploit attempts without enforcing and an enforce mode that applies the mitigation, and says Cisco creates shields for the release current when a shield is published and for the two immediately preceding releases in each supported release train that includes Live Protect, so older releases may have no shield (Cisco, 2026-09-22). The fixed releases, the exploitation statement and the KEV listing are unchanged, and Cisco keeps its position that the only remediation is the upgrade.

Builds on: A netadmin user on Cisco SD-WAN can become root through a crafted upload file; Mandiant saw… · A forged vHub peer can plant an SSH key on Cisco SD-WAN controllers without credentials; Talos…

vulnerability02 Oct 04:44Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-06-06 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-20245 +2exploitedupdatedNATOA1

CVE-2026-20245: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN netadmin-to-root command injection exploited as a zero-day; fixed releases and a Live Protect shield available

CVE-2026-20245 (CVSS 7.8) is a privilege escalation in the CLI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator: an authenticated, local attacker with netadmin privileges can inject commands through a crafted file and execute them as root (Cisco PSIRT). Netadmin access requires valid credentials or exploitation of the earlier authentication bypasses CVE-2026-20182 or CVE-2026-20127 (Cisco PSIRT). Cisco became aware of exploitation in June 2026 and has seen limited cases where it resulted in a configuration change pushed to edge devices (Cisco PSIRT), NCSC Switzerland relayed the advisory (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-05), and CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-06-09 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-06-09). First fixed releases are 20.9.9.2, 20.12.7.2, 20.15.4.5, 20.15.5.3, 20.18.3.1 and 26.1.1.2; Cisco's Live Protect shield gives only temporary partial protection while upgrades are planned (Cisco PSIRT).

In June 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of exploitation of this vulnerability.

Cisco PSIRT
Updaterun 2026-06-26-6bbe4619cvesevidencesourcestagsbody

Mandiant published a forensic reconstruction of an intrusion at a service provider in which CVE-2026-20245 was exploited as a zero-day (Mandiant, 2026-06-24). From late 2025 to January 2026 Mandiant observed unauthorized peering connections to the victim's SD-WAN Manager devices and considers it possible that they exploited CVE-2026-20127 or CVE-2026-20182, then undisclosed; further rogue peerings from March 2026 ran on a version unaffected by CVE-2026-20127, and Cisco confirmed they did not use CVE-2026-20182 either and could rely on stolen certificate material (Mandiant, 2026-06-24). In March the actor logged in over SSH as vmanage-admin and manipulated default account passwords; in April 2026, from an SSH session as admin, it passed a crafted CSV file to the request tenant-upload tenant-list command, whose payload appended a new UID-0 account to /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow (Mandiant, 2026-06-24). It then deleted the files it had created, reverted its configuration changes and ran a validation script (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Updaterun 2026-06-27-40e791d4cvesevidenceregionstagsbody

Mandiant's reconstruction dates the CVE-2026-20245 exploitation to April 2026, after rogue peering access that began in late 2025, and supports hunting for new UID-0 accounts and tenant-upload commands on Manager devices (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-audittitleheadlinesummaryevent_datetagssectorstechniquesaffected_productscvessourcesevidencesourcing_notereferencesclassificationactionsbody

Fixed releases exist for every supported train, and Cisco offers a Live Protect shield as temporary partial protection (Cisco PSIRT). The flaw needs an authenticated attacker with netadmin privileges and scores 7.8 (Cisco PSIRT). Mandiant dates its zero-day exploitation to April 2026 at a service provider; the late-2025 to March activity was rogue peering, which may or may not have used the earlier bypasses, and the actor cleaned up by deleting its files and reverting configuration rather than wiping history or syslog (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Improvementrun 2026-10-21T1149Z-auditheadlinetechniquesactionsbody

Cisco's indicators cover three CLI upload scripts in /var/log/scripts.log, vconfd_script_upload_tenant_list.sh, vconfd_script_upload_vsmart_serial_numbers.sh and vconfd_script_upload_chassis_number_file.sh, not only the tenant-list one; Cisco has also seen limited cases where exploitation pushed a configuration change to edge devices, asks customers to verify the configuration of the edge devices, and describes its Live Protect shield as only temporary partial protection (Cisco PSIRT). Mandiant's hunting guidance covers vmanage-admin logins from unexpected sources, admin password changes set and then reverted, and su from admin to unauthorized accounts in /var/log/auth.log, password delta commits under /var/confd/rollback/, and the upload command in the CLI's show history; its actor restored the system configurations it modified and checked that its root account was gone (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Builds on: A forged vHub peer can plant an SSH key on Cisco SD-WAN controllers without credentials; Talos…

vulnerability06 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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