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NOTABLECVE-2026-133968exploitedNATOB2vulnerability

CVE-2026-133968, MONAI Label through 0.8.5: an unauthenticated path traversal in the datastore upload endpoints gives arbitrary file write and code execution, exploited since September 2026 (Amazon says Cairn AI agents found it as a zero-day against East Asian university servers); fixed in 0.8.6, authentication is off by default (CVSS 3.1 9.8)

MONAI Label CVE-2026-133968 exploited since September: upgrade to 0.8.6; authentication is off by default

Defender actions

  • Upgrade every MONAI Label server to 0.8.6 (pip install -U monailabel==0.8.6, or the projectmonai/monailabel:0.8.6 image), because CVE-2026-133968 is exploited and every version through 0.8.5 is affected.
  • On every MONAI Label 0.8.5 or older server that was reachable from an untrusted network, review it for unexpected file changes before it returns to service, starting with sitecustomize.py, authorized_keys and cron entries that the service account wrote and nobody deployed, because the upgrade does not evict an attacker who is already in.

Analysis

MONAI Label 0.8.6, released on 2026-11-22 as a security release, fixes CVE-2026-133968, rated critical: PUT /datastore/image and PUT /datastore/label built the destination path from the image ID and label tag without confining it to the datastore, so a caller could write files anywhere the server process can write, in all versions up to and including 0.8.5 (Project MONAI, 2026-11-22). The project's advisory adds that arbitrary file write can lead to remote code execution, for example through application code, authorized_keys or cron, that authentication is off by default and that with authentication on the ANNOTATOR role is enough (Project MONAI, 2026-11-18). The same release fixes a second path traversal in session upload: PUT /session/?uncompress=true extracted uploaded tar archives without checking member names, and session IDs were used as paths without validation, in all versions up to and including 0.8.5 (Project MONAI, 2026-11-22).

Amazon Threat Intelligence found on 2026-09-10 a publicly reachable, unauthenticated instance of Cairn, an open-source autonomous AI penetration-testing framework, whose exposed history showed a roughly 48-hour campaign from 2026-09-08 against IP addresses of universities in East Asia outside mainland China (Amazon Threat Intelligence, 2026-11-20). Against a medical-imaging AI application the agents mapped the API, found an upload endpoint with a filename parameter, tested it for path traversal and reached arbitrary file write in about 11 minutes; in a later session they wrote a Python reverse shell to sitecustomize.py and triggered a training endpoint, which started a new Python process that imported it and gave a root shell (Amazon Threat Intelligence, 2026-11-20). The operator later gave the agents a proxy into a second university network that ran the same software, which Amazon infers it had reached through the same flaw, and Amazon assesses with moderate confidence that the actor is Chinese-nexus; the same agents ran 16 hours against a hardened Redis instance and tried more than 30,000 credential combinations against a GPU server without success (Amazon Threat Intelligence, 2026-11-20).

Cited evidence

This is a security release. All MONAI Label server deployments should upgrade.

Project MONAI

At the time of discovery, this path traversal vulnerability in the medical imaging application did not correspond to any assigned security advisory and was unpatched.

In about 11 minutes, the agents went from mapping the application’s API to arbitrarily writing files on the server.

Amazon Threat Intelligence

so in the default configuration any network client that can reach the server can exploit this.

Project MONAI

Sources3

PROVENANCE

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