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Microsoft Entra Agent ID

product · product:microsoft-entra-agent-id single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-10 → last 2026-11-10
Latest activity
2026-11-10
BluePhishing: consent to a rogue Entra agent blueprint gives tenant access, and default users can soon create…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft Entra Agent ID tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-10NOTABLEBluePhishing: consent to a rogue Entra agent blueprint gives tenant access, and default users can soon create blueprints

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-10BluePhishing: Proofpoint's proof of concept turns a consent link for a third-party Entra agent blueprint into tenant initial access, with an agent-creation permission that Proofpoint says cannot be revoked
    researchBluePhishing: consent to a rogue Entra agent blueprint gives tenant access, and default users can soon create blueprints

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Microsoft Entra Agent ID
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 7 tactics)

6 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing Link
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Create Account: Cloud Account
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Credential AccessSteal Application Access Token
  • DiscoveryAccount Discovery: Cloud Account
  • Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.003Create Account: Cloud Account×1

Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1528Steal Application Access Token×1

Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1087.004Account Discovery: Cloud Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-11-10/bluephishing-entra-agent-blueprint-consent-phishing-poc · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft Entra Agent ID (1)

2026-11-10 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Proofpoint presents BluePhishing, a proof of concept that extends OAuth consent phishing to Microsoft Entra Agent ID. The attacker builds an agent blueprint, the agent analogue of an app registration, in their own tenant with a client secret and permissions set to be inherited, sets its sign-in audience to work across tenants (a setting the Entra portal does not expose, so it takes Microsoft Graph, PowerShell or a manifest edit), and sends the victim a one-time consent link (Proofpoint, 2026-11-09). When a victim consents, a blueprint principal appears in the victim tenant with the AgentIdentity.CreateAsManager permission, which Proofpoint says cannot be revoked from the principal; the attacker then obtains an app-only Graph token for the victim tenant and creates agent identities, up to 250 per blueprint, that inherit the consented permissions (Proofpoint, 2026-11-09). Creating one needs the victim's tenant ID and the object ID of a sponsor user, both obtainable through documented unauthenticated lookups, and Proofpoint's tests used the Graph permissions User.Read.All and Group.Read.All (Proofpoint, 2026-11-09). Proofpoint, citing Microsoft's documentation, says inherited permissions are not visible in the Entra portal or in Microsoft Graph, which limits auditing what an agent identity can do; in its tests silent inheritance appeared only for delegated permissions, those granted through user consent (Proofpoint, 2026-11-09).

Proofpoint has identified no in-the-wild activity and says agent consent controls are less mature and less widely deployed than app consent controls; it adds that Microsoft 365 Message Center item MC1506733 says default Entra users will be able to create agent blueprints from November 2026 (Proofpoint, 2026-11-09).

By default, blueprint principals were observed to have an implicit admin-consent permission, AgentIdentity.CreateAsManager, to allow the blueprint to create agent identities linked to itself.

Proofpoint has not as of yet identified any in-the-wild activity

default Microsoft Entra users will be able to create agent blueprints by default from November 2026

Proofpoint 2026-11-09
research10 Nov 03:57Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Proofpoint

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • proofpoint.com1 (100%)