2026-09-03HIGHexploitedA months-old, already-patched Langflow RCE draws 360 attack attempts in days once honeypots start counting
Langflow
product · product:langflow single-source
Coverage
6
first 2026-07-04 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-09-03
A months-old, already-patched Langflow RCE draws 360 attack attempts in days once honeypots start counting
Peak priority
high
4 high · 2 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector, finance · regions: europe, apac
Sources cited
26
19 hosts
Action items (14)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Langflow, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Upgrade every self-hosted Langflow instance to the current release (1.12.0) now if still running any version at or below 1.4.2; where AWS or OpenAI credentials were configured as environment variables on an exposed instance, rotate them and check for outbound API usage from unfamiliar sources.2026-09-03CVE-2026-0768
- Confirm every internet-facing NetScaler ADC/Gateway is on 13.1-62.23, 14.1-66.59 or 13.1-FIPS/NDcPP 13.1-37.262 or later, and on any appliance configured as a SAML Identity Provider that ran an earlier build, invalidate existing AAA sessions rather than assuming the patch ended the exposure, the flaw leaks live session material from appliance memory.2026-07-31CVE-2026-3055 +2
- Confirm every marimo notebook instance is on 0.23.0 or later and that none answers from outside the development network, then, separately, compromise-assess any instance that was exposed while below 0.23.0, because Unit 42 records command execution as confirmed on 11 endpoints in this campaign rather than merely attempted, and the patch does not evict an attacker who already had a PTY shell.2026-07-31CVE-2026-3055 +2
- Confirm the April 2026 cumulative update is installed on every Windows host that answers IKEv2 (VPN gateways, Always On VPN endpoints and any domain member running Routing and Remote Access) and treat an unpatched internet-reachable responder as a compromise-assessment candidate rather than a patch backlog item; where a host cannot be patched this cycle, apply Microsoft's stated interim control (block inbound UDP 500/4500 on systems not using IKE, restrict those ports to known peers on systems that do).2026-07-31CVE-2026-3055 +2
- Inventory Model Context Protocol endpoints in your cloud estate and confirm each one requires authentication, Wiz found unauthenticated MCP endpoints across hundreds of environments, and each is a pre-authenticated proxy already holding the backend credentials it bridges.2026-08-08The AI toolchain became a cloud attack surface with…
9 older action items
- Upgrade every self-hosted Langflow instance to OSS 1.10.1; on any instance where AUTO_LOGIN must remain enabled, rotate the default langflow/langflow credentials and set NEW_USER_IS_ACTIVE=false, patching alone does not close CVE-2026-0770, and CVE-2026-9202 lets unauthenticated attackers self-provision active accounts otherwise.2026-07-22CVE-2026-0770 +5
- Upgrade self-hosted Langflow to OSS 1.10.2 rather than 1.10.1, CVE-2026-14499 (CVSS 8.8, authenticated command injection in the Python Interpreter component) affects 1.0.0 through 1.10.1 inclusive, so an estate that followed the earlier 1.10.1 guidance is still exposed to it.2026-07-22CVE-2026-0770 +5
- Take self-hosted Langflow instances off the public internet rather than patching them in place; three separate pre-authentication code-execution paths in this product are now confirmed exploited, and one of them still has no fixed version.2026-07-22CVE-2026-0770 +5
- Take every self-hosted Langflow instance off any internet-reachable interface: ZDI documents no fixed version and names restricting interaction with the product as the only mitigation, so network position is the whole of the available control.2026-07-29CVE-2026-0769
- On any Langflow host that was internet-exposed, rotate the LLM-provider API keys and any other service credentials that instance held or could read: VulnCheck reports credential harvesting as observed post-exploitation behaviour, and those keys are billable and usable from anywhere.2026-07-29CVE-2026-0769
- Patch Langflow to ≥ 1.3.0 and remove the code-validation/execution endpoint from internet exposure; the initial-access CVE has been on CISA KEV since May 2025.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
- Rotate MinIO and Nacos default credentials (minioadmin:minioadmin; Nacos default token.secret.key) and stop Nacos authenticating to its backing database as root.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
- Egress-filter AI-orchestration and application hosts so a compromised server cannot reach arbitrary external databases or staging infrastructure, and move LLM-provider/cloud credentials into a secrets manager off web-reachable hosts.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
- For any Langflow or self-hosted AI-pipeline estate, confirm model checkpoints and training datasets are backed up to storage isolated from the compute host, ENCFORGE encrypts ~180 ML-artifact file types and any training data sitting on the same host, so a co-located backup is inside the blast radius and recovery would otherwise mean re-training from scratch.2026-07-04CVE-2025-3248
Defender insights
What each entry about Langflow tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Latest update · triage · detection
Latest update · triage
Exposure · triage · detection
Latest update
Story timeline
- 2026-09-03CVE-2026-0768, Langflow: a code-injection RCE patched since January sees renewed mass exploitation, harvesting AWS and OpenAI credentials from environment variables
- 2026-08-08Wiz Cloud Threat Highlights H1 2026: LiteLLM had four separate security events in six months, unauthenticated MCP endpoints turned up across hundreds of environments, and a new extortion actor goes after service accounts rather than people
- 2026-07-31Unit 42 recovers a live autonomous-AI attack operation after it exposed its own home directory, the confirmed compromises came from manual exploitation of Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2026-3055) and Marimo notebooks, not the agent
