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Microsoft Active Directory

product · product:microsoft-active-directory single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-22 → last 2026-11-22
Latest activity
2026-11-22
Timeroasting leaves no logon event; Huntress shows the signal that holds is a host requesting another…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft Active Directory tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-22NOTABLETimeroasting leaves no logon event; Huntress shows the signal that holds is a host requesting another account's RID

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-22Huntress on timeroasting: the unauthenticated MS-SNTP sweep that harvests crackable MACs for computer and trust accounts leaves no logon event, Defender for Identity raised no alert in its tests, modern Windows sends an extended authenticator Huntress now has a cracker for, and the signal that holds is a host asking a domain controller to sign for an account other than its own
    researchTimeroasting leaves no logon event; Huntress shows the signal that holds is a host requesting another account's RID

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Microsoft Active Directory
ATT&CK techniques (1 across 1 tactic)

1 technique observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Credential AccessBrute Force: Password Cracking

Credential Access TA0006

T1110.002Brute Force: Password Cracking×1

Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.

Evidence: 2026-11-22/timeroasting-detection-ms-sntp-own-rid-check-huntress · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft Active Directory (1)

2026-11-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Huntress on timeroasting: the unauthenticated MS-SNTP sweep that harvests crackable MACs for computer and trust accounts leaves no logon event, Defender for Identity raised no alert in its tests, modern Windows sends an extended authenticator Huntress now has a cracker for, and the signal that holds is a host asking a domain controller to sign for an account other than its own

Timeroasting abuses MS-SNTP, Microsoft's authentication extension to NTP: a client names an account by its RID, and the domain controller answers with a MAC computed with that account's password-derived key, without the client authenticating first; the reachable accounts are computer and trust accounts, and the MAC is then cracked offline with no further contact and no lockout (Huntress, 2026-11-19). Huntress names the crackable population as image-built or never-rotated machines, hand-set trusts and non-Windows joins, and says a pre-created account still on its lowercase-name default falls instantly while a normal random machine secret would not (Huntress, 2026-11-19).

Reading w32time.dll and netlogon.dll on a fully patched Windows Server 2025 domain controller, Huntress documents two authenticator forms: a 68-byte legacy form with an MD5 MAC, which public tools emit and hashcat cracks, and a 120-byte extended form using HMAC-SHA512, which modern Windows clients send by default and which had no public cracker (Huntress, 2026-11-19). The patched controller answered extended-form requests that asked for the previous key, and Huntress published a reference implementation and a hashcat module for it that awaits a mode number upstream, so an extended-form capture can no longer be read as uncrackable (Huntress, 2026-11-19). Across eleven runs over five hours, with the sensor confirmed live by a control DCSync, Defender for Identity raised no alert on the MS-SNTP traffic; its "Suspicious SAM Account Name Change" alert, which names timeroasting, fires on a sAMAccountName change (event 5136), the fingerprint of the targeted variant, not of the unauthenticated sweep (Huntress, 2026-11-19).

Triage: packet size separates nothing on a modern fleet, where members send the 120-byte form as normal time sync and the public tools emit 68 bytes; domain controllers can legitimately request a trust account's RID during hierarchy synchronization, so they need an allowlist (Huntress, 2026-11-19). A machine account that authenticates and then sprays shares is delegation abuse, not timeroasting (Huntress, 2026-11-19).

Timeroasting leaves no authentication event for the targeted account.

During this testing, none of them fired on timeroasting.

Do not build on packet size.

Huntress 2026-11-19
research22 Nov 15:08Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Huntress

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • huntress.com1 (100%)