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TGR-STA-0049: Unit 42 describes the PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT implants, which use HTTP/3 over QUIC for command and control against government networks entered through unpatched Exchange servers, then spread through domain logon scripts and grant FullAccess on every mailbox

Unit 42: TGR-STA-0049 uses QUIC C2, logon-script spread and Exchange FullAccess loops against governments

Analysis

Unit 42 describes a campaign by TGR-STA-0049, also tracked as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, against Southeast Asian government entities since at least July 2025, and says the group's targeting also includes government organizations in South America and Europe (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Server exploitation is the primary entry: unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers receive web shells, among them variants of ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5, while phishing with decoy PDFs from lookalike government domains is secondary (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). The implants are two previously undocumented families: the Go-based PerfectPioneer RAT, active since July 2025 and run through DLL side-loading of a modified legitimate executable, decoy installers or phishing, and its modular C++ successor KUKURAT, deployed since March 2026, which loads at least 12 DLL modules from the command server into memory (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Unit 42 says both families use HTTP/3 over QUIC as the primary command channel, with an automatic HTTP/2 fallback in the PerfectPioneer variant it analyzes, separate HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 builds of KUKURAT, and two PerfectPioneer variants, RatAAkk-tt and PerfectRat, that rely on HTTP/2 alone, and that some firewalls and inspection engines handle QUIC less well than TCP traffic (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Two of the six PerfectPioneer variants, Pioneer and rat_http3_cc, carry a built-in blocklist that stops operators running noisy or destructive commands, and KUKURAT generates synthetic network, registry and file activity as camouflage (Unit 42, 2026-11-16).

After taking a domain controller, the operators installed malicious domain logon scripts, so each user's logon pulled KUKURAT; they also used PsExec, WMI and WinRM (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Credentials came from LSASS dumps taken with rundll32 calling comsvcs.dll by ordinal rather than by the MiniDump name, from DCSync, and from Mimikatz, ProcDump, SharpDPAPI and SAM and SYSTEM hive dumps (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). On Exchange, the operators first listed accounts holding the ApplicationImpersonation role and, when none was found, ran a hidden PowerShell loop that granted a compromised account FullAccess on every mailbox (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). The exfiltration targeted pdf, docx, xlsx and png files whose names suggest international relations and internal political affairs (Unit 42, 2026-11-16).

Cited evidence

the exploitation of vulnerable, unpatched Microsoft Exchange servers and web servers to deploy web shells

PerfectPioneer RAT relies on HTTP/3 as its primary C2 communication mechanism, automatically falling back to HTTP/2 in the event of connection failure.

Instead of calling the MiniDump function by name, the attackers invoked it via its ordinal hidden index number, #+000024.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 2026-11-16

Sources1

PROVENANCE

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