- 2026-07-29CVE-2026-0769 in Langflow: a pre-auth eval-injection RCE with no documented fix that VulnCheck observes being exploited, and that CISA KEV does not list
- 2026-07-22CVE-2026-0770, Langflow: CISA confirms active exploitation of an unauthenticated exec_globals RCE the same day a 15-CVE batch (incl. unauthenticated account creation) is patched in 1.10.1
- 2026-07-04JADEPUFFER, Sysdig documents an autonomous, LLM-driven ransomware operation entering via Langflow CVE-2025-3248
Hunting pivots
CVEs (exploited first)
Releases covered
Langflow ×6
ATT&CK techniques (20 across 10 tactics)
20 techniques observed across 6 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ReconnaissanceActive Scanning · Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
- Resource DevelopmentObtain Capabilities: Exploits
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Create Account
- Privilege EscalationExploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Escape to Host
- StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Credential AccessSteal Web Session Cookie · Unsecured Credentials · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- Command and ControlProxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Web Service
- ImpactData Destruction · Data Encrypted for Impact · Resource Hijacking
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1595Active Scanning×1
Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1
Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗
Resource Development TA0042
T1588.005Obtain Capabilities: Exploits×1
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×6
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/cve-2026-0768-langflow-renewed-mass-exploitation · 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · 2026-07-29/cve-2026-0769-langflow-preauth-eval-rce-exploited-not-in-kev · 2026-07-22/langflow-cve-2026-0770-exploited-ncsc-nl-15-cve-batch · 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools×1
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by adversaries. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×2
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · 2026-07-29/cve-2026-0769-langflow-preauth-eval-rce-exploited-not-in-kev · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
Evidence: 2026-07-22/langflow-cve-2026-0770-exploited-ncsc-nl-15-cve-batch · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
T1136Create Account×1
Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Evidence: 2026-07-22/langflow-cve-2026-0770-exploited-ncsc-nl-15-cve-batch · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
T1611Escape to Host×1
Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1
An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552Unsecured Credentials×3
Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).
Evidence: 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · 2026-07-29/cve-2026-0769-langflow-preauth-eval-rce-exploited-not-in-kev · 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×2
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-09-03/cve-2026-0768-langflow-renewed-mass-exploitation · 2026-07-22/langflow-cve-2026-0770-exploited-ncsc-nl-15-cve-batch · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1485Data Destruction×1
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-07-04/jadepuffer-agentic-llm-ransomware-langflow-rce · ATT&CK page ↗
T1496Resource Hijacking×1
Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.
Evidence: 2026-07-29/cve-2026-0769-langflow-preauth-eval-rce-exploited-not-in-kev · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Langflow (6)
Earlier coverage (3)
CVE-2026-0770, Langflow: CISA confirms active exploitation of an unauthenticated exec_globals RCE the same day a 15-CVE batch (incl. unauthenticated account creation) is patched in 1.10.1CISA added CVE-2026-0770 (CVSS 9.8) to its KEV catalog on 2026-07-21, confirming in-the-wild exploitation of an unauthenticated Python code-execution flaw in the self-hosted Langflow AI-agent platform's /api/v1/validate/code endpoint; the same day NCSC-NL disclosed 15 further CVEs (fixed in Langflow OSS 1.10.1), including an unauthenticated account-creation flaw (CVE-2026-9202) that reaches code execution. Any organisation self-hosting Langflow (increasingly EU/CH public-sector and research bodies building internal LLM/agent pipelines) must upgrade to 1.10.1 and close the AUTO_LOGIN / default-credential exposure.CVE-2026-0769 in Langflow: a pre-auth eval-injection RCE with no documented fix that VulnCheck observes being exploited, and that CISA KEV does not listVulnCheck reported on 2026-07-28 that it has observed attackers gaining initial access to Langflow with exploits targeting CVE-2026-0769 and a second Langflow flaw, CVE-2026-5027, then harvesting credentials, deploying cryptominers and attempting lateral movement, without splitting that activity between the two, and that neither flaw is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. CVE-2026-0769 is a Zero Day Initiative 0-day advisory: an eval injection in Langflow's eval_custom_component_code function reachable with no authentication (CVSS 9.8), for which ZDI documents no fixed version and names restricting interaction with the product as the only mitigation. A KEV-driven patch process will not surface this, and the KEV-listed CVE-2026-0770, the next CVE number, is a different vulnerability.JADEPUFFER, Sysdig documents an autonomous, LLM-driven ransomware operation entering via Langflow CVE-2025-3248Sysdig's Threat Research Team documented JADEPUFFER, which it assesses to be the first observed end-to-end ransomware operation driven autonomously by a large language model. Initial access exploited CVE-2025-3248, a missing-authentication code-execution flaw in Langflow's code-validation endpoint that has been on CISA KEV since May 2025; the agent then swept credentials, abused default MinIO/Nacos credentials, and destroyed data on internet-exposed, neglected infrastructure.
