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Mofu Loader

malware · malware:mofu-loader

Shellcode loader documented by JPCERT/CC and seen by Bitdefender in FamousSparrow's intrusion of an Azerbaijani energy operator (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-14 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-14
China-nexus FamousSparrow re-entered an Azerbaijani energy firm three times through the same unpatched…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
energy
sectors: energy · regions: russia-cis
Sources cited
6
5 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Mofu Loader tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-14NOTABLEexploitedChina-nexus FamousSparrow re-entered an Azerbaijani energy firm three times through the same unpatched Exchange server

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

used by

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-14FamousSparrow's three-wave intrusion at an Azerbaijani oil and gas company: repeated ProxyNotShell access, Deed RAT behind a two-export LogMeIn Hamachi sideload, and a blocked TernDoor attempt
    deep-diveChina-nexus FamousSparrow re-entered an Azerbaijani energy firm three times through the same unpatched Exchange server
ATT&CK techniques (17 across 8 tactics)

17 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · System Services: Service Execution · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Modify Registry · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • Privilege EscalationProcess Injection · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • StealthRootkit · Obfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Process Injection · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Registry
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Ingress Tool Transfer

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1055Process Injection×1

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1014Rootkit×1

Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055Process Injection×1

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-14/famoussparrow-three-wave-intrusion-of-an-azerbaijani-energy · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Mofu Loader (1)

2026-05-14 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2022-41040 +1exploitedupdatedNATOB2

FamousSparrow's three-wave intrusion at an Azerbaijani oil and gas company: repeated ProxyNotShell access, Deed RAT behind a two-export LogMeIn Hamachi sideload, and a blocked TernDoor attempt

Background. Bitdefender tracked an intrusion at an Azerbaijani oil and gas company from late December 2025 to late February 2026 and attributes it with moderate-to-high confidence to FamousSparrow, citing substantial overlap with the Earth Estries toolset and tradecraft; earlier public reporting placed the cluster against telecoms, government and technology targets in the United States, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and South Africa, and this is the first public link to energy targets in the South Caucasus (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Bitdefender sets the targeting against Azerbaijan's larger role in European gas supply, now reaching 13 European countries, but states that this context does not establish motive (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The Hacker News notes that FamousSparrow is also tracked as UAT-9244 and overlaps with Earth Estries and Salt Typhoon (The Hacker News, 2026-05-13).

Initial access, three times. On 2025-12-25 the Exchange IIS worker process w3wp.exe, with MSExchangePowerShellAppPool on its command line, tried to write a web shell into a publicly accessible directory, which Bitdefender reads as ProxyNotShell exploitation; more web-shell writes followed on 12-26 and 12-29, alongside attempts to execute commands through the same process (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Bitdefender calls ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082) usable by unauthenticated attackers (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13), whereas Microsoft's advisory for CVE-2022-41082 says the attacker must be authenticated and scores both flaws with low privileges required, 8.8 and 8.0 (MSRC, CVE-2022-41040; MSRC, CVE-2022-41082). Microsoft released fixes on 2022-11-08 (MSRC, CVE-2022-41082), and CISA has listed both as known exploited since 2022-09-30 (CISA KEV catalog, 2022-09-30). After remediation removed malware from at least one system, the attackers came back to the same still-vulnerable Exchange server about a month later, and again at the end of February (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Wave 1: Deed RAT behind a two-export sideload. The legitimate LogMeIn Hamachi binary LMIGuardianSvc.exe, first run from C:\TEMP, sideloaded a malicious loader and was then installed under a path chosen to mimic the legitimate Hamachi install directory, with a service named LogMeIn Hamachi starting it at boot (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The loader's Init export changes memory protection on StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW and patches its entry point; when the host later calls ComMain and its normal service start-up reaches that API, execution diverts into the loader, which restores the original bytes, decrypts the AES-128-CBC payload and runs shellcode that resolves APIs by hash, RC4-decrypts and LZNT1-decompresses the Deed RAT orchestrator (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13); a sandbox that runs the DLL on its own or invokes a single export sees the malware largely inactive (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Deed RAT's configuration names system processes such as SearchIndexer.exe and taskhost.exe as injection targets and a registry key under the Hamachi name for configuration and plugin storage, and it talks HTTPS to domains impersonating security vendors (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Bitdefender calls the technique an evolved DLL sideload and finds the loader closely matches one Trend Micro documented for Earth Estries, with the same exports and hook-and-restore flow (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Lateral movement. From the first host the attackers opened an RDP session to a second server with a domain administrator account, launched PowerShell, and within minutes the Hamachi-based Deed RAT files appeared there; from that host atexec and smbexec-style utilities consistent with Impacket spread it to a third machine (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Wave 2: TernDoor, blocked. About a month after the first wave, a renamed copy of the legitimate deskband_injector64.exe in a ProgramData subdirectory tried to sideload a malicious winmm.dll; the security product blocked execution before installation completed, and registry artefacts showed an attempt to create a kernel-driver service (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). From recovered memory pages Bitdefender identifies a Mofu loader chain and assesses the partially recovered payload as TernDoor (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Wave 3. At the end of February the attackers deployed Deed RAT again through the same chain with a modified configuration, the components moved to C:\Recovery and new injection targets (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Triage: legitimate Exchange maintenance rarely writes web-accessible script files through the IIS worker process, and legitimate applications rarely patch system API entry points, which signed system components or documented security tools do when they must (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

This context does not establish motive. We have N=1 victim and moderate-to-high attribution confidence.

the attackers returned to the same vulnerable Exchange server nearly a month after the initial compromise attempt

The attempt was unsuccessful, as the security solution blocked execution before the malware could complete its installation.

Legitimate Exchange maintenance workflows rarely write web-accessible script files through the IIS worker process.

Bitdefender 2026-05-13

Yes, the attacker must be authenticated.

Microsoft Security Response Center 2022-09-30
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationcvesentitiesevidenceheadlineregionssourcessourcing_notesummarytagstechniquestitlepriority

Bitdefender presents Azerbaijan's expanded gas exports to 13 European countries as context that does not establish motive, and attributes the intrusion with moderate-to-high confidence to FamousSparrow as likely affiliated with the Chinese APT ecosystem (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13); no source states a motive of Chinese state actors. Prior reporting placed the cluster against telecoms, government and technology targets, and Bitdefender cites toolset and tradecraft overlap with Earth Estries rather than shared infrastructure (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The sideload is what Bitdefender calls an evolved technique: its loader closely matches a Deed RAT loader Trend Micro documented for Earth Estries, and no source calls the Hamachi host new for the cluster or the binary signed (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

The second wave's TernDoor installation was blocked by the security product before it completed, and TernDoor is Bitdefender's assessment from recovered memory pages (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The re-entries came through the same still-vulnerable Exchange server, and Bitdefender's lesson is patching plus rotation of compromised credentials; no surviving web shell or scheduled task is reported, no source describes cumulative updates rolling back fixes, and the persisted loader sat in a path mimicking the legitimate Hamachi install directory, so a hunt that trusts that path misses it (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Microsoft's advisory says ProxyNotShell requires an authenticated attacker (MSRC, CVE-2022-41082), while Bitdefender describes it as unauthenticated.

threat14 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Deep dive1

Source distribution

  • msrc.microsoft.com2 (33%)
  • bitdefender.com1 (17%)
  • cisa.gov1 (17%)
  • microsoft.github.io1 (17%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (17%)