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GitHub

product · product:github

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-15 → last 2026-11-15
Latest activity
2026-11-15
PolinRider: forged backdated commits, npm hijacks and a fake recruiter run a loader at build or folder open
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
4
4 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about GitHub, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Search every branch of your organisation's and suppliers' GitHub repositories for a semicolon followed by 200 or more spaces in JavaScript, TypeScript and build configuration files, and for .vscode/tasks.json tasks that run node when a folder opens; on any hit, rotate every GitHub and npm token reachable from the developer machines and CI runners that built the repository and review force-pushes, deploy keys, Actions secrets and releases since the infection, because deleting the loader does not revoke the access that pushed it.
    2026-11-15PolinRider: forged backdated commits, npm hijacks…

Defender insights

What each entry about GitHub tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-15NOTABLEPolinRider: forged backdated commits, npm hijacks and a fake recruiter run a loader at build or folder open

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-15PolinRider: a North Korea-linked loader reaches developers through force-pushed forged commits in at least 7,609 GitHub repositories, hijacked npm releases and a fake employer's take-home test, and reads its server address from an Ethereum wallet
    active-threatsPolinRider: forged backdated commits, npm hijacks and a fake recruiter run a loader at build or folder open

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
GitHub
ATT&CK techniques (12 across 7 tactics)

12 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Domains · Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain · Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · User Execution: Malicious File
  • PersistenceValid Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading · Valid Accounts
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.001Acquire Infrastructure: Domains×1

Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1585.001Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts×1

Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036Masquerading×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-11-15/polinrider-forged-commits-npm-hijacks-fake-recruiter · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about GitHub (1)

2026-11-15 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

PolinRider: a North Korea-linked loader reaches developers through force-pushed forged commits in at least 7,609 GitHub repositories, hijacked npm releases and a fake employer's take-home test, and reads its server address from an Ethereum wallet

Apiiro calls PolinRider a North Korea-linked worm and found it in at least 7,609 GitHub repositories owned by 2,330 accounts, mostly developers' own (Apiiro, 2026-11-09). Three routes, none relying on an npm install script. Forged commits: with stolen GitHub access the worm force-pushes a copy of a commit the owner already made, with the same author, message and date, plus a loader hidden after hundreds of spaces in a build configuration file; in 94% of 9,990 injection pushes the copy claims to be more than an hour older than the push, so git log shows an old commit under the owner's name. Cloning runs nothing; building the project or running its dev, build or lint scripts loads the file, and in the newest wave opening the folder in VS Code is enough (Apiiro, 2026-11-09). Hijacked npm releases: Sonatype found concealed loaders in 12 releases across 10 hijacked packages with no install or postinstall hook, so disabling install scripts does not help (Sonatype, 2026-11-04). A fake employer: JFrog traced AccuraSoftHire, a decoy recruiter with ID-verified LinkedIn recruiters and job ads, whose take-home loads a look-alike npm package and whose scripted camera check fails and hands the candidate a command that installs the same loader (JFrog, 2026-11-09); StepSecurity says taking its site down, as had happened by 2026-11-13, does not end the operation (StepSecurity, 2026-11-13).

The loader reads the latest outbound transaction of a hard-coded Ethereum wallet and decodes two IPv4 addresses from its recipient field (Apiiro, 2026-11-09), then fetches XOR-encoded JavaScript over plain HTTP on port 443, so blocking one server changes nothing; the wallet in the hijacked npm releases also appears in GitGuardian's GhostAction report, which Sonatype says does not establish a shared operator (Sonatype, 2026-11-04). Cleanup does not hold: 1,949 repositories were infected again after being publicly listed, and where owners cleaned up the stolen access often still worked; Apiiro counts roughly 2,300 developers reached (Apiiro, 2026-11-09).

Triage: blockchain developers legitimately call public RPC endpoints; the discriminator is a build or lint process in a project with no Web3 purpose doing so and then spawning a detached node child (Apiiro, 2026-11-09).

Apiiro research found the worm, PolinRider, in at least 7,609 GitHub repos owned by 2,330 accounts.

Cloning runs nothing.

Apiiro 2026-11-09

Disabling npm install scripts does not address code that runs during module loading or application startup.

Sonatype Research 2026-11-04

We have found no link between AccuraSoftHire and that intrusion.

JFrog Security Research 2026-11-09

Builds on: GhostAction: fake security workflows now harvest whole git histories; rotating Actions secrets…

threat15 Nov 04:26Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • apiiro.com1 (25%)
  • research.jfrog.com1 (25%)
  • sonatype.com1 (25%)
  • stepsecurity.io1 (25%)