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Storm-2949: SSPR abuse of four privileged users turned into a data-theft sweep across Microsoft 365, Key Vault, SQL, Storage and Azure VMs

Storm-2949 hijacked privileged Entra ID accounts through SSPR abuse, then mined Azure management features for data

Analysis

Microsoft Threat Intelligence published its account of an intrusion by Storm-2949 on 2026-05-18: a campaign whose singular focus was to exfiltrate as much sensitive data as possible from one target organization's high-value assets, across Microsoft 365, file hosting and the Azure production environment (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). The actor did not rely on traditional malware but on legitimate cloud and Azure management features that blend into administrative behavior (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). Storm is Microsoft's temporary designation for activity not yet classified, and Microsoft saw no follow-on extortion and no link to ShinyHunters (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-19).

Identity takeover. Microsoft assesses with high confidence that Storm-2949 abused Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR): the actor starts a reset on a targeted user's behalf and persuades the user to approve the resulting MFA prompts, likely through an organized and convincing phishing scheme, for example by posing as IT support (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). It then reset the password, removed the user's phone, e-mail and Authenticator methods and enrolled Microsoft Authenticator on its own device, locking the user out; the victims included IT personnel and senior leadership, and the actor repeated the process until it held four accounts (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Directory discovery and Microsoft 365 theft. A custom Python script enumerated users and applications through Microsoft Graph to find privileged identities, and an attempt to add credentials to a service principal failed for lack of permissions (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). The actor searched OneDrive and SharePoint for VPN configuration and remote-access documents and in one instance downloaded thousands of files from the OneDrive web interface in a single action (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Azure control plane. With privileged custom RBAC roles on several subscriptions, the actor called microsoft.Web/sites/publishxml/action to retrieve the publishing profiles of secondary App Service apps, which often hold FTP, Web Deploy and Kudu credentials; with an Owner role over one Key Vault it changed the vault's access configuration and read dozens of secrets within four minutes; Microsoft believes they held the credentials the actor then used to take over the primary production web app and change its password (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). It opened SQL server firewall rules with microsoft.sql/servers/firewallrules/write and deleted them after taking data, opened storage account network access to its own addresses with microsoft.storage/storageaccounts/write, and retrieved account keys and SAS tokens with microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listkeys/action to download blobs over several days with an Azure SDK script (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Virtual machines and endpoints. Through the VMAccess extension the actor created a local administrator on a VM, and through Run Command it tried to use the VM's managed-identity token from the Instance Metadata Service against Key Vault, which failed on permissions (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). A Run Command PowerShell script then attempted to weaken Defender Antivirus by disabling several protections, installed ScreenConnect from actor infrastructure under names resembling Windows components, and attempted to clear event logs, command history and temporary files; over ScreenConnect the actor ran host and domain discovery, exfiltrated .pfx certificate files and scanned file shares for password strings (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Cited evidence

We assess with high confidence that Storm-2949 leveraged a social engineering technique consistent with known abuses of Microsoft’s Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process.

Over the span of four minutes, the threat actor successfully manipulated Key Vault access configurations and accessed dozens of secrets within the said Key Vault.

The script then installed the ScreenConnect remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool obtained from threat actor-controlled infrastructure.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-05-18

Tanmay Ganacharya, VP of Microsoft Security Research, told BleepingComputer that current Storm-2949 activity does not indicate a connection to ShinyHunters or an affiliate of the group.

BleepingComputer 2026-05-19

Updates1

Correction

Storm-2949 is not described as financially motivated: Microsoft's stated objective for the campaign is mass data exfiltration (Microsoft, 2026-05-18), Storm is its temporary designation for unclassified activity, and it observed no extortion and sees no link to ShinyHunters (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-19). The intrusion did not stay free of binaries: on VMs the actor installed ScreenConnect, tried to weaken Defender Antivirus and cleared event logs (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). SSPR abuse took over four privileged accounts, not one, and Microsoft hedges the social engineering as consistent with SSPR abuse and likely a phishing scheme, giving an IT-support call only as an example (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

At Key Vault the actor changed the vault's access configuration and read dozens of secrets, connection strings and identity credentials among them (Microsoft, 2026-05-18); the Key Vault operation names given earlier for hunting are not in Microsoft's write-up, and Entra ID records SSPR activity in the Self-Service Password Management audit category (Microsoft Learn). Microsoft names no victim sector or country.

Sources3

Revision history

  1. Published 2026-05-20-a0f7b07f
  2. Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit

    Microsoft does not call Storm-2949 financially motivated: its objective was mass data exfiltration, Storm is a temporary designation, no extortion was seen and there is no ShinyHunters link, and the intrusion was not binary-free, since ScreenConnect was installed on VMs, where a script tried to weaken Defender and to clear event logs. Self-service password reset abuse took over four privileged accounts on a hedged phishing assessment.

    Changed: body classification event_date evidence headline regions sectors sources sourcing_note summary tags techniques title verification

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