CTIPilot
AI-generated · no human review · verify critical claims against the linked source. how it works →

Cereal

malware · malware:cereal single-source

Modular .NET toolset for compromised Microsoft Exchange servers: CerealNeuron answers commands on paths imitating Outlook Web Access, Autodiscover and ActiveSync, CerealBox is injected into EdgeTransport.exe to wrap transport agents and collect mail; ESET attributes it to Turla with high confidence (ESET, 2026-11-10).

Aliases: CerealNeuron, CerealBox

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-11 → last 2026-11-11
Latest activity
2026-11-11
ESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange server as C2 and wraps transport agents to collect mail
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: europe, russia-cis
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Cereal, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every internet-facing Exchange server, compare ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll in C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\ and the Microsoft.Exchange .ni.dll files in the .NET native image cache with the Microsoft originals and list the non-Microsoft assemblies loaded into EdgeTransport.exe, because ESET places the Cereal loader at those locations and Get-TransportAgent shows nothing new.
    2026-11-11ESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange…

Defender insights

What each entry about Cereal tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-11NOTABLEESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange server as C2 and wraps transport agents to collect mail

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

used by

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-11Turla's Cereal toolset turns a compromised on-premises Exchange server into the command channel and mail collector at Kazakh and Romanian government bodies, with no attacker infrastructure and no new transport agent registered (ESET)
    active-threatsESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange server as C2 and wraps transport agents to collect mail
ATT&CK techniques (18 across 9 tactics)

18 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionWindows Management Instrumentation · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceServer Software Component: Transport Agent
  • Privilege EscalationProcess Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL · Reflective Code Loading
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets
  • DiscoveryPermission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · Account Discovery: Domain Account
  • CollectionEmail Collection: Remote Email Collection · Automated Collection · Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution TA0002

T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1505.002Server Software Component: Transport Agent×1

Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails. Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection×1

Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027.009Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads×1

Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection×1

Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.004OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets×1

Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1114.002Email Collection: Remote Email Collection×1

Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1119Automated Collection×1

Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1560.002Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library×1

An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile, libzip, and zlib. Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Cereal (1)

2026-11-11 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Turla's Cereal toolset turns a compromised on-premises Exchange server into the command channel and mail collector at Kazakh and Romanian government bodies, with no attacker infrastructure and no new transport agent registered (ESET)

ESET found a previously undocumented .NET toolset, Cereal, on a Kazakh government organisation's Exchange server on 2025-11-28 and, after tuning its detections, on a Romanian government organisation's Exchange server compromised from 2025-12-23; in Romania the mail-collection module was configured to identify messages to or from NATO and EU institutional addresses (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). ESET attributes Cereal to Turla with high confidence, on the concurrent use of another component publicly linked to Turla and conceptual similarity to older Turla malware, and could not determine the initial access method, although it considers a vulnerability exploit possible because the servers are reachable from the internet (ESET Research, 2026-11-10).

The command channel is the victim's own Exchange server. CerealNeuron runs on the compromised server and passively waits for requests on web paths made to look like Outlook Web Access, Autodiscover and ActiveSync traffic; a correctly encrypted request is treated as a command and a bad one gets a normal-looking Exchange error page, and ESET found no operator-controlled server and could not identify ingress addresses (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). CerealHermit is a network-less variant that reads encrypted command files from disk, and each task runs as a small .NET assembly inside a CerealRunner (mailbox retrieval, Active Directory and WMI queries, LSA secrets extraction, file operations) (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). CerealLoader, the only component written to disk in recognisable .NET form, abuses .NET VTable fixups so native code runs before managed code and is placed where trusted processes load it: the System32 wbem directory (ncobjapi.dll, wbemcomn.dll, loaded by WMI) and the .NET native image cache (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). CerealBox, injected into EdgeTransport.exe, wraps the handlers of transport agents already loaded, so "no new agent appears anywhere in Exchange's configuration"; it keeps messages with .doc, .docx or .pdf attachments that match hard-coded sender, recipient, subject or attachment-name lists and stages them compressed and encrypted on disk for exfiltration through CerealNeuron (ESET Research, 2026-11-10).

Triage: third-party anti-spam, data-loss-prevention and archiving products also inject into the transport service, but they are vendor-signed and appear in the transport-agent configuration, which CerealBox does not; the native image cache regenerates legitimately after .NET updates, so a changed timestamp alone is weak, while a file that does not match the Microsoft binary is the signal.

Instead – adding insult to injury – the victim’s compromised Exchange server is co-opted to act as the C&C infrastructure.

We attribute Cereal, with high confidence, to the Russia-aligned APT group Turla, based on the concurrent use of another component publicly linked to Turla and conceptual similarities to older Turla malware.

Once inside, CerealBox accesses Exchange’s internal structures, finds the existing transport agents, and wraps their handlers with malicious code.

No new agent appears anywhere in Exchange’s configuration.

it was configured to identify emails sent to, or received from, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU).

ESET Research
threat11 Nov 03:40Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • web-assets.esetstatic.com1 (50%)
  • welivesecurity.com1 (50%)