DAEMON Tools Lite supply-chain compromise — China-nexus QUIC RAT delivered via signed installers; ~12 selective government / scientific / manufacturing targets
Official DAEMON Tools Lite Windows installers (versions 12.5.0.2421 → 12.5.0.2434) were trojanised on the Disc Soft vendor distribution server from 8 April to 5 May 2026, with malicious installers maintaining the authentic AVB Disc Soft code-signing certificate. The campaign deployed three stages: a .NET information collector (envchk.exe) for host fingerprinting deployed broadly across more than 100 countries (Germany, France, Spain, and Italy appear explicitly in first-stage victim telemetry); a shellcode-based backdoor; and QUIC RAT — a C++ implant supporting HTTP / UDP / TCP / WebSocket / QUIC / HTTP/3 C2 channels — selectively deployed to approximately twelve targets in government, scientific, manufacturing, and retail sectors in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand per Kaspersky. Chinese-language strings in the information collector suggest a Chinese-speaking actor; no formal attribution to a named group. The C2 domain was registered 2026-03-27 — approximately two weeks before the first trojanised installer (2026-04-08) — confirming pre-planned operation. Disc Soft acknowledged 2026-05-05, released clean version 12.6.0.2445, resolved the distribution compromise within 12 hours (Kaspersky Securelist · The Record, 2026-05-06 · BleepingComputer, 2026-05-06 · Help Net Security, 2026-05-06 · daily 2026-05-07 and 2026-05-09 UPDATE).
Sources
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