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Storm-2949 SSPR-to-Key-Vault kill chain

campaign · campaign:storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-cloud-wide-kill-chain single-source

Storm-2949's self-service password reset abuse intrusion: four privileged Entra ID accounts taken over, then App Service publishing profiles, Key Vault secrets, SQL and Storage data, VM Run Command and VMAccess, and ScreenConnect on virtual machines (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-20 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-20
Storm-2949 hijacked privileged Entra ID accounts through SSPR abuse, then mined Azure management features for…
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Storm-2949 SSPR-to-Key-Vault kill chain tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-20HIGHStorm-2949 hijacked privileged Entra ID accounts through SSPR abuse, then mined Azure management features for data

Exposure · detection

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Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

attributed to

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-20Storm-2949: SSPR abuse of four privileged users turned into a data-theft sweep across Microsoft 365, Key Vault, SQL, Storage and Azure VMs
    deep-diveStorm-2949 hijacked privileged Entra ID accounts through SSPR abuse, then mined Azure management features for data
ATT&CK techniques (24 across 10 tactics)

24 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • ExecutionCloud Administration Command
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Create Account: Local Account · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
  • StealthMasquerading: Masquerade Task or Service · Indicator Removal: Clear Command History · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Disable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs · Disable or Modify System Firewall: Cloud Firewall
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys · Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API · Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
  • DiscoveryPermission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · System Information Discovery · Account Discovery: Domain Account · Account Discovery: Cloud Account
  • CollectionData from Information Repositories: Sharepoint · Data from Cloud Storage
  • Command and ControlRemote Access Tools

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1651Cloud Administration Command×1

Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×1

Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×1

Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.004Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.003Indicator Removal: Clear Command History×1

In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685.005Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs×1

Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1686.001Disable or Modify System Firewall: Cloud Firewall×1

Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys×1

Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk, .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API×1

Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.006Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation×1

Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.004Account Discovery: Cloud Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1213.002Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint×1

Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1530Data from Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/storm-2949-sspr-to-key-vault-azure-kill-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Storm-2949 SSPR-to-Key-Vault kill chain (1)

2026-05-20 · view entry permalink →

HIGHupdatedNATOB2

Storm-2949: SSPR abuse of four privileged users turned into a data-theft sweep across Microsoft 365, Key Vault, SQL, Storage and Azure VMs

Microsoft Threat Intelligence published its account of an intrusion by Storm-2949 on 2026-05-18: a campaign whose singular focus was to exfiltrate as much sensitive data as possible from one target organization's high-value assets, across Microsoft 365, file hosting and the Azure production environment (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). The actor did not rely on traditional malware but on legitimate cloud and Azure management features that blend into administrative behavior (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). Storm is Microsoft's temporary designation for activity not yet classified, and Microsoft saw no follow-on extortion and no link to ShinyHunters (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-19).

Identity takeover. Microsoft assesses with high confidence that Storm-2949 abused Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR): the actor starts a reset on a targeted user's behalf and persuades the user to approve the resulting MFA prompts, likely through an organized and convincing phishing scheme, for example by posing as IT support (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). It then reset the password, removed the user's phone, e-mail and Authenticator methods and enrolled Microsoft Authenticator on its own device, locking the user out; the victims included IT personnel and senior leadership, and the actor repeated the process until it held four accounts (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Directory discovery and Microsoft 365 theft. A custom Python script enumerated users and applications through Microsoft Graph to find privileged identities, and an attempt to add credentials to a service principal failed for lack of permissions (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). The actor searched OneDrive and SharePoint for VPN configuration and remote-access documents and in one instance downloaded thousands of files from the OneDrive web interface in a single action (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Azure control plane. With privileged custom RBAC roles on several subscriptions, the actor called microsoft.Web/sites/publishxml/action to retrieve the publishing profiles of secondary App Service apps, which often hold FTP, Web Deploy and Kudu credentials; with an Owner role over one Key Vault it changed the vault's access configuration and read dozens of secrets within four minutes; Microsoft believes they held the credentials the actor then used to take over the primary production web app and change its password (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). It opened SQL server firewall rules with microsoft.sql/servers/firewallrules/write and deleted them after taking data, opened storage account network access to its own addresses with microsoft.storage/storageaccounts/write, and retrieved account keys and SAS tokens with microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listkeys/action to download blobs over several days with an Azure SDK script (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

Virtual machines and endpoints. Through the VMAccess extension the actor created a local administrator on a VM, and through Run Command it tried to use the VM's managed-identity token from the Instance Metadata Service against Key Vault, which failed on permissions (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). A Run Command PowerShell script then attempted to weaken Defender Antivirus by disabling several protections, installed ScreenConnect from actor infrastructure under names resembling Windows components, and attempted to clear event logs, command history and temporary files; over ScreenConnect the actor ran host and domain discovery, exfiltrated .pfx certificate files and scanned file shares for password strings (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

We assess with high confidence that Storm-2949 leveraged a social engineering technique consistent with known abuses of Microsoft’s Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process.

Over the span of four minutes, the threat actor successfully manipulated Key Vault access configurations and accessed dozens of secrets within the said Key Vault.

The script then installed the ScreenConnect remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool obtained from threat actor-controlled infrastructure.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-05-18

Tanmay Ganacharya, VP of Microsoft Security Research, told BleepingComputer that current Storm-2949 activity does not indicate a connection to ShinyHunters or an affiliate of the group.

BleepingComputer 2026-05-19
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditbodyclassificationevent_dateevidenceheadlineregionssectorssourcessourcing_notesummarytagstechniquestitleverification

Storm-2949 is not described as financially motivated: Microsoft's stated objective for the campaign is mass data exfiltration (Microsoft, 2026-05-18), Storm is its temporary designation for unclassified activity, and it observed no extortion and sees no link to ShinyHunters (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-19). The intrusion did not stay free of binaries: on VMs the actor installed ScreenConnect, tried to weaken Defender Antivirus and cleared event logs (Microsoft, 2026-05-18). SSPR abuse took over four privileged accounts, not one, and Microsoft hedges the social engineering as consistent with SSPR abuse and likely a phishing scheme, giving an IT-support call only as an example (Microsoft, 2026-05-18).

At Key Vault the actor changed the vault's access configuration and read dozens of secrets, connection strings and identity credentials among them (Microsoft, 2026-05-18); the Key Vault operation names given earlier for hunting are not in Microsoft's write-up, and Entra ID records SSPR activity in the Self-Service Password Management audit category (Microsoft Learn). Microsoft names no victim sector or country.

threat20 May 05:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Deep dive1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (33%)
  • learn.microsoft.com1 (33%)
  • microsoft.com1 (33%)