COLD RELIC: Mandiant shows the FSB-linked group reusing data stolen from one US organisation as the impersonation pretext for the next, then holding cloud tenants through MFA push fatigue and enrolled passkeys, backup codes and MFA devices that survive password and session resets
Mandiant: COLD RELIC turns one cloud compromise into the pretext for the next; enrolled passkeys outlive password resets
Defender actions
- In every Google Workspace and Entra ID tenant you run, search the administrator and sign-in logs for passkey, backup-code and MFA-device enrolments on privileged accounts and for tenant-wide Customer Takeout exports, because COLD RELIC's enrolled authenticators survived password and session resets.
Analysis
Mandiant reports a series of linked intrusions in which COLD RELIC, the name Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) now uses for the group formerly tracked as COLDRIVER and UNC4057 (also Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear), turned data stolen in one US organisation into the pretext for the next (GTIG, 2026-11-17). GTIG cites a US Department of Justice assessment that the group operates within Russia's FSB and names government officials, defense contractors and NGOs in Europe and North America among its targets (GTIG, 2026-11-17). In 2026 the operators approached a second US organisation over an encrypted messaging app while impersonating an employee of the first, shared phishing links that stole Entra ID credentials and tokens and sent the victim on to document lures matching the conversation, and registered a new MFA device on the account (GTIG, 2026-11-17).
In the late-2025 case the operators used the stolen credentials of a Super Admin account from a US residential proxy network close to the victim, pressed the user with MFA push notifications until one was accepted, registered a device model new to the tenant and kept access with passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue MFA devices (GTIG, 2026-11-17). They took the whole cloud drive by mass sharing to an operator-run mailbox and by direct download, queried the admin investigation and email audit logs to check defensive visibility, viewed, modified and deleted Alert Center notifications, exported the employee list and ran a tenant-wide Customer Takeout export (GTIG, 2026-11-17). Access lasted several months through OAuth mail sync to an external client and re-authentication with enrolled passkeys that survived password and session resets, and in one case a password reset without revoking sessions did not evict the operators (GTIG, 2026-11-17). They searched for credentials, personnel data and .pst archives (GTIG, 2026-11-17).
Triage: a directory export, a Customer Takeout or a passkey or device enrolment by an administrator can be routine; the cues in GTIG's account are an unfamiliar device, a non-corporate or residential-proxy network, or an enrolment right after an MFA-fatigue pattern (GTIG, 2026-11-17).
Cited evidence
COLD RELIC is a Russian state-sponsored threat group that the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has assessed operates within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).
COLD RELIC leveraged passkeys, MFA backup codes, and rogue MFA devices to retain access throughout the intrusion.
Reauthentication using unrevoked attacker-enrolled passkeys that persisted across password and session resets and bypassed device registration controls
Sources1
AI-generated · no human review · this permalink is the shareable record for the finding · verify operationally critical claims against the linked primary source.