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YellowKey BitLocker / WinRE bypass — CVE formally assigned 2026-05-19; MSRC WinRE BootExecute mitigation; no patch

cve · CVE-2026-45585

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-05-20 → last 2026-05-20
Briefs
1
1 distinct
Sources cited
8
7 hosts
Sections touched
1
updates
Co-occurring entities
5
see Related entities below

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-20CTI Daily Brief — 2026-05-20
    updatesUPDATE: CVE formally assigned (prior coverage 2026-05-15 had no CVE); MSRC published interim WinRE registry mitigation; remains exploit-code-maturity E:P / RL:W

Where this entity is cited

  • updates1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com2 (25%)
  • msrc.microsoft.com1 (12%)
  • security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch1 (12%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (12%)
  • therecord.media1 (12%)
  • theregister.com1 (12%)
  • threatlocker.com1 (12%)

Related entities

Items in briefs about YellowKey BitLocker / WinRE bypass — CVE formally assigned 2026-05-19; MSRC WinRE BootExecute mitigation; no patch (1)

UPDATE: CVE-2026-45585 (YellowKey) — Microsoft formally assigns CVE and publishes WinRE mitigation

From CTI Daily Brief — 2026-05-20 · published 2026-05-20 · view item permalink →

UPDATE (originally covered 2026-05-15): Microsoft formally assigned CVE-2026-45585 to the BitLocker / WinRE bypass disclosed by "Nightmare Eclipse" on 2026-05-12 and confirmed there is still no security update. The MSRC update guide entry, published 2026-05-19, classifies it as CWE-77 (command injection in BitLocker / Windows Recovery Environment), CVSS 6.8 (AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), with exploit-code maturity rated E:P (proof-of-concept) and remediation level RL:W (workaround only).

Microsoft's interim mitigation requires per-endpoint work on every device using TPM-only BitLocker (no PIN / password protector): mount the WinRE image, remove the autofstx.exe entry from the BootExecute registry value inside the WinRE image, commit the image, then re-establish BitLocker trust for WinRE. The MSRC FAQ states: "A successful attacker could bypass the BitLocker Device Encryption feature on the system storage device. An attacker with physical access to the target could exploit this vulnerability to gain access to encrypted data."

Practically: for fleets at scale (Swiss federal admin, cantonal endpoints, classified Windows devices), the more durable hardening is to add a BitLocker PIN or password protector rather than relying solely on TPM-only. The WinRE registry edit is fragile and breaks on Windows feature updates that re-stage the WinRE image; the PIN/password protector closes the exposure regardless of WinRE state.