2026-10-30ROUTINETalos IR Q3: public administration tied for most targeted; vishing into RMM and EDR killing mark the ransomware cases
Interlock
actor · actor:interlock single-source
Financially motivated double-extortion ransomware group operating the Interlock encryptor, first observed in late September 2024 and tracked by Sophos Counter Threat Unit as GOLD EMBRACE; targets organisations across North America and Europe. In a March 2026 intrusion investigated by Sophos, the operator reached credential access by acquiring a physical-memory image with WinPmem and running Volatility3's hash-dump and cached-credential plugins against it offline, in place of a commodity credential dumper (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-08-07).
Aliases: GOLD EMBRACE
Coverage
3
2 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-06-25 → last 2026-10-30
Latest activity
2026-10-30
Talos IR Q3: public administration tied for most targeted; vishing into RMM and EDR killing mark the…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 routine
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, healthcare, energy · regions: europe
Sources cited
6
5 hosts
2026-06-253 appearances2026-10-30
Defender insights
What each entry about Interlock tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Triage
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
uses
- NodeSnakeSophos records the Node.js-based remote-access trojan re-established through a scheduled task masquerading as the built-in defragmentation task
Story timeline
Every entry that names Interlock, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-10-30ANNUAL REPORT: Cisco Talos Incident Response trends Q3 2026: public administration tied with finance as the most targeted sector, help-desk vishing into remote-management tools, and ransomware operators uninstalling and killing EDR
- 2026-08-10Interlock ran Volatility3 and WinPmem against a live endpoint to harvest credentials, the responder's own memory-forensics toolkit used in place of a commodity dumper
- 2026-06-25"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (16 across 11 tactics)
16 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessDrive-by Compromise · Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- StealthIndicator Removal
- Defense ImpairmentDisable or Modify Tools
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
- DiscoveryPermission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
- Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools
- ImpactData Encrypted for Impact
Initial Access TA0001
T1189Drive-by Compromise×1
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×1
Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1
An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1070Indicator Removal×1
Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1
Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.005OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials×1
Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1
Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/interlock-volatility3-winpmem-credential-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×1
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/cisco-talos-ir-trends-q3-2026-public-administration · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Interlock (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- sophos.com2 (33%)
- blog.talosintelligence.com1 (17%)
- broadcom.com1 (17%)
- csoonline.com1 (17%)
- securityweek.com1 (17%)
All cited sources (6)
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/ir-trends-q3-2026/
- broadcom.comBroadcom/Symantec protection bulletinhttps://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/backdoor-mistic-new-backdoor-may-be-linked-to-ransomware-access-broker
- csoonline.comCSO Onlinehttps://www.csoonline.com/article/4189132/be-on-the-lookout-for-mistic-a-new-backdoor-used-by-ransomware-broker.html
- securityweek.comSecurityWeekhttps://www.securityweek.com/new-mistic-rat-opens-door-to-several-ransomware-families/
- sophos.comSophos X-Opshttps://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/2608-volatility-interlock/
- sophos.comSophos Counter Threat Unithttps://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-profiles/gold-embrace