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PetitPotam

tool · tool:petitpotam single-source

Technique and tool that makes a Windows server authenticate to an attacker-controlled host over the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol; Microsoft Threat Intelligence (2026-10-30) describes it coercing a domain controller's machine account, with the NTLM authentication relayed to AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8) to obtain a domain controller certificate.

Coverage
3
1 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-08-29 → last 2026-10-31
Latest activity
2026-10-31
Microsoft: Teams help-desk vishing into Quick Assist ended in AD CS certificates for privileged accounts and…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
12
11 hosts
2026-08-293 appearances2026-10-31

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about PetitPotam, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • In every forest with an enterprise CA, list the AD CS Web Enrollment and Certificate Enrollment Web Service endpoints that lack HTTPS and Extended Protection for Authentication and the certificate templates that accept requester-supplied identity with broad enrollment rights, because both intrusions turned a Quick Assist session into a certificate for a privileged identity.
    2026-10-31Microsoft: Teams help-desk vishing into Quick…

Defender insights

What each entry about PetitPotam tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-31NOTABLEMicrosoft: Teams help-desk vishing into Quick Assist ended in AD CS certificates for privileged accounts and a DC

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

Every entry that names PetitPotam, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-10-31Teams help-desk impersonation to domain-controller identity: Microsoft traces two intrusions from a Quick Assist session to AD CS ESC1 certificates with DCSync, and to PetitPotam relayed to ESC8 Web Enrollment
    active-threatsMicrosoft: Teams help-desk vishing into Quick Assist ended in AD CS certificates for privileged accounts and a DC
  2. 2026-10-22k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen
    mentionactive-threatsGroup-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable private-data-encryption
  3. 2026-08-29CVE-2026-62911, Microsoft Exchange Server MRSProxy: a missing channel-binding check lets a relayed Negotiate authentication take over every mailbox, public exploit code now live sixteen days after the patch
    mentiontrending-vulnerabilitiesA working public exploit for an Exchange mailbox-move endpoint lands sixteen days after Patch Tuesday, and MSRC's exploitability rating has not moved
ATT&CK techniques (13 across 10 tactics)

13 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing via Service · Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • StealthMasquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: DCSync · Forced Authentication · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
  • DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery · System Information Discovery
  • CollectionAdversary-in-the-Middle
  • Command and ControlRemote Access Tools
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×1

Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.003Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities×1

Adversaries may rename legitimate / system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for legitimate utilities adversaries are capable of abusing, including both built-in binaries and tools such as PSExec, AutoHotKey, and IronPython. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on these utilities executing from non-standard paths.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.006OS Credential Dumping: DCSync×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1187Forced Authentication×1

Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates×1

Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1016System Network Configuration Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-10-31/teams-help-desk-impersonation-quick-assist-ad-cs-esc1-esc8 · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about PetitPotam (1)

2026-10-31 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Teams help-desk impersonation to domain-controller identity: Microsoft traces two intrusions from a Quick Assist session to AD CS ESC1 certificates with DCSync, and to PetitPotam relayed to ESC8 Web Enrollment

Microsoft Threat Intelligence describes two human-operated intrusions, not attributed to any threat actor, that began with an external Teams contact (across the broader activity Microsoft saw organisation-themed tenant names and support-style display names) who persuaded a user to open Quick Assist and read out the connection code; the activity did not exploit a Teams vulnerability. In the session the operator placed an archive in Downloads, extracted it into a newly created KB-prefixed folder under the user profile and started the payload with a portable Python, JavaScript or Java runtime, which ran host and network discovery and assessed AD CS (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-10-30).

In the first case a certificate template open to ESC1, where the requester supplies the identity, produced certificates for three privileged accounts, and about 90 minutes later for eight more after a second wave against 16 users; DCSync began within seconds of obtaining one privileged certificate. Defender's automated disruption blocked more than 1,000 SMB attempts, but a privileged account excluded from automated response stayed usable, reached a file server and ran a renamed Rclone that copied a share to an external SFTP destination (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-10-30). In the second case the operator used PetitPotam to make a domain controller authenticate to the attacker's host, relayed that NTLM authentication to an AD CS Web Enrollment endpoint, obtained a certificate from the Domain Controller template and used it for PKINIT to get a ticket-granting ticket for the controller's account; Defender raised ESC8 alerts and the customer isolated the workstation (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-10-30).

Triage: a help-desk Quick Assist session is routine; what separates this one is an external-tenant initiator with no matching ticket and an interpreter runtime launched from a newly created user-writable folder rather than a managed install path.

The activity described here is not attributed to a specific threat actor.

Resetting the user’s password or reimaging the first workstation does not revoke an issued certificate or invalidate Kerberos tickets that have already been issued.

One privileged account was excluded from automated response, so containment did not apply to that identity.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-10-30

Builds on: The intrusion's most consequential step is a remote-management connection from a…

threat31 Oct 03:51Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2
  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • fortiguard.fortinet.com2 (17%)
  • advisories.ncsc.nl1 (8%)
  • cisa.gov1 (8%)
  • frankysweb.de1 (8%)
  • group-ib.com1 (8%)
  • heise.de1 (8%)
  • microsoft.com1 (8%)
  • msrc.microsoft.com1 (8%)
  • other3 (25%)
All cited sources (12)