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KUKURAT

malware · malware:kukurat single-source

Modular C++ remote access trojan, the successor to PerfectPioneer RAT, deployed since March 2026, that loads at least 12 DLL modules from its command server into memory and generates synthetic network, registry and file activity as camouflage, in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 variants (Unit 42, 2026-11-16).

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-17 → last 2026-11-17
Latest activity
2026-11-17
Unit 42: TGR-STA-0049 uses QUIC C2, logon-script spread and Exchange FullAccess loops against governments
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: apac, europe, latam
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about KUKURAT tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-17NOTABLEUnit 42: TGR-STA-0049 uses QUIC C2, logon-script spread and Exchange FullAccess loops against governments

Exposure · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

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Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-17TGR-STA-0049: Unit 42 describes the PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT implants, which use HTTP/3 over QUIC for command and control against government networks entered through unpatched Exchange servers, then spread through domain logon scripts and grant FullAccess on every mailbox
    active-threatsUnit 42: TGR-STA-0049 uses QUIC C2, logon-script spread and Exchange FullAccess loops against governments

Hunting pivots

Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (16 across 10 tactics)

16 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing
  • ExecutionWindows Management Instrumentation · System Services: Service Execution · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Network Logon Script · Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions · Server Software Component: Web Shell
  • Privilege EscalationBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Network Logon Script · Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions
  • StealthSystem Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Windows Remote Management
  • CollectionData from Local System
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1037.003Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Network Logon Script×1

Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects. These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.002Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions×1

Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1037.003Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Network Logon Script×1

Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects. These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.002Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions×1

Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32×1

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.006OS Credential Dumping: DCSync×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×1

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/tgr-sta-0049-perfectpioneer-kukurat-quic-c2-government · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about KUKURAT (1)

2026-11-17 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

TGR-STA-0049: Unit 42 describes the PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT implants, which use HTTP/3 over QUIC for command and control against government networks entered through unpatched Exchange servers, then spread through domain logon scripts and grant FullAccess on every mailbox

Unit 42 describes a campaign by TGR-STA-0049, also tracked as REF7707, Earth Alux and Ink Dragon, against Southeast Asian government entities since at least July 2025, and says the group's targeting also includes government organizations in South America and Europe (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Server exploitation is the primary entry: unpatched Microsoft Exchange and web servers receive web shells, among them variants of ASPXSpy, Godzilla, Bysunue.aspx and Suo5, while phishing with decoy PDFs from lookalike government domains is secondary (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). The implants are two previously undocumented families: the Go-based PerfectPioneer RAT, active since July 2025 and run through DLL side-loading of a modified legitimate executable, decoy installers or phishing, and its modular C++ successor KUKURAT, deployed since March 2026, which loads at least 12 DLL modules from the command server into memory (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Unit 42 says both families use HTTP/3 over QUIC as the primary command channel, with an automatic HTTP/2 fallback in the PerfectPioneer variant it analyzes, separate HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 builds of KUKURAT, and two PerfectPioneer variants, RatAAkk-tt and PerfectRat, that rely on HTTP/2 alone, and that some firewalls and inspection engines handle QUIC less well than TCP traffic (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Two of the six PerfectPioneer variants, Pioneer and rat_http3_cc, carry a built-in blocklist that stops operators running noisy or destructive commands, and KUKURAT generates synthetic network, registry and file activity as camouflage (Unit 42, 2026-11-16).

After taking a domain controller, the operators installed malicious domain logon scripts, so each user's logon pulled KUKURAT; they also used PsExec, WMI and WinRM (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). Credentials came from LSASS dumps taken with rundll32 calling comsvcs.dll by ordinal rather than by the MiniDump name, from DCSync, and from Mimikatz, ProcDump, SharpDPAPI and SAM and SYSTEM hive dumps (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). On Exchange, the operators first listed accounts holding the ApplicationImpersonation role and, when none was found, ran a hidden PowerShell loop that granted a compromised account FullAccess on every mailbox (Unit 42, 2026-11-16). The exfiltration targeted pdf, docx, xlsx and png files whose names suggest international relations and internal political affairs (Unit 42, 2026-11-16).

the exploitation of vulnerable, unpatched Microsoft Exchange servers and web servers to deploy web shells

PerfectPioneer RAT relies on HTTP/3 as its primary C2 communication mechanism, automatically falling back to HTTP/2 in the event of connection failure.

Instead of calling the MiniDump function by name, the attackers invoked it via its ordinal hidden index number, #+000024.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 2026-11-16
threat17 Nov 04:40Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • unit42.paloaltonetworks.com1 (100%)