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Webworm

actor · actor:webworm-fishmonger-aquatic-panda-eset-echocreep-graphworm-eu single-source

China-aligned APT active since at least 2022 that moved to European governmental targets in 2025 (Belgium, Italy, Serbia, Poland) with the EchoCreep (Discord) and GraphWorm (Microsoft Graph and OneDrive) backdoors (ESET, 2026-05-20).

Aliases: FishMonger, Aquatic Panda, SixLittleMonkeys, Space Pirates

Coverage
3
2 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-05-21 → last 2026-10-23
Latest activity
2026-06-17
FishMonger (I-SOON) ports its SprySOCKS backdoor to Windows with a kernel-driver rootkit
Peak priority
high
2 high
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, telco, technology · regions: apac, europe
Sources cited
6
5 hosts
2026-05-213 appearances2026-10-23

Defender insights

What each entry about Webworm tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-21HIGHESET: China-aligned Webworm targeted governments in Belgium, Italy, Serbia and Poland with Discord and OneDrive implants

Exposure · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names Webworm, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-10-23BlackX: Kaspersky finds a BlackLotus-style UEFI bootkit on fully patched Windows machines of Central Asian diplomatic bodies, because the Baton Drop fix does not revoke the old boot-manager certificate until an administrator triggers it
    mentionactive-threatsKaspersky: a UEFI bootkit ran on fully patched Windows because Microsoft's Secure Boot revocation is off by default
  2. 2026-06-17FishMonger (I-SOON) ports its SprySOCKS backdoor to Windows with a kernel-driver rootkit
    active-threats
  3. 2026-05-21Webworm (China-aligned) turns to European government targets with the EchoCreep (Discord) and GraphWorm (Microsoft Graph and OneDrive) backdoors, ESET reports
    active-threatsESET: China-aligned Webworm targeted governments in Belgium, Italy, Serbia and Poland with Discord and OneDrive implants
ATT&CK techniques (30 across 12 tactics)

30 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning · Active Scanning: Wordlist Scanning
  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server · Acquire Infrastructure: Server · Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services · Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities · Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Modify Registry · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Indicator Removal: Timestomp · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Registry
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Cloud Services · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
  • CollectionData from Local System · Data Staged: Local Data Staging · Data Staged: Remote Data Staging
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Proxy: Internal Proxy · Proxy: External Proxy · Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Data Encoding: Standard Encoding · Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1

Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1595.003Active Scanning: Wordlist Scanning×1

Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to Brute Force, its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: Gather Victim Org Information, or Search Victim-Owned Websites).

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.003Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server×1

Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1583.004Acquire Infrastructure: Server×1

Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in Drive-by Compromise, enabling Phishing operations, or facilitating Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party Server or renting a Virtual Private Server, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1584.006Compromise Infrastructure: Web Services×1

Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. Additionally, leveraging compromised web-based email services may allow adversaries to leverage the trust associated with legitimate domains.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1588.006Obtain Capabilities: Vulnerabilities×1

Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1608.002Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool×1

Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1

Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×1

Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.007Remote Services: Cloud Services×1

Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×1

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1074.001Data Staged: Local Data Staging×1

Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1074.002Data Staged: Remote Data Staging×1

Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1132.001Data Encoding: Standard Encoding×1

Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.002Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/webworm-china-aligned-shifts-to-eu-government-targets-echocr · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Webworm (2)

2026-06-17 · view entry permalink →

HIGH

FishMonger (I-SOON) ports its SprySOCKS backdoor to Windows with a kernel-driver rootkit

ESET disclosed two previously undocumented Windows variants of SprySOCKS, a backdoor it attributes to FishMonger (a.k.a. Earth Lusca / Aquatic Panda / TAG-22), assessed with high confidence as operated by Chinese contractor I-SOON (ESET WeLiveSecurity, 2026-06-16). Previously known only as a Linux backdoor, the Windows builds (WIN_PLUS and WIN_DRV) were deployed in 2023–2024 against foreign-affairs, technology and telecom government bodies in Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan and Honduras. WIN_PLUS persists as a Windows Print Processor (VSPMsg) and supports 30+ commands over TCP/UDP/WebSocket. WIN_DRV is the notable one: it loads a kernel driver (fsdiskbit.sys, signed with a certificate from the public PastDSE leaked-cert corpus) which memory-loads a second driver to deliver rootkit-class stealth, hiding processes, files, network connections and registry keys, and performing TCP traffic diversion so the backdoor receives operator commands on an arbitrary port that never appears in netstat (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-16). ESET notes limited, unconfirmed telemetry of a possible UEFI bootkit component (potentially CVE-2023-24932-class Secure Boot bypass).

