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NOTABLECVE-2022-41040 +1exploitedupdatedNATOB2threatdeep dive · other

FamousSparrow's three-wave intrusion at an Azerbaijani oil and gas company: repeated ProxyNotShell access, Deed RAT behind a two-export LogMeIn Hamachi sideload, and a blocked TernDoor attempt

China-nexus FamousSparrow re-entered an Azerbaijani energy firm three times through the same unpatched Exchange server

Analysis

Background. Bitdefender tracked an intrusion at an Azerbaijani oil and gas company from late December 2025 to late February 2026 and attributes it with moderate-to-high confidence to FamousSparrow, citing substantial overlap with the Earth Estries toolset and tradecraft; earlier public reporting placed the cluster against telecoms, government and technology targets in the United States, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and South Africa, and this is the first public link to energy targets in the South Caucasus (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Bitdefender sets the targeting against Azerbaijan's larger role in European gas supply, now reaching 13 European countries, but states that this context does not establish motive (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The Hacker News notes that FamousSparrow is also tracked as UAT-9244 and overlaps with Earth Estries and Salt Typhoon (The Hacker News, 2026-05-13).

Initial access, three times. On 2025-12-25 the Exchange IIS worker process w3wp.exe, with MSExchangePowerShellAppPool on its command line, tried to write a web shell into a publicly accessible directory, which Bitdefender reads as ProxyNotShell exploitation; more web-shell writes followed on 12-26 and 12-29, alongside attempts to execute commands through the same process (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Bitdefender calls ProxyNotShell (CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082) usable by unauthenticated attackers (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13), whereas Microsoft's advisory for CVE-2022-41082 says the attacker must be authenticated and scores both flaws with low privileges required, 8.8 and 8.0 (MSRC, CVE-2022-41040; MSRC, CVE-2022-41082). Microsoft released fixes on 2022-11-08 (MSRC, CVE-2022-41082), and CISA has listed both as known exploited since 2022-09-30 (CISA KEV catalog, 2022-09-30). After remediation removed malware from at least one system, the attackers came back to the same still-vulnerable Exchange server about a month later, and again at the end of February (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Wave 1: Deed RAT behind a two-export sideload. The legitimate LogMeIn Hamachi binary LMIGuardianSvc.exe, first run from C:\TEMP, sideloaded a malicious loader and was then installed under a path chosen to mimic the legitimate Hamachi install directory, with a service named LogMeIn Hamachi starting it at boot (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The loader's Init export changes memory protection on StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW and patches its entry point; when the host later calls ComMain and its normal service start-up reaches that API, execution diverts into the loader, which restores the original bytes, decrypts the AES-128-CBC payload and runs shellcode that resolves APIs by hash, RC4-decrypts and LZNT1-decompresses the Deed RAT orchestrator (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13); a sandbox that runs the DLL on its own or invokes a single export sees the malware largely inactive (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Deed RAT's configuration names system processes such as SearchIndexer.exe and taskhost.exe as injection targets and a registry key under the Hamachi name for configuration and plugin storage, and it talks HTTPS to domains impersonating security vendors (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Bitdefender calls the technique an evolved DLL sideload and finds the loader closely matches one Trend Micro documented for Earth Estries, with the same exports and hook-and-restore flow (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Lateral movement. From the first host the attackers opened an RDP session to a second server with a domain administrator account, launched PowerShell, and within minutes the Hamachi-based Deed RAT files appeared there; from that host atexec and smbexec-style utilities consistent with Impacket spread it to a third machine (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Wave 2: TernDoor, blocked. About a month after the first wave, a renamed copy of the legitimate deskband_injector64.exe in a ProgramData subdirectory tried to sideload a malicious winmm.dll; the security product blocked execution before installation completed, and registry artefacts showed an attempt to create a kernel-driver service (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). From recovered memory pages Bitdefender identifies a Mofu loader chain and assesses the partially recovered payload as TernDoor (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Wave 3. At the end of February the attackers deployed Deed RAT again through the same chain with a modified configuration, the components moved to C:\Recovery and new injection targets (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Triage: legitimate Exchange maintenance rarely writes web-accessible script files through the IIS worker process, and legitimate applications rarely patch system API entry points, which signed system components or documented security tools do when they must (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

Cited evidence

This context does not establish motive. We have N=1 victim and moderate-to-high attribution confidence.

the attackers returned to the same vulnerable Exchange server nearly a month after the initial compromise attempt

The attempt was unsuccessful, as the security solution blocked execution before the malware could complete its installation.

Legitimate Exchange maintenance workflows rarely write web-accessible script files through the IIS worker process.

Bitdefender 2026-05-13

Yes, the attacker must be authenticated.

Microsoft Security Response Center 2022-09-30

Updates1

Correction

Bitdefender presents Azerbaijan's expanded gas exports to 13 European countries as context that does not establish motive, and attributes the intrusion with moderate-to-high confidence to FamousSparrow as likely affiliated with the Chinese APT ecosystem (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13); no source states a motive of Chinese state actors. Prior reporting placed the cluster against telecoms, government and technology targets, and Bitdefender cites toolset and tradecraft overlap with Earth Estries rather than shared infrastructure (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The sideload is what Bitdefender calls an evolved technique: its loader closely matches a Deed RAT loader Trend Micro documented for Earth Estries, and no source calls the Hamachi host new for the cluster or the binary signed (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13).

The second wave's TernDoor installation was blocked by the security product before it completed, and TernDoor is Bitdefender's assessment from recovered memory pages (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). The re-entries came through the same still-vulnerable Exchange server, and Bitdefender's lesson is patching plus rotation of compromised credentials; no surviving web shell or scheduled task is reported, no source describes cumulative updates rolling back fixes, and the persisted loader sat in a path mimicking the legitimate Hamachi install directory, so a hunt that trusts that path misses it (Bitdefender, 2026-05-13). Microsoft's advisory says ProxyNotShell requires an authenticated attacker (MSRC, CVE-2022-41082), while Bitdefender describes it as unauthenticated.

Sources6

Revision history

  1. Published 2026-05-14-e05c6e6e
  2. Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit

    Bitdefender gives Azerbaijan's European gas role as context that does not establish motive and attributes the intrusion to the China-nexus FamousSparrow cluster with moderate-to-high confidence, not to Chinese state actors as fact. The sideload is an evolved technique closely matching a Deed RAT loader Trend Micro documented for Earth Estries, the second wave's TernDoor installation was blocked before it completed, and the re-entries came through the same still-vulnerable Exchange server rather than through surviving persistence. Microsoft says ProxyNotShell requires authentication, while Bitdefender calls it unauthenticated.

    Changed: affected_products body classification cves entities evidence headline regions sources sourcing_note summary tags techniques title priority

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