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PolinRider: a North Korea-linked loader reaches developers through force-pushed forged commits in at least 7,609 GitHub repositories, hijacked npm releases and a fake employer's take-home test, and reads its server address from an Ethereum wallet

PolinRider: forged backdated commits, npm hijacks and a fake recruiter run a loader at build or folder open

Defender actions

  • Search every branch of your organisation's and suppliers' GitHub repositories for a semicolon followed by 200 or more spaces in JavaScript, TypeScript and build configuration files, and for .vscode/tasks.json tasks that run node when a folder opens; on any hit, rotate every GitHub and npm token reachable from the developer machines and CI runners that built the repository and review force-pushes, deploy keys, Actions secrets and releases since the infection, because deleting the loader does not revoke the access that pushed it.

Analysis

Apiiro calls PolinRider a North Korea-linked worm and found it in at least 7,609 GitHub repositories owned by 2,330 accounts, mostly developers' own (Apiiro, 2026-11-09). Three routes, none relying on an npm install script. Forged commits: with stolen GitHub access the worm force-pushes a copy of a commit the owner already made, with the same author, message and date, plus a loader hidden after hundreds of spaces in a build configuration file; in 94% of 9,990 injection pushes the copy claims to be more than an hour older than the push, so git log shows an old commit under the owner's name. Cloning runs nothing; building the project or running its dev, build or lint scripts loads the file, and in the newest wave opening the folder in VS Code is enough (Apiiro, 2026-11-09). Hijacked npm releases: Sonatype found concealed loaders in 12 releases across 10 hijacked packages with no install or postinstall hook, so disabling install scripts does not help (Sonatype, 2026-11-04). A fake employer: JFrog traced AccuraSoftHire, a decoy recruiter with ID-verified LinkedIn recruiters and job ads, whose take-home loads a look-alike npm package and whose scripted camera check fails and hands the candidate a command that installs the same loader (JFrog, 2026-11-09); StepSecurity says taking its site down, as had happened by 2026-11-13, does not end the operation (StepSecurity, 2026-11-13).

The loader reads the latest outbound transaction of a hard-coded Ethereum wallet and decodes two IPv4 addresses from its recipient field (Apiiro, 2026-11-09), then fetches XOR-encoded JavaScript over plain HTTP on port 443, so blocking one server changes nothing; the wallet in the hijacked npm releases also appears in GitGuardian's GhostAction report, which Sonatype says does not establish a shared operator (Sonatype, 2026-11-04). Cleanup does not hold: 1,949 repositories were infected again after being publicly listed, and where owners cleaned up the stolen access often still worked; Apiiro counts roughly 2,300 developers reached (Apiiro, 2026-11-09).

Triage: blockchain developers legitimately call public RPC endpoints; the discriminator is a build or lint process in a project with no Web3 purpose doing so and then spawning a detached node child (Apiiro, 2026-11-09).

Cited evidence

Apiiro research found the worm, PolinRider, in at least 7,609 GitHub repos owned by 2,330 accounts.

Cloning runs nothing.

Apiiro 2026-11-09

Disabling npm install scripts does not address code that runs during module loading or application startup.

Sonatype Research 2026-11-04

We have found no link between AccuraSoftHire and that intrusion.

JFrog Security Research 2026-11-09

Sources4

PROVENANCE

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