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Microsoft MDASH: multi-model agentic scanning harness credited with 16 Windows networking and authentication CVEs, four of them Critical remote code execution flaws

Microsoft's MDASH agent harness found 16 Windows networking CVEs, including four Critical remote code execution flaws

Analysis

Microsoft's Autonomous Code Security team disclosed MDASH on 2026-05-12, a harness that orchestrates more than 100 specialised agents across an ensemble of frontier and distilled models in a prepare, scan, validate, dedupe and prove pipeline: debater agents argue each finding's reachability and exploitability, and the prove stage constructs and executes triggering inputs where the bug class admits it, to prove the vulnerability exists (Microsoft, 2026-05-12). Microsoft lists 16 CVEs its engineering teams found with MDASH across the Windows network stack and adjacent services, 10 kernel-mode and 6 user-mode, most of them reachable from a network position with no credentials (Microsoft, 2026-05-12).

Four are Critical remote code execution flaws: CVE-2026-33827, a race-driven use-after-free in tcpip.sys; CVE-2026-33824, a double-free in the IKEEXT service, which runs as LocalSystem, triggered by two UDP packets; CVE-2026-41089, an unauthenticated CLDAP filter stack overflow in netlogon.dll; and CVE-2026-41096, a heap out-of-bounds flaw in dnsapi.dll triggered by a crafted UDP DNS response (Microsoft, 2026-05-12). Microsoft released the first two on 2026-04-14, scored 8.1 with high attack complexity and 9.8, both rated Exploitation Less Likely (MSRC, CVE-2026-33827; MSRC, CVE-2026-33824), and the other two on 2026-05-12, both scored 9.8, the Netlogon flaw rated Exploitation Less Likely and the DNS client flaw Exploitation Unlikely (MSRC, CVE-2026-41089; MSRC, CVE-2026-41096). The MDASH write-up describes the tcpip.sys trigger as crafted IPv4 packets carrying the Strict Source and Record Route option (Microsoft, 2026-05-12), while the advisory's FAQ describes a crafted IPv6 packet sent to a node where IPsec is enabled (MSRC, CVE-2026-33827).

Microsoft's benchmark figures are its own: all 21 vulnerabilities planted in a private test driver found with zero false positives, recall of 96% on 28 historical MSRC cases in clfs.sys and 100% on 7 in tcpip.sys, which it describes as retrospective recall on internal code with a finite case count, and an 88.45% success rate on CyberGym's 1,507 vulnerability reproduction tasks drawn from 188 OSS-Fuzz projects (Microsoft, 2026-05-12). The harness is used by Microsoft security engineering teams and tested by a small set of customers in a limited private preview (Microsoft, 2026-05-12; The Register, 2026-05-13).

Cited evidence

Across the Windows network stack and adjacent services, today’s Patch Tuesday includes 16 CVEs our engineering teams found using codename MDASH.

Constructs and executes triggering inputs where the bug class admits it.

These vulnerabilities are 10 kernel-mode / 6 usermode.

a bare Start-Service IKEEXT with no responder policy is not vulnerable

Microsoft Security Blog 2026-05-12

Updates1

Correction

Microsoft describes MDASH's prove stage as constructing and executing triggering inputs where the bug class admits it, to prove that a vulnerability exists (Microsoft, 2026-05-12); it does not say every finding was proven exploitable, and its advisories rate CVE-2026-33827, CVE-2026-33824 and CVE-2026-41089 Exploitation Less Likely and CVE-2026-41096 Exploitation Unlikely (MSRC, CVE-2026-33827; MSRC, CVE-2026-33824; MSRC, CVE-2026-41089; MSRC, CVE-2026-41096). CVE-2026-33827 and CVE-2026-33824 were patched in April 2026, not in the May update, and six of the 16 bugs are user-mode while the cohort also covers http.sys and telnet.exe, so they are not all network-stack kernel flaws (Microsoft, 2026-05-12).

Microsoft did not call the 16 CVEs a first production run, and gives no June date: the harness is already being tested by a small set of customers in a limited private preview (Microsoft, 2026-05-12). The benchmark figures come from Microsoft's blog rather than The Register, and the tcpip.sys recall covers 7 historical MSRC cases (Microsoft, 2026-05-12). No cited source describes DirectAccess or Always-On VPN deployment in Swiss or EU government estates; the IKEv2 flaw is reachable only on hosts configured as IKEv2 responders (Microsoft, 2026-05-12).

Sources6

Revision history

  1. Published 2026-05-13-c148b9a5
  2. Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit

    Microsoft says MDASH's prove stage builds triggering inputs to show a bug exists, not that every finding was proven exploitable; its advisories rate three of the four Critical flaws Exploitation Less Likely and the DNS client flaw Exploitation Unlikely, and two of them shipped in April 2026, not May. The harness is in a limited private preview rather than scheduled for June, the 16 CVEs are not described as a first production run, and no source describes DirectAccess or Always-On VPN deployment in Swiss or EU government estates; the IKEv2 flaw needs a host configured as an IKEv2 responder. The benchmark figures come from Microsoft's own blog.

    Changed: affected_products body classification event_date evidence headline sources sourcing_note summary techniques title

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