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Windows YellowKey BitLocker bypass via WinRE

cve · CVE-2026-45585

Coverage
2
first 2026-05-15 → last 2026-06-14
Latest activity
2026-05-30
Nightmare Eclipse / Chaotic Eclipse, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit threatens criminal action; GreenPlasma…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, defense, education
Sources cited
7
6 hosts

Action items (2)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about CVE-2026-45585, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Enforce BitLocker pre-boot PIN on all managed Windows laptops and enforce BIOS/UEFI boot password, YellowKey (no CVE) bypasses TPM-only BitLocker via WinRE with a public PoC. Group Policy path: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > BitLocker Drive Encryption > Operating System Drives > Require additional authentication at startup → Enable + require PIN. Disable WinRE access where operationally viable (reagentc /disable).
    2026-05-15CVE-2026-45585
  • Add BitLocker PIN / password protector to TPM-only-protected endpoints (CVE-2026-45585 / YellowKey). Microsoft's WinRE BootExecute registry mitigation is per-device and fragile under Windows feature updates that re-stage WinRE; the PIN/password protector closes the bypass regardless of WinRE state. Public PoC, no patch (MSRC CVE-2026-45585).
    2026-05-15CVE-2026-45585

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-30Nightmare Eclipse / Chaotic Eclipse, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit threatens criminal action; GreenPlasma and MiniPlasma (cldflt.sys SYSTEM escalation) remain unpatched; researcher announces July 14 drop
    trending-vulnerabilitiesNightmare Eclipse / Chaotic Eclipse, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit threatens criminal action; GreenPlasma and MiniPlasma (cldflt.sys SYSTEM escalation)
  2. 2026-05-15Windows BitLocker "YellowKey" and CTFMON "GreenPlasma" zero-days: public PoC, no patch, TPM-only BitLocker bypassed
    active-threats
ATT&CK techniques (4 across 3 tactics)

4 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • PersistencePre-OS Boot: System Firmware
  • Privilege EscalationExploitation for Privilege Escalation · Access Token Manipulation
  • StealthDirect Volume Access · Access Token Manipulation · Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware

Persistence TA0003

T1542.001Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware×1

Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/windows-bitlocker-yellowkey-and-ctfmon-greenplasma-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/windows-bitlocker-yellowkey-and-ctfmon-greenplasma-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

T1134Access Token Manipulation×1

Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/windows-bitlocker-yellowkey-and-ctfmon-greenplasma-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1006Direct Volume Access×1

Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/windows-bitlocker-yellowkey-and-ctfmon-greenplasma-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

T1134Access Token Manipulation×1

Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/windows-bitlocker-yellowkey-and-ctfmon-greenplasma-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

T1542.001Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware×1

Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.

Evidence: 2026-05-15/windows-bitlocker-yellowkey-and-ctfmon-greenplasma-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Windows YellowKey BitLocker bypass via WinRE (2)

2026-05-30 · view entry permalink →

Nightmare Eclipse / Chaotic Eclipse, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit threatens criminal action; GreenPlasma and MiniPlasma (cldflt.sys SYSTEM escalation) remain unpatched; researcher announces July 14 drop

UPDATE (originally covered 2026-W21): Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit issued a formal public statement on 28–29 May 2026 calling uncoordinated zero-day releases "never justifiable" and warning its DCU would "continue bringing cases against these actors and those that enable their criminal activity" (The Record, 2026-05-29). The pseudonymous researcher Nightmare Eclipse / Chaotic Eclipse responded by threatening a new vulnerability release on 14 July 2026 (the next Patch Tuesday).

Of the six Windows vulnerabilities the researcher has released since early April: BlueHammer (CVE-2026-33825), UnDefend (CVE-2026-45498), and RedSun (CVE-2026-41091) are patched and saw confirmed in-the-wild exploitation following PoC publication. YellowKey (CVE-2026-45585, BitLocker bypass via Windows Recovery Environment, requiring physical access), GreenPlasma (LPE class), and MiniPlasma remain unpatched as of 30 May 2026. MiniPlasma specifically abuses the Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver (cldflt.sys) to achieve a SYSTEM shell from a standard user session on fully-patched Windows 11; the root cause is assessed as an incomplete remediation of CVE-2020-17103 (no CVE yet assigned to MiniPlasma itself).

