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MONAI Label through 0.8.5: unauthenticated path traversal in the datastore upload endpoints gives arbitrary file write, exploited since September 2026; fixed in 0.8.6

cve · CVE-2026-133968

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-22 → last 2026-11-22
Latest activity
2026-11-22
MONAI Label CVE-2026-133968 exploited since September: upgrade to 0.8.6; authentication is off by default
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
education
sectors: education
Sources cited
3
2 hosts

Action items (2)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about CVE-2026-133968, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Upgrade every MONAI Label server to 0.8.6 (pip install -U monailabel==0.8.6, or the projectmonai/monailabel:0.8.6 image), because CVE-2026-133968 is exploited and every version through 0.8.5 is affected.
    2026-11-22CVE-2026-133968
  • On every MONAI Label 0.8.5 or older server that was reachable from an untrusted network, review it for unexpected file changes before it returns to service, starting with sitecustomize.py, authorized_keys and cron entries that the service account wrote and nobody deployed, because the upgrade does not evict an attacker who is already in.
    2026-11-22CVE-2026-133968

Defender insights

What each entry about CVE-2026-133968 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-22NOTABLEexploitedMONAI Label CVE-2026-133968 exploited since September: upgrade to 0.8.6; authentication is off by default

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-22CVE-2026-133968, MONAI Label through 0.8.5: an unauthenticated path traversal in the datastore upload endpoints gives arbitrary file write and code execution, exploited since September 2026 (Amazon says Cairn AI agents found it as a zero-day against East Asian university servers); fixed in 0.8.6, authentication is off by default (CVSS 3.1 9.8)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesMONAI Label CVE-2026-133968 exploited since September: upgrade to 0.8.6; authentication is off by default
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 7 tactics)

6 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Python
  • PersistenceEvent Triggered Execution: Python Startup Hooks
  • Privilege EscalationEvent Triggered Execution: Python Startup Hooks
  • Credential AccessBrute Force: Password Spraying
  • Command and ControlProxy

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1

Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/monai-label-path-traversal-zero-day-found-by-cairn-ai-agents · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/monai-label-path-traversal-zero-day-found-by-cairn-ai-agents · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1

Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/monai-label-path-traversal-zero-day-found-by-cairn-ai-agents · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1546.018Event Triggered Execution: Python Startup Hooks×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging Python’s startup mechanisms, including path configuration (`.pth`) files and the `sitecustomize.py` or `usercustomize.py` modules. These files are automatically processed during the initialization of the Python interpreter, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code whenever Python is invoked.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/monai-label-path-traversal-zero-day-found-by-cairn-ai-agents · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1546.018Event Triggered Execution: Python Startup Hooks×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging Python’s startup mechanisms, including path configuration (`.pth`) files and the `sitecustomize.py` or `usercustomize.py` modules. These files are automatically processed during the initialization of the Python interpreter, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code whenever Python is invoked.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/monai-label-path-traversal-zero-day-found-by-cairn-ai-agents · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/monai-label-path-traversal-zero-day-found-by-cairn-ai-agents · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/monai-label-path-traversal-zero-day-found-by-cairn-ai-agents · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about MONAI Label through 0.8.5: unauthenticated path traversal in the datastore upload endpoints gives arbitrary file write, exploited since September 2026; fixed in 0.8.6 (1)

2026-11-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2026-133968exploitedNATOB2

CVE-2026-133968, MONAI Label through 0.8.5: an unauthenticated path traversal in the datastore upload endpoints gives arbitrary file write and code execution, exploited since September 2026 (Amazon says Cairn AI agents found it as a zero-day against East Asian university servers); fixed in 0.8.6, authentication is off by default (CVSS 3.1 9.8)

MONAI Label 0.8.6, released on 2026-11-22 as a security release, fixes CVE-2026-133968, rated critical: PUT /datastore/image and PUT /datastore/label built the destination path from the image ID and label tag without confining it to the datastore, so a caller could write files anywhere the server process can write, in all versions up to and including 0.8.5 (Project MONAI, 2026-11-22). The project's advisory adds that arbitrary file write can lead to remote code execution, for example through application code, authorized_keys or cron, that authentication is off by default and that with authentication on the ANNOTATOR role is enough (Project MONAI, 2026-11-18). The same release fixes a second path traversal in session upload: PUT /session/?uncompress=true extracted uploaded tar archives without checking member names, and session IDs were used as paths without validation, in all versions up to and including 0.8.5 (Project MONAI, 2026-11-22).

Amazon Threat Intelligence found on 2026-09-10 a publicly reachable, unauthenticated instance of Cairn, an open-source autonomous AI penetration-testing framework, whose exposed history showed a roughly 48-hour campaign from 2026-09-08 against IP addresses of universities in East Asia outside mainland China (Amazon Threat Intelligence, 2026-11-20). Against a medical-imaging AI application the agents mapped the API, found an upload endpoint with a filename parameter, tested it for path traversal and reached arbitrary file write in about 11 minutes; in a later session they wrote a Python reverse shell to sitecustomize.py and triggered a training endpoint, which started a new Python process that imported it and gave a root shell (Amazon Threat Intelligence, 2026-11-20). The operator later gave the agents a proxy into a second university network that ran the same software, which Amazon infers it had reached through the same flaw, and Amazon assesses with moderate confidence that the actor is Chinese-nexus; the same agents ran 16 hours against a hardened Redis instance and tried more than 30,000 credential combinations against a GPU server without success (Amazon Threat Intelligence, 2026-11-20).

This is a security release. All MONAI Label server deployments should upgrade.

Project MONAI

At the time of discovery, this path traversal vulnerability in the medical imaging application did not correspond to any assigned security advisory and was unpatched.

In about 11 minutes, the agents went from mapping the application’s API to arbitrarily writing files on the server.

Amazon Threat Intelligence

so in the default configuration any network client that can reach the server can exploit this.

Project MONAI
vulnerability22 Nov 04:42Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • github.com2 (67%)
  • aws.amazon.com1 (33%)