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LiteLLM authorization bypass via unvalidated allowed_routes in key-generation; CVSS 8.8; fixed v1.83.14

cve · CVE-2026-47101

Coverage
1
first 2026-06-16 → last 2026-06-16
Latest activity
2026-06-16
Obsidian Security: a three-CVE chain turns any LiteLLM user into root on the AI gateway
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about CVE-2026-47101, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Pin LiteLLM to version ≥ 1.83.14 and keep admin endpoints off the internet (CVE-2026-47101/-47102/-40217), rotate all provider API keys if any pre-1.83.14 instance was reachable by untrusted users; move keys into a secrets manager.
    2026-06-16CVE-2026-47101 +2

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-16Obsidian Security: a three-CVE chain turns any LiteLLM user into root on the AI gateway
    research
ATT&CK techniques (3 across 5 tactics)

3 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Python
  • PersistenceValid Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
  • StealthValid Accounts

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/obsidian-security-a-three-cve-chain-turns-any-litellm-user-i · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1

Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/obsidian-security-a-three-cve-chain-turns-any-litellm-user-i · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/obsidian-security-a-three-cve-chain-turns-any-litellm-user-i · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/obsidian-security-a-three-cve-chain-turns-any-litellm-user-i · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism×1

Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control privilege elevation to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/obsidian-security-a-three-cve-chain-turns-any-litellm-user-i · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-16/obsidian-security-a-three-cve-chain-turns-any-litellm-user-i · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about LiteLLM authorization bypass via unvalidated allowed_routes in key-generation; CVSS 8.8; fixed v1.83.14 (1)

2026-06-16 · view entry permalink →

Obsidian Security: a three-CVE chain turns any LiteLLM user into root on the AI gateway

Obsidian Security published a privilege-escalation-to-RCE chain in LiteLLM (BerriAI), the widely self-hosted AI gateway that proxies 100+ LLM providers behind one OpenAI-compatible API (Obsidian Security, 2026-06-15; The Hacker News, 2026-06-15). The chain: CVE-2026-47101 (authorization bypass), the key-generation endpoint accepts a caller-supplied allowed_routes without checking the caller's role, so an internal_user can mint a key reaching admin routes; CVE-2026-47102 (privilege escalation); /user/update lacks field-level authorization, letting any authenticated user set their own user_role to proxy_admin; CVE-2026-40217 (RCE); the Custom Code Guardrails feature runs attacker-supplied Python via exec() with __builtins__ available, giving arbitrary code execution. VulnCheck scores CVE-2026-47102 at CVSS 8.8 (3.1), and Obsidian rates the chained impact CVSS 9.9; chained, a default low-privilege account reaches the master key, the salt key decrypting stored secrets, the database URL and every configured provider API key, and can rewrite responses delivered to downstream AI agents ("man-in-the-gateway"). Fixed in v1.83.14-stable, but Obsidian reports broad under-deployment of the fix. Mapped to T1078, T1548 and T1059.006.

Why it matters to us: Swiss/EU public-sector and research bodies increasingly centralise AI workflows on a gateway proxy; a compromised LiteLLM is both a credential-theft and an agent-manipulation vector. Pin LiteLLM to ≥1.83.14, keep admin endpoints off the internet, store provider keys in a secrets manager, and rotate all provider keys if any pre-1.83.14 instance was reachable by untrusted users.

research16 Jun 05:09Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • obsidiansecurity.com1 (50%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (50%)