CVE-2026-104935, Ivanti Connect Secure: an authentication bypass chained to code execution is exploited as a zero-day, and the root-escalation step of the chain is still unpatched (CVSS 8.6)
Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day chain is exploited; its root step has no fix and it evades the Integrity Checker
Defender actions
- Upgrade every Ivanti Connect Secure appliance on 25.1.1.1 or earlier, 25.1.2.2 or earlier, or 22.8R2.4 or earlier to 25.1.1.2, 25.1.3.0 or 25.1.3.1, or 22.8R2.5 now, internet-facing appliances first; 22.7.x and below are not affected.
- Run a compromise check on every appliance that was reachable on an affected build, starting with proxy, load balancer or WAF logs back to at least 2026-10-03 for welcome.cgi requests that carry an X-DSCGI-PATH header; where compromise cannot be excluded, follow Ivanti's recovery steps and then reset the domain service account, LAPS and local passwords, certificates and API keys the appliance held.
Analysis
Ivanti disclosed a vulnerability in limited versions of Connect Secure on 2026-10-13 and says it is aware of limited exploitation in the wild (Ivanti, 2026-10-13). Rapid7 describes CVE-2026-104935 as an authentication bypass by spoofing that lets a remote unauthenticated attacker run commands, and scores it CVSS 8.6 (Rapid7, 2026-10-13). CISA added CVE-2026-104935 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the same day (CISA, 2026-10-13). Volexity found the activity on 2026-10-05, tracks the operator as UTA0576, a previously unknown cluster it assesses with low confidence as criminal, and dates exploitation of a fully patched 22.8R2.4 appliance to 2026-10-03 (Volexity, 2026-10-13).
The chain has three steps. A request to the public login script welcome.cgi names a protected script in an X-DSCGI-PATH header, so the URL passes the authentication check while the header picks the destination. The upload script wu.cgi writes a file to disk before checking that it is a ZIP, and parallel requests run a Perl script before it is deleted. A root escalation then abuses the dsinvoked service's trust in the shared DSCache configuration store (Volexity, 2026-10-13). Ivanti tracks the first two steps under CVE-2026-104935 and has not fixed the root escalation, which it says will ship in a future release in the coming weeks (Volexity, 2026-10-13). Every command re-runs the whole chain over HTTPS with no web shell or backdoor, and the exploit patches library code in memory only, so Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool, which looks for file changes, does not detect it; Volexity also found entries removed from the debug and audit logs (Volexity, 2026-10-13). The operator then went after the Active Directory service account stored on the appliance: LDAP queries for LAPS passwords, BitLocker recovery keys and password attributes, a Kerberoast-capable tool, password spraying, and packet capture of plaintext LDAP, HTTP Basic and NTLM traffic (Volexity, 2026-10-13).
Cited evidence
At the time of disclosure, Ivanti is aware of limited exploitation in the wild.
In the first week of October 2026, Volexity discovered an unknown threat actor, UTA0576, abusing a zero-day exploit chain to compromise a fully patched (at the time, version 22.8R2.4) Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) VPN appliance.
because this exploit chain patches library code in memory only and restores configuration store data, the tool does not detect any modifications.
Ivanti is working on a fix for the privilege escalation vulnerability, and it will be included in a future release in the coming weeks.
apply the appropriate update on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles
Sources5
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