Why it matters to us: Post-deployment detection is hard because the driver actively hides artefacts; the leverage is pre-deployment hygiene. Hunt scheduled-task creation (EID 4698 / Sysmon EID 1) referencing binaries under %SystemRoot%\Fonts\, Image File Execution Options hijacks of vds.exe, and kernel-driver loads (Sysmon EID 6) of drivers signed with PastDSE-derived certificates. Because TCP diversion defeats host network-tab inspection, rely on EDR kernel sensors / ETW for listening-socket enumeration. Validate that vulnerable/revoked drivers are blocked via WDAC/HVCI and the Microsoft vulnerable-driver blocklist.

threat17 Jun 05:14Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-21 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2017-7692updatedNATOB2

Webworm (China-aligned) turns to European government targets with the EchoCreep (Discord) and GraphWorm (Microsoft Graph and OneDrive) backdoors, ESET reports

ESET Research published its analysis of Webworm, a China-aligned group active since at least 2022 that it links to SixLittleMonkeys and FishMonger, on 2026-05-20: in 2025 the group moved from Asia to governmental organizations in Belgium, Italy, Serbia and Poland, compromised a South African university, and replaced its Trochilus and McRat backdoors with two new ones, EchoCreep and GraphWorm (ESET, 2026-05-20). ESET told The Hacker News that a link to Space Pirates is tenuous at best (The Hacker News, 2026-05-20). ESET could not find the entry point, but an operator server showed nuclei and dirsearch scans of 56 targets in countries including Spain, Hungary, Belgium, Nigeria, Czechia and Serbia, and a public exploit for the SquirrelMail post-authentication RCE CVE-2017-7692 run against a Serbian webmail target, which suggests the group held that victim's credentials (ESET, 2026-05-20).

EchoCreep and GraphWorm. EchoCreep, written in Go, sends all its traffic through Discord API endpoints, decodes commands with base64 and AES-CBC-128, runs them through cmd.exe and uploads files as attachments; it reports to per-victim channels, named after the victim's IP address or IP address and hostname, that the operators created before it first ran, and it runs under a custom scheduled task and carries a modified timestamp (ESET, 2026-05-20). ESET decrypted 433 messages going back to 2024-03-21 across four victim channels; the first real compromise came on 2025-04-09, followed by curl downloads (ESET, 2026-05-20). GraphWorm runs at every user logon through registry Run keys and talks only to OneDrive endpoints of Microsoft Graph, with a valid cloud account and API tokens, fetching jobs from and uploading results to a per-victim folder; it encrypts traffic with AES-256-CBC and base64, stages command output in a local file that it deletes after upload, and likely uses Graph's upload-session endpoint for large files (ESET, 2026-05-20).

Proxies, staging and stolen data. The proxy tools WormFrp, a modified frp that reads AES-encrypted configurations from a compromised third-party Amazon S3 bucket, ChainWorm, SmuxProxy and WormSocket build internal, external and multi-hop proxies through rented servers and VPS hosts, the group staged tools in a GitHub repository, and both the repository and the S3 bucket have been taken down (ESET, 2026-05-20). The S3 bucket held virtual-machine snapshots, one with the state of an Italian governmental machine, and from December 2025 to January 2026 an mRemoteNG connection-configuration file and a Visio infrastructure diagram taken from a Spanish governmental entity; in October 2025 the operators also uploaded SharpSecretsdump, a tool that mimics Impacket's secretsdump (ESET, 2026-05-20).

This trend continued in 2025, with the attacks we observed targeting governmental organizations in Belgium, Italy, Serbia, and Poland.

Upon EchoCreep’s first execution, it does not attempt to create a new channel, but sends a message saying Up Success to a channel that already exists

In the case of GraphWorm, which uses Microsoft Graph API for C&C communication, we discovered that it uses OneDrive endpoints exclusively, specifically to get new jobs and to upload victim information.

ESET Research (WeLiveSecurity) 2026-05-20

ESET told The Hacker News that Webworm's links to Space Pirates is tenuous at best, citing the use of open-source RATs and a lack of concrete evidence tying the two clusters.

The Hacker News 2026-05-20
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditbodyclassificationcvesevidenceheadlinesourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitleverification

FishMonger (which The Hacker News also calls Aquatic Panda (The Hacker News, 2026-05-20)), SixLittleMonkeys and Space Pirates are not other names for Webworm: ESET links Webworm to SixLittleMonkeys and FishMonger as related China-aligned groups (ESET, 2026-05-20) and calls the Space Pirates link tenuous at best (The Hacker News, 2026-05-20). EchoCreep does not create its Discord channels: it reports to channels the operators made before it first ran, which suggests they knew their targets or had gathered the details after initial access (ESET, 2026-05-20). The S3 bucket was a compromised third-party bucket that has since been taken down, and SharpSecretsdump, which mimics Impacket's secretsdump rather than dumping LSASS memory, was only seen uploaded to it (ESET, 2026-05-20).

threat21 May 05:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3

Source distribution

  • welivesecurity.com2 (33%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (17%)
  • securelist.com1 (17%)
  • support.microsoft.com1 (17%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (17%)