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Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager command-injection to root; Mandiant confirms pre-disclosure zero-day exploitation; patched (chains CVE-2026-20127/-20182)

cve · CVE-2026-20245

Coverage
1
first 2026-06-06 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-06-27
A netadmin user on Cisco SD-WAN can become root through a crafted upload file; Mandiant saw zero-day use in…
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
·
regions: switzerland
Sources cited
4
4 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about CVE-2026-20245, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Upgrade every Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator to its first fixed release (20.9.9.2, 20.12.7.2, 20.15.4.5 or 20.15.5.3, 20.18.3.1 or 26.1.1.2) after collecting request admin-tech from each control component, then verify the configuration of every edge device.
    2026-06-06CVE-2026-20245 +2

Defender insights

What each entry about CVE-2026-20245 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-06-06HIGHexploitedA netadmin user on Cisco SD-WAN can become root through a crafted upload file; Mandiant saw zero-day use in April

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-06CVE-2026-20245: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN netadmin-to-root command injection exploited as a zero-day; fixed releases and a Live Protect shield available
    trending-vulnerabilitiesA netadmin user on Cisco SD-WAN can become root through a crafted upload file; Mandiant saw zero-day use in April
ATT&CK techniques (7 across 6 tactics)

7 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Default Accounts
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Default Accounts · Account Manipulation · Create Account: Local Account
  • Privilege EscalationExploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Account Manipulation
  • StealthIndicator Removal: File Deletion · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: SSH

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-06-06/cve-2026-20245-cisco-catalyst-sd-wan-manager-actively-exploi · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager command-injection to root; Mandiant confirms pre-disclosure zero-day exploitation; patched (chains CVE-2026-20127/-20182) (1)

2026-06-06 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-20245 +2exploitedupdatedNATOA1

CVE-2026-20245: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN netadmin-to-root command injection exploited as a zero-day; fixed releases and a Live Protect shield available

CVE-2026-20245 (CVSS 7.8) is a privilege escalation in the CLI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator: an authenticated, local attacker with netadmin privileges can inject commands through a crafted file and execute them as root (Cisco PSIRT). Netadmin access requires valid credentials or exploitation of the earlier authentication bypasses CVE-2026-20182 or CVE-2026-20127 (Cisco PSIRT). Cisco became aware of exploitation in June 2026 and has seen limited cases where it resulted in a configuration change pushed to edge devices (Cisco PSIRT), NCSC Switzerland relayed the advisory (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-05), and CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-06-09 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-06-09). First fixed releases are 20.9.9.2, 20.12.7.2, 20.15.4.5, 20.15.5.3, 20.18.3.1 and 26.1.1.2; Cisco's Live Protect shield gives only temporary partial protection while upgrades are planned (Cisco PSIRT).

In June 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of exploitation of this vulnerability.

Cisco PSIRT
Updaterun 2026-06-26-6bbe4619cvesevidencesourcestagsbody

Mandiant published a forensic reconstruction of an intrusion at a service provider in which CVE-2026-20245 was exploited as a zero-day (Mandiant, 2026-06-24). From late 2025 to January 2026 Mandiant observed unauthorized peering connections to the victim's SD-WAN Manager devices and considers it possible that they exploited CVE-2026-20127 or CVE-2026-20182, then undisclosed; further rogue peerings from March 2026 ran on a version unaffected by CVE-2026-20127, and Cisco confirmed they did not use CVE-2026-20182 either and could rely on stolen certificate material (Mandiant, 2026-06-24). In March the actor logged in over SSH as vmanage-admin and manipulated default account passwords; in April 2026, from an SSH session as admin, it passed a crafted CSV file to the request tenant-upload tenant-list command, whose payload appended a new UID-0 account to /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow (Mandiant, 2026-06-24). It then deleted the files it had created, reverted its configuration changes and ran a validation script (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Updaterun 2026-06-27-40e791d4cvesevidenceregionstagsbody

Mandiant's reconstruction dates the CVE-2026-20245 exploitation to April 2026, after rogue peering access that began in late 2025, and supports hunting for new UID-0 accounts and tenant-upload commands on Manager devices (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-audittitleheadlinesummaryevent_datetagssectorstechniquesaffected_productscvessourcesevidencesourcing_notereferencesclassificationactionsbody

Fixed releases exist for every supported train, and Cisco offers a Live Protect shield as temporary partial protection (Cisco PSIRT). The flaw needs an authenticated attacker with netadmin privileges and scores 7.8 (Cisco PSIRT). Mandiant dates its zero-day exploitation to April 2026 at a service provider; the late-2025 to March activity was rogue peering, which may or may not have used the earlier bypasses, and the actor cleaned up by deleting its files and reverting configuration rather than wiping history or syslog (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Improvementrun 2026-10-21T1149Z-auditheadlinetechniquesactionsbody

Cisco's indicators cover three CLI upload scripts in /var/log/scripts.log, vconfd_script_upload_tenant_list.sh, vconfd_script_upload_vsmart_serial_numbers.sh and vconfd_script_upload_chassis_number_file.sh, not only the tenant-list one; Cisco has also seen limited cases where exploitation pushed a configuration change to edge devices, asks customers to verify the configuration of the edge devices, and describes its Live Protect shield as only temporary partial protection (Cisco PSIRT). Mandiant's hunting guidance covers vmanage-admin logins from unexpected sources, admin password changes set and then reverted, and su from admin to unauthorized accounts in /var/log/auth.log, password delta commits under /var/confd/rollback/, and the upload command in the CLI's show history; its actor restored the system configurations it modified and checked that its root account was gone (Mandiant, 2026-06-24).

Builds on: A forged vHub peer can plant an SSH key on Cisco SD-WAN controllers without credentials; Talos…

vulnerability06 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • cisa.gov1 (25%)
  • cloud.google.com1 (25%)
  • sec.cloudapps.cisco.com1 (25%)
  • security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch1 (25%)