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Apache Tomcat×1
- Citrix NetScaler×1
- Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway out-of-bounds memory read when configured as a SAML Identity Provider (CWE-125, CVSS 9.8), CISA KEV-listed and exploited by multiple unrelated clusters, including manual exfiltration of appliance memory searched for session cookies (Unit 42, 2026-07-30); fixed in 13.1-62.24 / 14.1-66.60 / 13.1-FIPS-NDcPP 13.1-37.263×1
- CVE-2026-0770, Langflow: unauthenticated exec_globals RCE (actively exploited, CISA KEV 2026-07-21)×1
- CVE-2026-8859, Langflow OSS: path-traversal arbitrary file write (fixed 1.10.1)×1
- CVE-2026-9135, Langflow OSS: code injection in Policies/ToolGuard component (fixed 1.10.1)×1
- CVE-2026-9202, Langflow OSS: unauthenticated account creation reaching RCE (fixed 1.10.1)×1
- Hermes AI agent×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- cisa.gov3 (12%)
- zerodayinitiative.com3 (12%)
- euvd.enisa.europa.eu2 (8%)
- ibm.com2 (8%)
- sysdig.com2 (8%)
- 0patch.com1 (4%)
- advisories.ncsc.nl1 (4%)
- api.first.org1 (4%)
- other11 (42%)
All cited sources (26)
- 0patch.com0patch (ACROS Security)https://0patch.com/blog/micropatches-released-for-windows-ike-service-extensions
- advisories.ncsc.nlNCSC-NLhttps://advisories.ncsc.nl/advisory?id=NCSC-2026-0251
- api.first.orgFIRST.org EPSS API, value as of 2026-08-18https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-33824&date=2026-08-18
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-langflow-flaw-exploited-to-steal-openai-and-aws-keys/
- cisa.govCISAhttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/07/21/cisa-adds-four-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- cisa.govCISAhttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/08/04/cisa-adds-three-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- cisa.govCISA KEV cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Databasehttps://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/enisa/eu_vulnerability_database/EUVD-2026-22641
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EUVDhttps://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-4475
- github.comLangflow (GitHub Releases)https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases
- heise.deheise Securityhttps://www.heise.de/news/Jetzt-patchen-Angreifer-attackieren-Langflow-Instanzen-mit-Schadcode-11437701.html
- ibm.comIBM PSIRThttps://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278927
- ibm.comIBM Security Bulletinhttps://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7279996
- infosecurity-magazine.comInfosecurity Magazinehttps://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/jadepuffer-ai-model-ransomware/
- labs.watchtowr.comwatchTowr Labshttps://labs.watchtowr.com/please-we-beg-just-one-weekend-free-of-appliances-citrix-netscaler-cve-2026-3055-memory-overread-part-2/
- msrc.microsoft.comMicrosoft Security Response Centerhttps://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-33824
- support.citrix.comCitrix (Cloud Software Group), security bulletin CTX696300https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX696300
- sysdig.comSysdig Threat Research Teamhttps://www.sysdig.com/blog/jadepuffer-agentic-ransomware-for-automated-database-extortion
- sysdig.comSysdig Threat Research Teamhttps://www.sysdig.com/blog/jadepuffer-evolves-the-agentic-threat-actor-deploys-ransomware-built-to-destroy-ai-models
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/07/ai-agent-exploits-langflow-rce-to.html
- unit42.paloaltonetworks.comUnit 42 (Palo Alto Networks)https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/autonomous-ai-cyber-attack-campaign/
- vulncheck.comVulnCheckhttps://www.vulncheck.com/blog/state-of-exploitation-1h-2026
- wiz.ioWiz Researchhttps://www.wiz.io/blog/cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026
- zerodayinitiative.comZero Day Initiative (Trend Micro)https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-034/
- zerodayinitiative.comZero Day Initiative (ZDI-26-035)https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-035/
- zerodayinitiative.comZero Day Initiative (Trend Micro)https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-036/