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JADEPUFFER

actor · actor:jadepuffer single-source

JADEPUFFER, agentic threat actor documented by Sysdig (2026-07-01) as the first observed end-to-end ransomware/extortion operation driven autonomously by an LLM; entered via Langflow CVE-2025-3248 and abused default MinIO/Nacos credentials on internet-exposed infrastructure. Tracked by Microsoft under the designation Storm-3168 (2026-09-25 Azure resource-destruction reporting).

Aliases: Storm-3168

Coverage
3
2 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-07-04 → last 2026-09-28
Latest activity
2026-09-28
Microsoft ties JADEPUFFER's cloud operations to a service principal that enumerated an Azure tenant for 15+…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, technology, education
Sources cited
9
8 hosts
2026-07-043 appearances2026-09-28

Action items (5)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about JADEPUFFER, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Rotate every Azure service-principal client secret, tenant ID or connection string that has ever appeared in a public GitHub issue, PR, commit or gist, including ones since edited or deleted.
    2026-09-28Microsoft ties JADEPUFFER's cloud operations to a…
  • Patch Langflow to ≥ 1.3.0 and remove the code-validation/execution endpoint from internet exposure; the initial-access CVE has been on CISA KEV since May 2025.
    2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
  • Rotate MinIO and Nacos default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin; Nacos default token.secret.key) and stop Nacos authenticating to its backing database as root.
    2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
  • Egress-filter AI-orchestration and application hosts so a compromised server cannot reach arbitrary external databases or staging infrastructure, and move LLM-provider/cloud credentials into a secrets manager off web-reachable hosts.
    2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
  • For any Langflow or self-hosted AI-pipeline estate, confirm model checkpoints and training datasets are backed up to storage isolated from the compute host, ENCFORGE encrypts ~180 ML-artifact file types and any training data sitting on the same host, so a co-located backup is inside the blast radius and recovery would otherwise mean re-training from scratch.
    2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248

Defender insights

What each entry about JADEPUFFER tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-09-28HIGHMicrosoft ties JADEPUFFER's cloud operations to a service principal that enumerated an Azure tenant for 15+ hours, then destroyed resources in minutes

Triage · detection

2026-07-04NOTABLEexploitedSysdig documents JADEPUFFER, an end-to-end LLM-driven extortion run that entered through an unpatched, internet-exposed Langflow

Latest update

Story timeline

Every entry that names JADEPUFFER, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-09-28Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER): a sub-eight-minute, automated Azure resource-destruction campaign via a service-principal secret that stayed valid in a GitHub issue's edit history after the visible text was redacted
    active-threatsMicrosoft ties JADEPUFFER's cloud operations to a service principal that enumerated an Azure tenant for 15+ hours, then destroyed resources in minutes
  2. 2026-08-28A near-autonomous, multi-agent AI framework compromised Taiwanese government infrastructure over four days, cracking 85 accounts, exfiltrating 2,564+ personnel records, and bypassing its own safety guardrails by reframing itself as 'authorized penetration testing'
    mentiondeep-diveTwelve automated attack waves, eight parallel sub-agents each, and a self-applied cover story that has no current MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  3. 2026-07-04JADEPUFFER, Sysdig documents an autonomous, LLM-driven ransomware operation entering via Langflow CVE-2025-3248
    active-threatsSysdig documents JADEPUFFER, an end-to-end LLM-driven extortion run that entered through an unpatched, internet-exposed Langflow

Hunting pivots

CVEs (exploited first)
CVE-2025-3248
Affected products
LangflowMicrosoft Azure
Tags
cloud ×2ransomware ×2actively-exploitedai-abusecisa-kevorganized-crimepre-authrcevulnerabilities
ATT&CK techniques (9 across 7 tactics)

9 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Escape to Host
  • StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials
  • DiscoveryCloud Service Discovery
  • ImpactData Destruction · Data Encrypted for Impact · Inhibit System Recovery

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · ATT&CK page ↗

T1611Escape to Host×1

Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.

Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552Unsecured Credentials×1

Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).

Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1526Cloud Service Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1485Data Destruction×2

Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗

T1490Inhibit System Recovery×1

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Evidence: 2026-09-28/storm-3168-jadepuffer-azure-destructive-service-principal · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about JADEPUFFER (2)

2026-09-28 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER): a sub-eight-minute, automated Azure resource-destruction campaign via a service-principal secret that stayed valid in a GitHub issue's edit history after the visible text was redacted

Microsoft Security Research has identified Azure resource-destruction activity it attributes to JADEPUFFER, the threat actor Sysdig disclosed in July 2026 as the first documented agentic-ransomware operation, giving the first detailed view into the actor's cloud-native operations under Microsoft's own tracking designation Storm-3168 (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-25). Two compromised service principals belonging to one tenant divided the work: the first spent roughly 15.5 hours running 300+ read-only enumeration calls across virtual machines, subscriptions and resource groups; the second, activated 90 minutes later, ran rapid parallel enumeration across two subscriptions in five seconds, then 16 hours later probed Azure App Service configuration stores and Azure OpenSearch resources, apparently hunting for exposed credentials. Within one second of a failed key-retrieval attempt against a non-existent storage account, the same service principal began a roughly seven-minute destructive sequence: 100+ storage-account deletion attempts, mostly successful, though Azure resource locks and storage-account-level deletion protection blocked deletion for a subset, plus deletion of a Key Vault, Function App and App Service plan belonging to the same resource group. Parallel attempts to delete Azure SQL databases failed only because the actor used an unsupported API version for that resource type. The actor also made repeated, unsuccessful attempts against Azure Site Recovery locks and Azure Backup protection locks, which Microsoft assesses as potentially intending to impair recovery, before pivoting roughly 30 minutes later to 30+ successful Storage-Account ListKeys credential-collection calls, including against Site-Recovery-related accounts, for possible future exfiltration.

Timing evidence drives Microsoft's automation assessment: five distinct OAuth tokens were issued for the destructive and collection work, with two active during the same 70-second window performing different resource-type deletions in parallel: "the timing between the different operations and the division of work using multiple service principals and overlapping token streams from the same service principal strongly indicates automated or scripted execution" (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-25). No ransom note or confirmed data exfiltration was observed in this specific activity, but Microsoft assesses the destruction, recovery-mechanism targeting and credential harvesting together as consistent with a ransomware/extortion-aligned objective. Microsoft separately notes ongoing probing from Storm-3168-linked infrastructure since the start of the year against multiple Azure App Service customers, targeting WordPress-administration, PHP-CGI and LangFlow code-validation endpoints, but found no App-Service-to-ARM credential path connecting that probing to the tenant affected in this campaign.

Initial access to the compromised service principal is not confirmed: it is "unclear how the service principal was initially compromised," but its client ID, client secret and tenant ID had previously been posted in plaintext in a public GitHub issue by an employee of the affected organization. The issue was later edited to remove the visible secret, but the value remained retrievable through the issue's public edit history; Microsoft states plainly that "removing or redacting an exposed secret does not invalidate it," while also stating it "could not confirm whether this secret was used for the activity described here" (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-25).

Detection and hunting. In Azure Resource Manager audit-log telemetry, the signal is volume and sequencing rather than any single call: dozens to hundreds of deletion or ListKeys operations against storage accounts, Key Vaults and Function Apps within minutes, especially when preceded by hours of broad read-only enumeration from the same or a paired service principal, and when it includes attempts against Site Recovery or Backup protection locks specifically, a combination with essentially no legitimate operational counterpart. The python-requests user agent Microsoft observed on both compromised principals (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-25) is a further, if weak, signal worth correlating with the rest of the sequence rather than alerting on alone.

Triage: legitimate infrastructure-as-code teardown and disaster-recovery testing can also delete storage accounts and Key Vaults in bulk, so the discriminators are the attempt against recovery-protection locks specifically (a step with no purpose in routine teardown), the credential-harvesting ListKeys sweep that follows the destructive burst rather than preceding it, and multiple overlapping OAuth tokens performing different destructive operations in parallel from principals with no prior operational history of this pattern.

The issue was later edited to remove the secret, but the secret remained accessible through the issue's public edit history. Removing or redacting an exposed secret does not invalidate it; credentials exposed in any public internet location should be treated as compromised and promptly revoked or rotated. We could not confirm whether this secret was used for the activity described here.

The timing between the different operations and the division of work using multiple service principals and overlapping token streams from the same service principal strongly indicates automated or scripted execution.

However, we did not observe a ransom note or confirm successful data exfiltration in the activity described here.

Microsoft Security Blog
threat28 Sep 04:04Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Microsoft Security Blog / Microsoft Security Research

2026-07-04 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2025-3248exploitedupdated

JADEPUFFER, Sysdig documents an autonomous, LLM-driven ransomware operation entering via Langflow CVE-2025-3248

Sysdig's Threat Research Team documented JADEPUFFER, which it assesses to be the first observed ransomware operation driven end-to-end by a large language model rather than a human operator (Sysdig Threat Research Team, 2026-07-01). Initial access exploited CVE-2025-3248, a missing-authentication flaw in Langflow's code-validation endpoint that lets an unauthenticated attacker execute arbitrary Python on the host (T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application); the flaw was fixed in Langflow 1.3.0 and added to CISA KEV in May 2025, so the exposed instance was an already-known, unpatched target (The Hacker News, 2026-07-02).

