GTIG: UNC6671 "BlackFile" vishing → AiTM → rogue-MFA → programmatic SharePoint exfiltration (1M+ files from one victim); DLS shutdown signals possible rebrand
Analysis
Google Threat Intelligence Group published on 2026-05-15 an analysis of UNC6671, a financially motivated extortion cluster that adopted the "BlackFile" brand by February 2026 and has targeted dozens of organizations across North America, Australia and the UK (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). Callers hired by the actor phone employees' personal mobile numbers, pose as internal IT or helpdesk staff citing a passkey migration or MFA update, and send the victim to a lookalike single sign-on portal on Tucows-registered domains, lately as organization-named subdomains with "passkey" or "enrollment" themes (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). The operator relays the credentials and the MFA code or push approval to the real SSO provider in real time, then immediately registers a new attacker-controlled MFA device for persistence (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). GTIG stresses that these compromises come from social engineering, not a vendor vulnerability (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15).
After access, the actor moves into connected SaaS applications (SharePoint, OneDrive, Zendesk, Salesforce), searches for strings such as "confidential" and "SSN", and exfiltrates with Python requests and PowerShell scripts through Microsoft Graph and direct HTTP GET requests against document URLs, reusing session cookies (for example FedAuth) captured during the vishing phase (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). In one case the script downloaded more than a million files from SharePoint and OneDrive (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). The direct-fetch method is often logged as FileAccessed rather than FileDownloaded, so it slips past SOCs that treat FileAccessed as benign (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). In early intrusions the FileDownloaded records carried a spoofed Microsoft Office ClientAppId, which GTIG says served to bypass basic conditional access filters, while the user-agent showed python-requests or WindowsPowerShell (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). In later intrusions the FileAccessed records named python-requests as the client application in AppAccessContext (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). The sessions came from commercial VPN exit nodes and hosting providers (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15).
The BlackFile leak site went offline in late April 2026, came back on 2026-05-11 with a message that BlackFile "is shutting down… under this name", and was inaccessible at publication (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). GTIG reads this as a possible transition phase rather than a permanent cessation, noting that extortion clusters commonly rebrand or disperse after shutdowns (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). GTIG assesses UNC6671 as independent of ShinyHunters (UNC6240), although UNC6671 co-opted the ShinyHunters brand at least once (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15).
Triage: an Office client identity paired with a scripting-library user-agent is the mismatch GTIG found, and GTIG reads it as scripted access rather than a person using SharePoint (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). A session source on a commercial VPN or hosting provider that is unusual for the user adds weight (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15).
Updates1
GTIG describes the leak-site shutdown as a possible transition phase rather than a permanent cessation, not as a probable rebrand (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). The detection guidance is corrected to GTIG's own: the spoofed Microsoft Office ClientAppId appeared on FileDownloaded records, later FileAccessed records named python-requests as the client, and new MFA factor registrations are suspicious when immediately preceded by failed or abandoned MFA challenges (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15). The actor reused captured session cookies such as FedAuth, and GTIG does not describe theft of application access tokens (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026-05-15).
Sources1
Revision history
- Published 2026-05-16-5bc123a0
- Correction 2026-09-30T0639Z-audit
GTIG's leak-site assessment is corrected from probable rebrand to a possible transition phase. The detection guidance now follows GTIG's own: the spoofed Office ClientAppId sat on FileDownloaded records, and new MFA registrations are suspicious after failed or abandoned challenges. Reuse of captured session cookies replaces an unsupported token-theft mapping, and the title and summary no longer present the one-victim figure of over a million files as a norm. An attacker-controlled domain, inline ATT&CK ids, an unsourced conditional-access recommendation, the context-only ShinyHunters link and three victim sectors GTIG does not name are removed. Priority is lowered to notable because the targeting GTIG reports is in North America, Australia and the UK, and the entry gains an ATT&CK mapping.
Changed: body classification techniques title headline summary priority entities sectors
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