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Paessler PRTG Network Monitor

product · product:paessler-prtg-network-monitor single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-07 → last 2026-11-07
Latest activity
2026-11-07
Kaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a monitoring server's root password and admin notes, no VM…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Paessler PRTG Network Monitor, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • List every monitoring server, script, scheduled task and connection manager that stores an ESXi, vCenter or Proxmox root password, replace each with a least-privilege monitoring account, and rotate the root passwords that were stored or reused across hosts.
    2026-11-07Kaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a…

Defender insights

What each entry about Paessler PRTG Network Monitor tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-07NOTABLEKaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a monitoring server's root password and admin notes, no VM escape

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-07Kaspersky GERT: two ESXi and Proxmox ransomware cases in which a monitoring server's reused root password and plaintext administrator notes, not a VM escape, gave the attackers the hypervisor
    active-threatsKaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a monitoring server's root password and admin notes, no VM escape

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Paessler PRTG Network Monitor
ATT&CK techniques (8 across 9 tactics)

8 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Local Accounts
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Local Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Local Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts: Local Accounts
  • Defense ImpairmentDisable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: SSH · Remote Services: VNC
  • Command and ControlRemote Access Tools
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685.006Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs×1

Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the `/var/log/` directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.005Remote Services: VNC×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Paessler PRTG Network Monitor (1)

2026-11-07 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Kaspersky GERT: two ESXi and Proxmox ransomware cases in which a monitoring server's reused root password and plaintext administrator notes, not a VM escape, gave the attackers the hypervisor

In the first case, Kaspersky's investigation began with BlackNevas ransomware activity on a Windows system in a virtualised domain-controller segment, where the execution of the AnyDesk remote tool and the GMER binary was recorded (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). The environment used PRTG Network Monitor, whose deployment had broad access to the ESXi hosts, and the same root password was reused across several nodes; after obtaining access to the monitoring environment the attacker used the ESXi credential to connect over SSH to the hosts that shared the password (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). On the first host, a file was uploaded during a root SSH session and its first execution failed with "Execution of non-installed file prevented"; the actor then disabled the execInstalledOnly policy with esxcli and ran it, while on a second host in another subnet with the same password the binary ran and the logs were cleared (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06).

In the second case, a ransomware incident by The Gentlemen, the actor used information it had collected between initial access and visible impact: on a compromised system administrator's workstation it found Proxmox root credentials and access details in plain-text notes and logged in as root (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). It then activated the VNC web socket through the root account, which gave it control of the Proxmox environment, and used that access to download and run the ransomware in the cluster, encrypting the whole virtual environment (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). Kaspersky says a fully patched hypervisor can still be compromised through a shared password, an overprivileged monitoring account, an open SSH path or an administrator interface reachable from a general server network (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06).

A monitoring system that could reach the virtualization layer also exposed a reusable root credential.

No VM escape was required.

Password reuse converted one recovered secret into farm-wide access.

Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (Securelist) 2026-11-06
threat07 Nov 04:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • securelist.com1 (100%)