APT28
actor · actor:apt28 single-source
Russian state-sponsored espionage group that the US government attributes to the GRU; Symantec tracks the HOOKEDGE intrusions as Swallowtail and Recorded Future as BlueDelta, which it says overlaps APT28 and which it assesses with moderate confidence conducted the HOOKEDGE campaigns, against government, defence, diplomatic and law-enforcement organizations in Europe (Symantec, 2026-10-20; Recorded Future, 2026-08-27).
Aliases: Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, Swallowtail, BlueDelta
Defender insights
What each entry about APT28 tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
uses
- HOOKEDGESymantec attributes the HOOKEDGE intrusions to Swallowtail, which it equates with APT28; Recorded Future assesses with moderate confidence that BlueDelta, overlapping APT28, used it
Story timeline
Every entry that names APT28, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-10-21APT28 (Swallowtail) used the HOOKEDGE backdoor against a law-enforcement agency, a naval shipbuilder and an aircraft-engine maker in two NATO states; at the shipbuilder it then pushed an SSH key for a persistent tunnel, captured NTLM handshakes and ran a reflective loader
- 2026-08-01CaptiveCrunch: an SVR-linked sub-cluster hijacks hotel and conference captive portals to serve fake update lures, a Go RAT and a token-stealing PowerShell module to travelling staff
- 2026-07-25TA458 / Operation RoundPress: a running supply of half-click webmail zero-days adds a fresh SOGo flaw (CVE-2026-8496)
- 2026-06-14Sekoia: APT28 (GRU Unit 26165) tradecraft shifts to LLM-generated payloads and cloud-native C2
- 2026-05-30ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolset
- 2026-05-28CVE-2026-48842, Roundcube Webmail pre-authentication SQL injection in virtuser_query plugin (CVSS 8.1)
- 2026-05-10Bauman University "Department No. 4", leaked GRU cyber-operator training pipeline reveals direct line to Sandworm and APT28 operations against European targets
- 2026-05-08Poland's ABW: attackers breached five municipal water treatment plants in 2025 and in some cases altered equipment parameters, and hacktivists exploited weak passwords on exposed management panels at municipal sites
- 2026-05-08CVE-2026-32202 in Windows Shell: an incomplete fix for an APT28-exploited LNK flaw leaks NTLM hashes when a folder is opened, exploited and re-released in July (CVSS 4.3)
ATT&CK techniques (20 across 8 tactics)
20 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessPhishing: Spearphishing Attachment
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic · User Execution: Malicious File
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window · Reflective Code Loading
- Credential AccessForced Authentication
- DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery · System Owner/User Discovery · Process Discovery · Permission Groups Discovery · System Information Discovery · File and Directory Discovery
- Command and ControlWeb Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Protocol Tunneling
Initial Access TA0001
T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.005Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic×1
Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as Component Object Model and the Native API through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1564.003Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window×1
Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1620Reflective Code Loading×1
Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1187Forced Authentication×1
Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1016System Network Configuration Discovery×1
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1033System Owner/User Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1057Process Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1069Permission Groups Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1082System Information Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1083File and Directory Discovery×1
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
T1572Protocol Tunneling×1
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-10-21/apt28-hookedge-backdoor-nato-police-shipbuilder-ssh-tunnel · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about APT28 (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Midnight Blizzard×2
- Roundcube Webmail×2
- CaptiveCrunch×1
- ChocoShell×1
- CornFlake×1
- FrostyNeighbor March–May 2026 campaign×1
- HOOKEDGE×1
- Kerio Connect×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- abw.gov.pl2 (7%)
- cisa.gov2 (7%)
- heise.de2 (7%)
- welivesecurity.com2 (7%)
- bleepingcomputer.com1 (4%)
- blog.sekoia.io1 (4%)
- cyber.gc.ca1 (4%)
- cyberdefence24.pl1 (4%)
- other15 (56%)
All cited sources (27)
- abw.gov.plABW (Internal Security Agency), Internal Security Agency ABW 2024-2025: Selected activitieshttps://www.abw.gov.pl/download/24/4877/InternalSecurityAgencyABW2024-2025Selectedactvities.pdf
- abw.gov.plABW (Internal Security Agency), news release: Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego 2024-2025. Wybrane aktywnościhttps://www.abw.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/2815,Agencja-Bezpieczenstwa-Wewnetrznego-2024-2025-Wybrane-aktywnosci.html
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-roundcube-flaw-now-actively-exploited-in-code-injection-attacks/
- blog.sekoia.ioSekoia TDRhttps://blog.sekoia.io/apt28-an-evolution-of-tradecraft/
- cisa.govCISA AA24-060Ahttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-060a
- cisa.govCISA KEV cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- cyber.gc.caCanadian Centre for Cyber Securityhttps://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories/roundcube-security-advisory-av26-503
- cyberdefence24.plCyberDefence24https://cyberdefence24.pl/cyberbezpieczenstwo/ataki-na-wodociagi-abw-o-widocznosci-obiektow-z-internetu
- github.comAlinto (SOGo release notes)https://github.com/Alinto/sogo/releases/tag/SOGo-5.12.8
- heise.deheise online, 2026-05-07https://www.heise.de/news/Cyberkrieg-Medien-zitieren-Interna-aus-Russlands-Geheimdienstausbildung-11285528.html
- heise.deHeise Securityhttps://www.heise.de/news/Roundcube-Webmail-Instanzen-mit-Schadcode-attackierbar-11307545.html
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Securityhttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/04/29/windows-cve-2026-32202-exploited/
- infosecurity-magazine.comInfosecurity Magazinehttps://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/chinese-hackers-exploit-iran-war/
- lemonde.frLe Monde, 2026-05-07https://www.lemonde.fr/en/m-le-mag/article/2026/05/07/moscow-s-bauman-university-the-clandestine-school-training-russian-hackers_6753208_117.html
- meduza.ioMeduza (English), 2026-05-07https://meduza.io/amp/en/feature/2026/05/07/secret-gru-linked-department-at-top-russian-university-trains-hackers-and-saboteurs-investigation-finds
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligencehttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/31/captivecrunch-midnight-blizzard-targets-travelers-worldwide-for-malware-delivery-and-credential-theft/
- msrc.microsoft.comMicrosoft Security Response Centerhttps://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2026-32202
- proofpoint.comProofpoint Threat Researchhttps://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta458-roundpress-exploits
- recordedfuture.comRecorded Future Insikt Grouphttps://www.recordedfuture.com/research/bluedelta-targets-with-hookedge
- reliaquest.comReliaQuesthttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-dns-poisoning-tactics-expand-to-hospitality/
- roundcube.netRoundcube Projecthttps://roundcube.net/news/2026/05/24/security-updates-1.6.16-and-1.7.1
- security-hub.ncsc.admin.chNCSC Switzerland post 12596https://security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch/#/posts/12596
- security.comSymantec Threat Hunter Teamhttps://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/swallowtail-russia-nato-targets
- spiegel.deDer Spiegel, 2026-05-07https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/hybrider-krieg-moskau-bildet-in-einem-geheimen-uni-programm-spione-und-hacker-aus-a-2de79023-aa56-4ed6-b5de-d7c222402e63
- theguardian.comThe Guardian, 2026-05-07https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/07/revealed-russia-top-secret-spy-school-hacking-western-electoral-interference
- welivesecurity.comESET WeLiveSecurityhttps://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/eset-apt-activity-report-q4-2025-q1-2026/
- welivesecurity.comESET Researchhttps://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/operation-roundpress/