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NetSupport Manager

product · product:netsupport-manager single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-09-21 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-09-21
Huntress: a fake Lenovo driver installs a working, private certificate authority into a victim's own trust…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
2
1 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about NetSupport Manager tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-09-21NOTABLEHuntress: a fake Lenovo driver installs a working, private certificate authority into a victim's own trust store, able to fake 'clean' VirusTotal lookups

Triage

Story timeline

  1. 2026-09-21A phishing chain reported against conference attendees installs a rogue root CA generated fresh on every host, plus a hosts-file/firewall local proxy able to fake clean VirusTotal results and to mint trusted certificates for any domain, surviving reboot
    active-threatsHuntress: a fake Lenovo driver installs a working, private certificate authority into a victim's own trust store, able to fake 'clean' VirusTotal lookups

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
NetSupport Manager
ATT&CK techniques (17 across 10 tactics)

17 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessPhishing: Spearphishing via Service
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious File · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Process Injection: Process Hollowing · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation · Process Injection: Process Hollowing
  • Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing · Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate
  • Credential AccessAdversary-in-the-Middle
  • DiscoverySoftware Discovery
  • CollectionAdversary-in-the-Middle
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Remote Access Tools

Initial Access TA0001

T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.004Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.004Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027.010Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation×1

Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., Phishing and Drive-by Compromise) or interactively via Command and Scripting Interpreter.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1553.004Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate×1

Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1518Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about NetSupport Manager (1)

2026-09-21 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

A phishing chain reported against conference attendees installs a rogue root CA generated fresh on every host, plus a hosts-file/firewall local proxy able to fake clean VirusTotal results and to mint trusted certificates for any domain, surviving reboot

A Huntress researcher was targeted after DEFCON by an X account impersonating a CoinDesk marketing executive, who sent a legitimate Google Doc carrying a custom Google Apps Script sidebar (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19 · Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). The sidebar runs client-side with no OAuth consent prompt, and merely opening the document while signed in, with no click or download, was enough for it to report the viewer's public IP address, geolocation, browser and whether a MetaMask, Phantom, Tron or Solana wallet extension was installed, beaconing every action through the Telegram API (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). A fake "decryption failure" overlay then delivered OS-specific ClickFix instructions, each offering a choice between pasting a command or downloading a file manually (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). On macOS, the pasted command launched a piped zsh chain that never delivered a payload in Huntress's testing, because the fetched URL looped through redirects (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19). The manual download led to a disk image bundling its own Gatekeeper-bypass instructions and password prompt, which delivered an AMOS-family stealer (Huntress's later recap says the payload appeared to be a variant of AMOS) harvesting browser, crypto-wallet, Telegram, Apple Notes, cookie and login-keychain data, plus a LaunchDaemon-installed backdoor capable of arbitrary remote commands and of turning the host into a SOCKS5 proxy (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19 · Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). On Windows, one path launched an encoded PowerShell command that fetched a loader, which pulled down three further payloads that were offline by the time Huntress looked but already on VirusTotal (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). The other told the victim to update a "Google API Connector", an application signed with a certificate belonging to a small Norwegian company (stolen or fraudulently issued) and deployed through Microsoft's ClickOnce feature, the first of three abused code-signing certificates in the campaign (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19 · Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15).

Contradiction: Huntress's two pieces assign the Windows paths differently. The 2026-08-19 write-up says the update button launches the ClickOnce installer and the manual path shows ClickFix-style instructions with an encrypted PowerShell script (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19). The 2026-09-15 recap assigns ClickOnce to the manual download and the encoded PowerShell command to the ClickFix lure (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). Huntress's write-up also describes campaigns that target conference attendees (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19), while its recap calls the account's outreach a volume play rather than specific targeting of DEF CON attendees (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). On NetSupport persistence, both name a keyboard-filter driver, a service and a Winlogon change; the write-up adds its own COM object (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19), the recap a Run key and a reinstalling scheduled task (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15).