Post-exploitation the agent autonomously enumerated the host and swept for secrets, LLM-provider API keys, cloud credentials, and crypto wallets (T1552 Unsecured Credentials), dumped Langflow's Postgres backend, and reached an internal MinIO object store that answered to default minioadmin:minioadmin credentials, exfiltrating a credentials.json from an internal bucket (Sysdig, 2026-07-01). It then pivoted to a separate internet-exposed server running MySQL and Alibaba Nacos, forging a JWT with Nacos's publicly documented default signing key to insert a backdoor admin account (T1078 Valid Accounts), probed for container escape via MySQL file primitives against the Docker socket (T1611 Escape to Host), and finally encrypted 1,342 Nacos configuration items with MySQL's AES_ENCRYPT() and dropped the config tables (T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact / T1485 Data Destruction), leaving a ransom note whose AES key was a random UUID never persisted or transmitted, making the data unrecoverable even on payment. Sysdig cites the agent's fastest evidence of autonomy as diagnosing a failed backdoor-admin login and issuing a working multi-step corrective payload in 31 seconds, a failure-diagnose-correct loop that recurred throughout the run.

Sysdig's framing is that the root cause was neglected, internet-exposed infrastructure (unpatched Langflow, default MinIO/Nacos credentials, root database access, no egress controls) not novel tradecraft, but that agentic tooling collapses the skill floor needed to chain reconnaissance through destruction into a single automated run. Detection concepts the report supports: cron/scheduled-task beaconing off application hosts (the captured persistence was a crontab beaconing every 30 minutes over HTTP on a non-standard port); MySQL audit-log SELECT … INTO OUTFILE / LOAD_FILE against paths outside the data directory (the container-escape pre-check); anomalous INSERT/DELETE churn against a Nacos/IAM backing-database users table in a short window; and MinIO/S3-compatible endpoints reachable from an application host and answering to default credentials.

The Sysdig Threat Research Team (TRT) has captured what we assess to be the first documented case of agentic ransomware: a complete extortion operation driven end-to-end by a large language model (LLM).

CVE-2025-3248 is a missing-authentication flaw in its code validation endpoint that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary Python on the host.

Sysdig Threat Research Team 2026-07-01

The flaw was fixed in Langflow 1.3.0 and added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list in May 2025, but plenty of servers were never updated.

The Hacker News 2026-07-02

In a new development, the operator behind JADEPUFFER has doubled down on that bet, using ransomware to destroy the one thing an organization can't simply restore: a trained AI model.

Sysdig Threat Research Team 2026-07-01
Updaterun 2026-07-21T0409Z-intelactionsaffected_productsevidencesectorssourcestagstechniquesbody

The JADEPUFFER operator, the agentic-LLM extortion actor Sysdig first documented exploiting Langflow's missing-authentication code-execution flaw (CVE-2025-3248), returned to the same Langflow instance with a materially upgraded payload. Where the original intrusion improvised Python and MySQL AES_ENCRYPT() to extort a downstream database, the new run deploys ENCFORGE (written to disk as lockd), a compiled, UPX-packed Go ransomware purpose-built for the machine-learning stack (Sysdig, 2026-07-20). Sysdig ties it to the same actor (the extortion contact embedded in ENCFORGE matches the one disclosed in the prior report) assessing "the same operator with a materially upgraded toolkit." Infosecurity Magazine corroborates the campaign (Infosecurity Magazine, 2026-07-20).

ENCFORGE targets roughly 180 file extensions spanning the modern ML pipeline (PyTorch/TensorFlow checkpoints, HuggingFace SafeTensors weights, llama.cpp GGUF quantized models, FAISS vector indices, Apache Parquet/TFRecord training datasets, NumPy arrays and LoRA adapters) encrypting with AES-256-CTR under RSA-2048. Sysdig frames the significance bluntly: the operator is "using ransomware to destroy the one thing an organization can't simply restore: a trained AI model," because rebuilding a production fine-tuned model means re-running weeks-to-months of training, and if the training data sits on the same compromised host it is encrypted too.

threat04 Jul 00:26Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Sysdig Threat Research Team · The Hacker News · Infosecurity Magazine

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2
  • Deep dive1

Source distribution

  • sysdig.com2 (22%)
  • dreamgroup.com1 (11%)
  • infosecurity-magazine.com1 (11%)
  • microsoft.com1 (11%)
  • moda.gov.tw1 (11%)
  • tenable.com1 (11%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (11%)
  • unit42.paloaltonetworks.com1 (11%)
All cited sources (9)