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NtMonitor

malware · malware:ntmonitor single-source

Custom Windows rebuild of SoftEther VPN Bridge 4.44 that Rapid7 attributes with moderate confidence to Webworm; it renames the handshake endpoints, replaces the handshake watermark, embeds its resource archive and encrypts its configuration to remove SoftEther's fingerprints (Rapid7, 2026-11-19).

Aliases: NtMonitor VPN

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-21 → last 2026-11-21
Latest activity
2026-11-21
Rapid7: Webworm hides SoftEther VPN Bridge behind NtMonitor branding, new endpoints and an encrypted config
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: europe
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about NtMonitor tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-21NOTABLERapid7: Webworm hides SoftEther VPN Bridge behind NtMonitor branding, new endpoints and an encrypted config

Exposure · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

used by

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-21Webworm's NtMonitor: Rapid7 finds a custom rebuild of the SoftEther VPN Bridge that removes the open-source tool's detection fingerprints (rebranded metadata, renamed handshake endpoints, a custom handshake watermark, an embedded resource archive and an encrypted configuration), attributed with moderate confidence to the China-aligned actor that targets European governments
    active-threatsRapid7: Webworm hides SoftEther VPN Bridge behind NtMonitor branding, new endpoints and an encrypted config

Hunting pivots

ATT&CK techniques (9 across 4 tactics)

9 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentDevelop Capabilities: Malware
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Defense ImpairmentNetwork Boundary Bridging · Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Proxy: Internal Proxy

Resource Development TA0042

T1587.001Develop Capabilities: Malware×1

Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027.005Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools×1

Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1

Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1599Network Boundary Bridging×1

Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1686.003Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall×1

Adversaries may disable or modify the Windows host firewall to bypass controls limiting network usage. This can include disabling the Windows host firewall entirely, suppressing specific profiles (domain, private, public), or adding, deleting, and modifying firewall rules to allow or restrict traffic.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071Application Layer Protocol×1

Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.

Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about NtMonitor (1)

2026-11-21 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB3

Webworm's NtMonitor: Rapid7 finds a custom rebuild of the SoftEther VPN Bridge that removes the open-source tool's detection fingerprints (rebranded metadata, renamed handshake endpoints, a custom handshake watermark, an embedded resource archive and an encrypted configuration), attributed with moderate confidence to the China-aligned actor that targets European governments

Rapid7 analysed what it believes is a so-far unknown custom tool, a modified build of SoftEther VPN Bridge version 4.44 (build 9807) that it attributes to Webworm with moderate confidence (Rapid7, 2026-11-19). Webworm is the China-aligned actor that ESET reported in May 2026 moving to European government targets and to dual-use tools such as SoftEther (ESET Research, 2026-05-20). The rebuild keeps the bridge function, which cascades a remote network into the victim's local network, and removes the fingerprints: the PE metadata and internal strings are rebranded as a network-monitoring product (inconsistently, since the service name and many registry paths still say SoftEther), the HTTP handshake endpoints get update-style names, the handshake watermark becomes a truncated PNG header so stock SoftEther peers cannot connect and the stock watermark cannot fingerprint the build, the resource archive that normally sits beside the executable is embedded in it as a PE resource, and the configuration is stored under a new name in a custom-encrypted format (Rapid7, 2026-11-19). Rapid7 found no backdoor or other added capability, concludes the actor puts stealth above capability, and says only one antivirus vendor detected the sample although it has been public since January (Rapid7, 2026-11-19).

NtMonitor changes the upstream GIF watermark with a custom byte pattern (a truncated PNG file showing the Windows logo), so that stock SoftEther clients and servers cannot handshake with this build

which we attribute to Webworm with moderate confidence

Rapid7 2026-11-19

Builds on: ESET: China-aligned Webworm targeted governments in Belgium, Italy, Serbia and Poland with…

threat21 Nov 04:49Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Rapid7 · ESET Research

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • rapid7.com1 (50%)
  • welivesecurity.com1 (50%)