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Interlock

actor · actor:interlock single-source

Financially motivated double-extortion ransomware group operating the Interlock encryptor, first observed in late September 2024 and tracked by Sophos Counter Threat Unit as GOLD EMBRACE; targets organisations across North America and Europe. In a March 2026 intrusion investigated by Sophos, the operator reached credential access by acquiring a physical-memory image with WinPmem and running Volatility3's hash-dump and cached-credential plugins against it offline, in place of a commodity credential dumper (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-08-07).

Aliases: GOLD EMBRACE

Coverage
3
2 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-06-25 → last 2026-10-30
Latest activity
2026-10-30
Talos IR Q3: public administration tied for most targeted; vishing into RMM and EDR killing mark the…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 routine
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, healthcare, energy · regions: europe
Sources cited
6
5 hosts
2026-06-253 appearances2026-10-30

Defender insights

What each entry about Interlock tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-30ROUTINETalos IR Q3: public administration tied for most targeted; vishing into RMM and EDR killing mark the ransomware cases

Exposure · detection

2026-08-10HIGHA ransomware operator acquired a memory image and ran hashdump and cachedump offline against it, leaving traces that look like an IR engagement

Triage

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

uses

Story timeline

Every entry that names Interlock, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-10-30ANNUAL REPORT: Cisco Talos Incident Response trends Q3 2026: public administration tied with finance as the most targeted sector, help-desk vishing into remote-management tools, and ransomware operators uninstalling and killing EDR
    researchTalos IR Q3: public administration tied for most targeted; vishing into RMM and EDR killing mark the ransomware cases
  2. 2026-08-10Interlock ran Volatility3 and WinPmem against a live endpoint to harvest credentials, the responder's own memory-forensics toolkit used in place of a commodity dumper
    active-threatsA ransomware operator acquired a memory image and ran hashdump and cachedump offline against it, leaving traces that look like an IR engagement
  3. 2026-06-25"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke
    mentionactive-threats
ATT&CK techniques (16 across 11 tactics)

16 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessDrive-by Compromise · Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthIndicator Removal
  • Defense ImpairmentDisable or Modify Tools
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
  • DiscoveryPermission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
  • Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact

Initial Access TA0001

T1189Drive-by Compromise×1

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×1

Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070Indicator Removal×1

Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.005OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials×1

Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Interlock (2)

2026-10-30 · view entry permalink →

ROUTINENATOB2

Cisco Talos Incident Response reports that in Q3 2026 financial organisations made up 18 percent of its engagements, tying with public administration as the most targeted sector (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-29). Phishing was the leading initial-access technique at 37 percent of engagements and exploitation of public-facing applications second at 33 percent; the phishing cases include numerous actors who phone the victim as the IT help desk to get remote access allowed through a legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-29). Ransomware and pre-ransomware cases were 27 percent of engagements, with The Gentlemen, Qilin, Rhysida and the closed group Interlock among the families and a new variant, VYPR, that Talos calls operationally immature: it had no leak site when seen, reused leaked Conti-derived source code and exfiltrated over several days (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-29).

The VYPR intrusion began with a vishing call that had the user start a Microsoft Quick Assist session; the actor then used RMM software that ran PowerShell to download and install an MSI from a remote address, with MeshAgent, Rclone, PsExec, an IP scanner and mstsc as tools, and disabled EDR with several vulnerable drivers (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-29). Interlock operators repeatedly tried to uninstall Cisco Secure Endpoint, used PsExec and taskkill to end security services and integrity checkers, turned off Windows Defender real-time protection and cleared event logs (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-29). Talos names insufficient logging (over 40 percent of engagements), weak credential and secret handling, and absent or incomplete MFA as the most common weaknesses, and recommends centralised logging with at least 90 days of retention (Cisco Talos, 2026-10-29).

