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Citizen Lab: a European Parliament spyware-inquiry member was himself infected twice with Pegasus

discovered 2026-07-03 18:25 UTCrun 2026-07-03T1809Z-intel2 sourcesmulti-source

Citizen Lab published a forensic report confirming, with high confidence, that the iPhone of Stelios Kouloglou — a former MEP who sat on the European Parliament's PEGA committee, the inquiry into commercial-spyware abuse — was infected with NSO Group's Pegasus on two occasions, around 21 October 2022 and 6–7 March 2023, while the device ran iOS 15.5 (Citizen Lab, 2026-07-03). The 2022 infection used the PWNYOURHOME zero-click chain: a specially crafted NSKeyedArchive object landing in the HomeKit daemon, followed by malicious content processed by MessagesBlastDoorService (iMessage's sandboxed attachment parser) — a distinct path from earlier NSO chains that abused iMessage directly. Citizen Lab does not attribute the intrusion to any government and explicitly found no indication of Greek-government responsibility, but notes the targeting infrastructure overlaps a previously documented Pegasus campaign against Russian- and Belarusian-speaking exiled journalists and opposition figures in Europe, suggesting a single Pegasus customer with multi-country authorization (The Record, 2026-07-03). Because Kouloglou sat on the committee scrutinising exactly this abuse, the operator would have gained visibility into confidential PEGA deliberations — an EU parliamentary-privilege and confidentiality concern.

We found with high confidence that his device was successfully infected with Pegasus spyware on or around October 21, 2022, and again on March 6 and 7, 2023.

PWNYOURHOME appeared to first involve the attacker sending a specially crafted NSKeyedArchive that landed in HomeKit, followed by malicious content that landed in MessagesBlastDoorService.

Citizen Lab

Defender actions

  • For officials in oversight, diplomatic, or inquiry roles handling sensitive material: enrol government-issued iPhones in Lockdown Mode (or an MDM-enforced equivalent that disables HomeKit and rich iMessage/attachment parsing) and Apple's at-risk threat-notification program.
  • Establish proactive mobile forensic triage for high-risk principals — run the Mobile Verification Toolkit (MVT) against iOS sysdiagnose/backup artefacts periodically rather than waiting for an alert; a zero-click chain leaves no phishing artefact to hunt on the endpoint.
PROVENANCE

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