The July 14 release deadline should be treated as a hard date for resolving any outstanding Windows LPE chain gaps. Defenders on Windows 11 estates should monitor for cldflt.sys-related anomalies and consider AppLocker/WDAC policies blocking unsigned executables from low-privileged user sessions while patches are pending. Next Patch Tuesday: 10 June 2026.

vulnerability30 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-15 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-45585updated

Windows BitLocker "YellowKey" and CTFMON "GreenPlasma" zero-days: public PoC, no patch, TPM-only BitLocker bypassed

Researcher "Nightmare Eclipse" published two new unpatched Windows zero-days on 2026-05-12–13 as full-disclosure drops after a disclosure dispute with Microsoft, bringing the total of unpatched Nightmare Eclipse Windows zero-days to four (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-13 · The Register, 2026-05-13 · NCSC-CH Security Hub #12574, 2026-05-14). YellowKey exploits a Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) bug in NTFS transaction-log (TxF/FsTx) replay: crafted FsTx folder contents placed on a USB drive or the EFI partition are replayed by WinRE during startup, deleting winpeshl.ini (the file that suppresses the recovery shell) and dropping the attacker into a CMD prompt with the BitLocker-protected volume already mounted and readable. The current public PoC defeats TPM-only BitLocker configurations on Windows 11 and Windows Server 2022/2025; the researcher asserts the full bypass also defeats TPM+PIN but the unpublished variant is unconfirmed. MITRE ATT&CK: T1542.001 (Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware), T1006 (Direct Volume Access). GreenPlasma is a local privilege-escalation flaw in the CTFMON (Collaborative Translation Framework) service: an unprivileged user creates arbitrary section objects in SYSTEM-writable directories, which can be leveraged to manipulate privileged services for a SYSTEM token; the public PoC is partial and the exploit chain triggers a UAC prompt in default configurations. MITRE ATT&CK: T1134 (Access Token Manipulation), T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation). Neither vulnerability has been assigned a CVE nor received a Microsoft patch as of 2026-05-15; Microsoft states it is "actively investigating." A previous drop by the same researcher (BlueHammer, CVE-2026-33825, now patched) was confirmed used in real-world intrusions by Huntress in April 2026, demonstrating that this researcher's PoCs are operationally adopted. Immediate mitigations: require BitLocker pre-boot PIN (Group Policy Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > BitLocker Drive Encryption > Require additional authentication at startup); set BIOS/UEFI boot password and disable USB/external-media boot; disable WinRE where operationally viable (reagentc /disable).

Updaterun 2026-05-20-a0f7b07factionscvessourcesbody

Microsoft formally assigned CVE-2026-45585 to the BitLocker / WinRE bypass disclosed by "Nightmare Eclipse" on 2026-05-12 and confirmed there is still no security update. The MSRC update guide entry, published 2026-05-19, classifies it as CWE-77 (command injection in BitLocker / Windows Recovery Environment), CVSS 6.8 (AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), with exploit-code maturity rated E:P (proof-of-concept) and remediation level RL:W (workaround only).

Microsoft's interim mitigation requires per-endpoint work on every device using TPM-only BitLocker (no PIN / password protector): mount the WinRE image, remove the autofstx.exe entry from the BootExecute registry value inside the WinRE image, commit the image, then re-establish BitLocker trust for WinRE. The MSRC FAQ states: "A successful attacker could bypass the BitLocker Device Encryption feature on the system storage device. An attacker with physical access to the target could exploit this vulnerability to gain access to encrypted data."

Practically: for fleets at scale (Swiss federal admin, cantonal endpoints, classified Windows devices), the more durable hardening is to add a BitLocker PIN or password protector rather than relying solely on TPM-only. The WinRE registry edit is fragile and breaks on Windows feature updates that re-stage the WinRE image; the PIN/password protector closes the exposure regardless of WinRE state.

threat15 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1
  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • msrc.microsoft.com2 (29%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (14%)
  • heise.de1 (14%)
  • security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch1 (14%)
  • therecord.media1 (14%)
  • theregister.com1 (14%)