Targeting of the financial industry increased from last quarter to comprise 18 percent of all engagements, tying with public administration as the most targeted sector.

numerous threat actors conducting voice phishing (vishing) in tandem with IT desk impersonation to socially engineer the victim into allowing remote access via a legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool

making multiple attempts to impair endpoint detection EDR capabilities by trying to uninstall Cisco Secure Endpoint (CSE) on compromised systems

Cisco Talos 2026-10-29
annual-report30 Oct 03:46Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Cisco Talos

2026-08-10 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

Interlock ran Volatility3 and WinPmem against a live endpoint to harvest credentials, the responder's own memory-forensics toolkit used in place of a commodity dumper

Sophos's Emergency Incident Response team has published an intrusion in which the Interlock ransomware operator (which Sophos's Counter Threat Unit tracks as GOLD EMBRACE, active since September 2024 against North American and European targets) used the defender's own toolkit for credential access (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-08-07). On the first compromised host, the actor acquired a full physical-memory image using WinPmem, the open-source physical-memory acquisition tool, and then ran Volatility3's Windows plugins against that image offline: the hash-dump plugin to recover account material from the SAM and SYSTEM hive structures resident in memory, and the cached-domain-credential plugin for cached logons. No commodity credential dumper was involved in that step.

The chain around it is otherwise conventional and worth reading for its timing. The user reached a compromised but reputable site through a search result, and five seconds later the page read the clipboard, the ClickFix fingerprint. Eight seconds later, thirteen seconds into the chain, the user pasted an attacker-supplied command into the Run dialog, which fetched a second-stage script and installed a remote-access trojan to run at startup; registry Run-key persistence landed about twenty-five minutes in. The operator then paused for roughly a day before resuming with domain-group enumeration over LDAP, a service-principal-name query consistent with Kerberoasting, and a lateral move to the domain controller over RDP. On the third day, using a compromised domain-administrator account, persistence was re-established through a scheduled task named to imitate the built-in disk-defragmentation task and running a bundled Node.js interpreter. Sophos records the outcome as credential dumping including cloud credentials, access to sensitive files, new domain-administrator accounts, and tampering with endpoint protection, and notes that, across the estate, not all endpoints were in fact running protection of any sort.

The reason this is worth a defender's attention is not novelty of the malware but the inversion it forces. Memory acquisition and Volatility analysis are exactly what an incident responder does, so the on-host artifacts of the attack step and of a legitimate engagement are the same artifacts. Sophos is explicit that adversarial use "would leave similar traces" to a DFIR investigation, a security assessment, or malware analysis, and that what resolved it in this case was that the customer knew of no legitimate activity of that kind.

Triage: memory-acquisition and memory-analysis binaries executing on an endpoint are not anomalous by artifact; they are anomalous by authorisation and by context. The discriminators that survive are organisational rather than technical: whether an engagement, assessment or analysis was actually scheduled on that host at that time; whether the binaries arrived through the change process that normally delivers them or were dropped into a user-writable path; and whether the acquisition ran on a host with a current, unexplained persistence artifact and recent Run-key or scheduled-task creation. A memory image being written to disk by a process whose parent is a user shell or a downloaded stager, rather than by a responder's tooling deployed through management infrastructure, is the sequence worth alerting on.

In March 2026, the Sophos Emergency Incident Response (EIR) team investigated an incident in which we observed the use of the legitimate IR memory analysis tool Volatility3 by the ransomware threat actor Interlock.

Interlock, which Sophos Counter Threat Unit (CTU) researchers track as GOLD EMBRACE, emerged in September 2024.

We found evidence of credential dumping (including AWS credentials), access to sensitive files, addition of new domain-admin accounts, tampering with Defender on the endpoints, and more.

Sophos X-Ops 2026-08-07
threat10 Aug 04:44Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2
  • Research1

Source distribution

  • sophos.com2 (33%)
  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (17%)
  • broadcom.com1 (17%)
  • csoonline.com1 (17%)
  • securityweek.com1 (17%)