2026-11-21NOTABLERapid7: Webworm hides SoftEther VPN Bridge behind NtMonitor branding, new endpoints and an encrypted config
NtMonitor
malware · malware:ntmonitor single-source
Custom Windows rebuild of SoftEther VPN Bridge 4.44 that Rapid7 attributes with moderate confidence to Webworm; it renames the handshake endpoints, replaces the handshake watermark, embeds its resource archive and encrypts its configuration to remove SoftEther's fingerprints (Rapid7, 2026-11-19).
Aliases: NtMonitor VPN
Coverage
1
first 2026-11-21 → last 2026-11-21
Latest activity
2026-11-21
Rapid7: Webworm hides SoftEther VPN Bridge behind NtMonitor branding, new endpoints and an encrypted config
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: europe
Sources cited
2
2 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about NtMonitor tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
used by
- WebwormRapid7 attributes the NtMonitor SoftEther rebuild to Webworm with moderate confidence
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (9 across 4 tactics)
9 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Resource DevelopmentDevelop Capabilities: Malware
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- Defense ImpairmentNetwork Boundary Bridging · Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Proxy: Internal Proxy
Resource Development TA0042
T1587.001Develop Capabilities: Malware×1
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027.005Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools×1
Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1
Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1599Network Boundary Bridging×1
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1686.003Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host Firewall×1
Adversaries may disable or modify the Windows host firewall to bypass controls limiting network usage. This can include disabling the Windows host firewall entirely, suppressing specific profiles (domain, private, public), or adding, deleting, and modifying firewall rules to allow or restrict traffic.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071Application Layer Protocol×1
Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy×1
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
Evidence: 2026-11-21/webworm-ntmonitor-custom-softether-vpn-bridge-rapid7 · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about NtMonitor (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Webworm×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- rapid7.com1 (50%)
- welivesecurity.com1 (50%)