In a later message, the same actor sent a second document link, this time via DropBox DocSend, that routed macOS victims to another host serving the same AMOS payload and told Windows victims to install a DocSend-branded desktop installer signed with a second stolen certificate, from Discord Inc., whose signature did not validate (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19). The installer's DocSend flow was a non-functional distraction: a five-screen fake onboarding carousel using genuine Dropbox marketing pages that installed nothing. Huntress reconstructed the sample's command-and-control registration protocol from its bundled @sentry/electron module and queried the live infrastructure of a sibling campaign directly (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15), recovering three payload archives this way: NetSupport Manager, a TLS-intercepting local proxy and a Ledger-wallet implant. Each was downloaded encrypted, launched detached and hidden, then relaunched twenty seconds later with an elevation request. The first, NetSupport Manager, is a legitimate remote-monitoring tool reconfigured to redirect data to attacker infrastructure and disable its own chat, connect and disconnect alerts, and it carries persistence for all three payloads: a kernel-mode keyboard-filter driver, a Windows service, a Winlogon modification and its own registered COM object (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19). The third, the Ledger-wallet implant, reuses the second payload's disguise and technique.

Huntress SOC analyst Jon Semon deemed that second payload, the TLS-intercepting local proxy, the most interesting (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). Disguised as a Lenovo driver package and signed with a genuine stolen Lenovo certificate, the third abused code-signing certificate, it hollows MsBuild.exe, generates its own self-signed certificate authority presenting itself as "Google Trust Services CN=WR3", issues a www.virustotal.com leaf certificate from it, installs the CA into the system root store, adds a hosts-file entry pointing www.virustotal.com at the local machine and creates a local-proxy firewall rule (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19). VirusTotal lookups from the host then reach a local proxy that answers over fully validating HTTPS and can block them or return fabricated results. VirusTotal was the only target Huntress observed, but the CA's private key is written to disk, so a trusted certificate can be minted for any domain at will (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19). Huntress SOC analyst Jon Semon named crypto-wallet domains and antivirus update signals as targets the operator could intercept the same way (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). Because the certificate authority is regenerated per infected host, blocking a specific certificate thumbprint achieves nothing. The interception process dies at reboot, but the installed root CA, the hosts-file entry and the firewall rule persist (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15).

Triage: a locally-installed root CA is not automatically malicious, since some legitimate enterprise MDM and TLS-inspection proxies do this deliberately. The discriminator is provenance: a root CA your own PKI or MDM inventory does not recognize as provisioned by it, especially one impersonating a well-known public CA's name, is the signal; one your MDM issued is not.

VIEW is the one worth sitting with. Opening the document while signed in, clicking nothing, and downloading nothing, was enough to report the viewer's IP address, location, browser, and whether they were running a crypto wallet extension.

It hollowed MsBuild.exe and imported only kernel32, ultimately establishing what Jon called "purpose-built and working public key infrastructure on your machine."

Because the CA was regenerated per host, blocking a single certificate thumbprint does nothing.

Huntress Labs 2026-08-19
Correctionrun 2026-09-27T1308Z-auditsourcing_notebody

Huntress published its fuller technical write-up on 2026-08-19 and the webinar recap on 2026-09-15, an interval of 27 days rather than the 33 days first stated (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19; Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). Both publication dates, and every technical claim resting on them, are unchanged.

Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditprioritysourcing_notebodytitleheadlinesummary

Huntress describes the rogue certificate authority's use only against VirusTotal lookups, as a capability: the hosts-file entry redirects www.virustotal.com to the local proxy (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19). Because the authority's private key sits on disk, a trusted certificate can be minted for any domain, and crypto-wallet sites and antivirus update checks are what Huntress SOC analyst Jon Semon said the operator could intercept, not observed targets (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19 · Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). Huntress's two pieces also assign the ClickOnce installer and the PowerShell command to different Windows paths (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19 · Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15). The lure was a legitimate Google Doc carrying the attacker's custom Apps Script sidebar, not a compromised document (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15), and the certificate authority is generated fresh on every host (Huntress Labs, 2026-08-19).

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-audittechniquesbodytitle

Huntress names the macOS payload AMOS, and its 2026-09-15 recap says the payload "appeared to be a variant of the AMOS stealer" (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15); neither write-up describes an analysis that confirms the family, so the stealer is described here as AMOS-family, not as confirmed AMOS. Huntress's recap calls the account's outreach a volume play rather than specific targeting of DEF CON attendees (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15), so the title now says only that the chain was reported against conference attendees, and the takeaway no longer presents the campaign as conference-targeted.

Improvementrun 2026-10-21T0800Z-auditbodysummarytechniques

Ranking the TLS-intercepting proxy as the chain's standout payload is the judgement of Huntress SOC analyst Jon Semon, not the targeted researcher's: Huntress's recap says Jon "deemed the second payload the most interesting" (Huntress Labs, 2026-09-15).

threat21 Sep 04:45Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Huntress Labs

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • huntress.com2 (100%)