2026-07-04NOTABLEexploitedSysdig documents JADEPUFFER, an end-to-end LLM-driven extortion run that entered through an unpatched, internet-exposed Langflow
Langflow /api/v1/validate/code missing-auth RCE, initial access for the JADEPUFFER agentic ransomware operation
cve · CVE-2025-3248
Coverage
1
first 2026-07-04 → last 2026-07-04
Latest activity
2026-07-21
Sysdig documents JADEPUFFER, an end-to-end LLM-driven extortion run that entered through an unpatched…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector, education
Sources cited
4
3 hosts
Action items (4)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about CVE-2025-3248, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Patch Langflow to ≥ 1.3.0 and remove the code-validation/execution endpoint from internet exposure; the initial-access CVE has been on CISA KEV since May 2025.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
- Rotate MinIO and Nacos default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin; Nacos default token.secret.key) and stop Nacos authenticating to its backing database as root.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
- Egress-filter AI-orchestration and application hosts so a compromised server cannot reach arbitrary external databases or staging infrastructure, and move LLM-provider/cloud credentials into a secrets manager off web-reachable hosts.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
- For any Langflow or self-hosted AI-pipeline estate, confirm model checkpoints and training datasets are backed up to storage isolated from the compute host, ENCFORGE encrypts ~180 ML-artifact file types and any training data sitting on the same host, so a co-located backup is inside the blast radius and recovery would otherwise mean re-training from scratch.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
Defender insights
What each entry about CVE-2025-3248 tells a defender to do, newest first.
Latest update
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 6 tactics)
6 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application
- PersistenceValid Accounts
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Escape to Host
- StealthValid Accounts
- Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials
- ImpactData Destruction · Data Encrypted for Impact
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1611Escape to Host×1
Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1552Unsecured Credentials×1
Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1485Data Destruction×1
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Langflow /api/v1/validate/code missing-auth RCE, initial access for the JADEPUFFER agentic ransomware operation (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- sysdig.com2 (50%)
- infosecurity-magazine.com1 (25%)
- thehackernews.com1 (25%)
External references
All cited sources (4)
- sysdig.comprimarySysdig Threat Research Teamhttps://www.sysdig.com/blog/jadepuffer-agentic-ransomware-for-automated-database-extortion
- sysdig.comprimarySysdig Threat Research Teamhttps://www.sysdig.com/blog/jadepuffer-evolves-the-agentic-threat-actor-deploys-ransomware-built-to-destroy-ai-models
- infosecurity-magazine.comInfosecurity Magazinehttps://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/jadepuffer-ai-model-ransomware/
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/07/ai-agent-exploits-langflow-rce-to.html