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Huntress on timeroasting: the unauthenticated MS-SNTP sweep that harvests crackable MACs for computer and trust accounts leaves no logon event, Defender for Identity raised no alert in its tests, modern Windows sends an extended authenticator Huntress now has a cracker for, and the signal that holds is a host asking a domain controller to sign for an account other than its own

Timeroasting leaves no logon event; Huntress shows the signal that holds is a host requesting another account's RID

Analysis

Timeroasting abuses MS-SNTP, Microsoft's authentication extension to NTP: a client names an account by its RID, and the domain controller answers with a MAC computed with that account's password-derived key, without the client authenticating first; the reachable accounts are computer and trust accounts, and the MAC is then cracked offline with no further contact and no lockout (Huntress, 2026-11-19). Huntress names the crackable population as image-built or never-rotated machines, hand-set trusts and non-Windows joins, and says a pre-created account still on its lowercase-name default falls instantly while a normal random machine secret would not (Huntress, 2026-11-19).

Reading w32time.dll and netlogon.dll on a fully patched Windows Server 2025 domain controller, Huntress documents two authenticator forms: a 68-byte legacy form with an MD5 MAC, which public tools emit and hashcat cracks, and a 120-byte extended form using HMAC-SHA512, which modern Windows clients send by default and which had no public cracker (Huntress, 2026-11-19). The patched controller answered extended-form requests that asked for the previous key, and Huntress published a reference implementation and a hashcat module for it that awaits a mode number upstream, so an extended-form capture can no longer be read as uncrackable (Huntress, 2026-11-19). Across eleven runs over five hours, with the sensor confirmed live by a control DCSync, Defender for Identity raised no alert on the MS-SNTP traffic; its "Suspicious SAM Account Name Change" alert, which names timeroasting, fires on a sAMAccountName change (event 5136), the fingerprint of the targeted variant, not of the unauthenticated sweep (Huntress, 2026-11-19).

Triage: packet size separates nothing on a modern fleet, where members send the 120-byte form as normal time sync and the public tools emit 68 bytes; domain controllers can legitimately request a trust account's RID during hierarchy synchronization, so they need an allowlist (Huntress, 2026-11-19). A machine account that authenticates and then sprays shares is delegation abuse, not timeroasting (Huntress, 2026-11-19).

Cited evidence

Timeroasting leaves no authentication event for the targeted account.

During this testing, none of them fired on timeroasting.

Do not build on packet size.

Huntress 2026-11-19

Sources1

PROVENANCE

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