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Netgate pfSense CE 2.7.2 — unsafe deserialization in backup/restore yields authenticated root RCE (CVSS 8.8, no-patch posture)

cve · CVE-2025-69690

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-05-11 → last 2026-05-11
Briefs
1
1 distinct
Sources cited
6
4 hosts
Sections touched
1
active_threats
Co-occurring entities
1
see Related entities below

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-11CTI Daily Brief — 2026-05-11
    active_threatsFirst coverage. Sibling of CVE-2025-69691 in BSI WID-SEC-2026-1435. Authenticated root RCE via unsafe deserialization of a malicious post_reboot_commands property in a crafted configuration backup restore.

Where this entity is cited

  • active_threats1

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org3 (50%)
  • cve.news1 (17%)
  • seclists.org1 (17%)
  • wid.cert-bund.de1 (17%)

Related entities

Items in briefs about Netgate pfSense CE 2.7.2 — unsafe deserialization in backup/restore yields authenticated root RCE (CVSS 8.8, no-patch posture) (2)

BSI flags Netgate pfSense Community Edition as critical-unpatched — CVE-2025-69690 / CVE-2025-69691 authenticated root RCE, vendor refuses to fix

From CTI Daily Brief — 2026-05-11 · published 2026-05-11 · view item permalink →

BSI published WID-SEC-2026-1435 on 2026-05-08 rating two authenticated remote code execution vulnerabilities in Netgate pfSense Community Edition as kritisch and explicitly UNGEPATCHT in the BSI advisory feed (BSI WID-SEC-2026-1435, 2026-05-08). CVE-2025-69691 (CVSS 9.9) affects pfSense CE 2.8.0: the XMLRPC API endpoint /xmlrpc.php exposes the pfsense.exec_php method, which executes arbitrary PHP as root when invoked with any Basic Auth credentials — including default admin passwords on Internet-exposed deployments (Full Disclosure, 2026-02-16; cve.news analysis of CVE-2025-69691, 2026-05-08). CVE-2025-69690 (CVSS 8.8) affects pfSense CE 2.7.2 via unsafe deserialization in the configuration backup/restore path — uploading a crafted backup containing a serialized PHP object with a malicious post_reboot_commands property yields root RCE on restore (same primary disclosure thread).

Netgate's position, restated in the Full Disclosure thread, is that both behaviours are expected for authenticated administrators and that no patch will be issued. BSI taking a national-CERT position on the unpatched state three months after researcher disclosure is the in-window signal: this elevates pfSense CE from "vendor accepts behaviour" to "EU national authority recommends mitigation." pfSense Community Edition is licence-free and commonly deployed at the perimeter of Swiss cantonal, municipal, healthcare, education and SME networks where commercial pfSense+ subscriptions are out of reach. The pfSense+ commercial product is reportedly not affected by the same code paths.

Why it matters to us: Treat any Internet-exposed pfSense CE management interface (HTTPS web GUI, XMLRPC endpoint, SSH) as a credential-theft single-point-of-failure rather than a hardened control plane. Block the XMLRPC interface at the network level for any CE 2.8.0 deployment that cannot disable it administratively, restrict the web GUI to a management VLAN, rotate any admin passwords that ever traversed unencrypted networks, and audit system.xml for unexplained post_reboot_commands entries (CVE-2025-69690 persistence indicator). Because exploitation requires existing admin credentials, the operative attack chain is T1078 Valid Accounts (after credential theft) → T1059.004 Unix Shell; for an Internet-exposed management plane, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application remains the framing for the initial brute-force / credential-stuffing pivot. See § 7 reduced-confidence note on BSI sourcing.

Restrict pfSense CE management interfaces; assume no patch is coming

From CTI Daily Brief — 2026-05-11 · published 2026-05-11 · view item permalink →

For pfSense Community Edition deployments at the perimeter of cantonal, municipal, healthcare, education or SME networks: place the web GUI and SSH on a management VLAN reachable only from authorised admin workstations; block /xmlrpc.php at the network level if the XMLRPC API is not actively used by automation; rotate any admin password that ever traversed a management interface exposed beyond the management VLAN; audit system.xml for unexplained post_reboot_commands entries. Plan migration to pfSense+ (commercial), OPNsense, or an alternative supported firewall platform for any deployment that cannot be locked down. Treat Netgate's "expected behaviour for administrators" position as a permanent posture, not a temporary delay.