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Microsoft OneDrive

product · product:microsoft-onedrive

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-07 → last 2026-11-07
Latest activity
2026-11-07
Oneconsult: a site granted a folder in Chrome or Edge can steal tokens and plant VS Code and PowerShell…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft OneDrive tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-07NOTABLEOneconsult: a site granted a folder in Chrome or Edge can steal tokens and plant VS Code and PowerShell persistence

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-07Oneconsult on the File System Access API: after two clicks a website holds read and write access to folders such as .vscode, .Azure, the public desktop and SMB shares in Chrome and Edge, enough for token theft and persistence without a process on the host
    researchOneconsult: a site granted a folder in Chrome or Edge can steal tokens and plant VS Code and PowerShell persistence

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Microsoft OneDrive
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 6 tactics)

6 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionUser Execution: Malicious Link
  • PersistenceSoftware Extensions: IDE Extensions · Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile
  • Privilege EscalationEvent Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
  • Lateral MovementTaint Shared Content
  • CollectionData from Local System

Execution TA0002

T1204.001User Execution: Malicious Link×1

An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/file-system-access-api-browser-persistence-chrome-edge · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1176.002Software Extensions: IDE Extensions×1

Adversaries may abuse an integrated development environment (IDE) extension to establish persistent access to victim systems. IDEs such as Visual Studio Code, IntelliJ IDEA, and Eclipse support extensions - software components that add features like code linting, auto-completion, task automation, or integration with tools like Git and Docker. A malicious extension can be installed through an extension marketplace (i.e., Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) or side-loaded directly into the IDE.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/file-system-access-api-browser-persistence-chrome-edge · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.013Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile×1

Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/file-system-access-api-browser-persistence-chrome-edge · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1546.013Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile×1

Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/file-system-access-api-browser-persistence-chrome-edge · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/file-system-access-api-browser-persistence-chrome-edge · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1080Taint Shared Content×1

Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/file-system-access-api-browser-persistence-chrome-edge · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×1

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/file-system-access-api-browser-persistence-chrome-edge · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft OneDrive (1)

2026-11-07 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Oneconsult on the File System Access API: after two clicks a website holds read and write access to folders such as .vscode, .Azure, the public desktop and SMB shares in Chrome and Edge, enough for token theft and persistence without a process on the host

Oneconsult analyses, from the Chromium source and tests on Windows 11 with Chrome and Edge 150.0.7871.101, what a website can reach through the File System Access API once a user selects a folder and grants permission: the handle stays valid as long as the tab is open and is obtained after just two user clicks (Oneconsult, 2026-11-02). Chrome rejects blocklisted paths, but a path that is not in its table and not an ancestor of a blocked path is allowed, and the kDontBlockChildren rule leaves the subfolders of listed directories selectable; Oneconsult confirmed .vscode, the Azure token cache, C:\Users\Public and SMB shares as accessible (Oneconsult, 2026-11-02).

Oneconsult demonstrates these paths. A site can search a granted folder and take files such as cached Azure tokens and .env files. It can drop a fake VS Code extension into .vscode/extensions, which runs inside the normal code.exe process and is unaffected by Mark of the Web because Node.js does not check the Zone.Identifier stream. It can plant PowerShell profile and module backdoors, which work only with the Bypass or Unrestricted execution policy because the API stamps every written file with ZoneId=3 and RemoteSigned refuses such files. It can drop files on the public desktop, where they appear for all users and trigger a warning that a certain percentage of users acknowledge. And it can run an interactive file proxy through the still-open tab, where EDR sees only the browser reading and writing files (Oneconsult, 2026-11-02). A OneDrive Known Folder Move enabled while Chrome is running leaves a stale blocklist, so the redirected Desktop was writable; Oneconsult notes that the bypass has been reported to Google, which made the issue public, and that Google classed reading a single dragged file from a blocked folder as "not a security issue" (Oneconsult, 2026-11-02).

Daniel Oz's July write-up of the same technique has a website edit a file the user already holds. He says the user-gesture requirement does not prevent phishing, only automatic picker invocation, and that signed or complex files may fail, be blocked or break in a way that prevents execution (Oz, 2026-07-05).

Triage: browsers legitimately read and write files for web editors such as Google Docs and VS Code for Web, as Oneconsult notes; the signal is a browser process writing into a persistence location, not the file activity itself.

after just two user clicks (selecting the folder and granting permission) on the website, a handle to the files is obtained

A MotW (Mark of the Web) has no effect on the execution, since Node.js simply does not check the Zone.Identifier Alternate Data Stream (ADS).

EDR solutions only detect that Chrome is reading and writing files

Oneconsult 2026-11-02
research07 Nov 04:01Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • danieloz147.github.io1 (50%)
  • oneconsult.com1 (50%)